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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND TURKEY
by
Bilal Ciplak
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor
The dissertation documented the degree of Turkey’s involvement in the promotion
of democracy in the Arab Middle East (ME). Initially, I investigated why and under what
conditions Turkey promotes democracy in the ME, and then I explained strategies through
which Turkey promotes democracy in the region. I applied the neo-classical realist
theoretical framework and a mixed methodology in the research, and I provided evidence
from two sources: face-to-face interviews with the Turkish and foreign officials and
common citizens, and the statistical data from institutions, such as the OECD, Turkish
Statistical Institute, and World Bank.
My research indicates that Turkey promotes democracy through seven channels.
These channels are official development assistance (ODA), mentoring, demonstrative
effect, normative pressure, conditionality, military power, enlargement, and civil society
organizations. Turkey promotes democracy in the ME for three substantial reasons: first,
to advance its security and economic interests; second, to improve the political, social, and
economic conditions of people living in the region; and third, to create long-term regional
stability, crucial for cooperation in economic and security realms.
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I attempted to engage in debates with two distinct, but interrelated fields of
comparative politics and international relations. My most important contribution to the
field is that I documented Turkey’s case of democracy promotion regarding the degree of
Turkey’s involvement in this endeavor, its strategies, specificities, and effectiveness in the
region. I also contribute to the field as I explained the difference between democracy
promotion policies of a regional power, such as Turkey, and global powers, such as the
US. I further engaged in discussions that illuminate some aspects of the interplay between
the identity and strategic interests in states’ foreign policy decisions.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER

PAGE

CHAPTER I: SIGNIFICANCE, THEORY, & METHODOLOGY....................................1
Context of the Study ................................................................................................1
Research Question ...................................................................................................4
Significance of the Study .........................................................................................4
Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................6
Identity .....................................................................................................................9
Methodology and Data Sources .............................................................................17
The Plan of the Dissertation ...................................................................................21
CHAPTER II: DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE EMERGENCE OF TURKEY AS A
POWER HOUSE UNDER THE AKP GOVERNMENT......................................22
Democratization During the Ottoman Empire .......................................................24
The Establishment of the Modern Turkish Republic .............................................26
The AKP Era ..........................................................................................................31
The First Phase: Liberal Democracy......................................................................32
The Second Phase: Conservative Democracy........................................................39
The Third Phase: Increased Authoritarianism .......................................................41
The Gezi Park Protests ...........................................................................................45
The 17 December 2013 Corruption Scandal ..........................................................48
CHAPTER III: TURKEY, THE WEST, AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION ..............55
The American Democracy Promotion after 9-11...................................................56
The US’ Interests in Turkish Model ......................................................................64
Turkey’s Reactions to the American Democracy Promotion in the ME ...............67
Initial Talks between Turkey and the US ..............................................................67
Turkey’s Response to the BMENA Initiative ........................................................72
Turkey’s Response to the Backtracking of the US ................................................75
Turkey’s Reaction to the US Interests in the Turkish Model ................................77
The EU’s Impact on Turkey’s Democracy Promotion ..........................................80
The EU and the BMENA Initiative .......................................................................80
The EU’s Influence over Turkey ...........................................................................82
The EU and Institutionalization of Democratic Norms in Turkey ........................82
Turkey’s Learning from the Regionalization in the West .....................................84
The EU’s Impact on the Turkish CSOs .................................................................85
The EU’s Impact on Turkey’s Soft Power .............................................................86
The Arab Spring ....................................................................................................88
CHAPTER IV: TURKEY’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
TURKEY’S APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER .......................................97
Problematizing the Promotion of Democracy......................................................101
Survival ................................................................................................................106

ix

A-Iraq ...................................................................................................................107
B-Syria .................................................................................................................114
Economic Interests ...............................................................................................119
Libya ....................................................................................................................124
Strategic Alliances with Like-Minded Governments ..........................................130
CHAPTER V: STRATEGIES (1): TURKEY’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
THROUGH OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) ...................138
Official Institutions and the Provision of ODA ...................................................140
Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Detail .............................................143
Turkish ODA and Democratization in the BMENA Region ...............................153
The Country-Based Distribution of ODA in the BMENA Region ......................155
The Other BMENA Countries .............................................................................163
Turkey’s Official Humanitarian Aid (OHA) .......................................................164
CHAPTER VI: STRATEGIES (2): TURKISH DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
THROUGH MENTORING, DEMONSTRATIVE EFFECT, AND
NORMATIVE PRESSURE .................................................................................170
1- Mentoring ........................................................................................................170
2- Demonstrative Effect .......................................................................................179
3- Normative Pressure..........................................................................................181
4- Conditionality ..................................................................................................183
5- Peace Building .................................................................................................184
6- Enlargement .....................................................................................................184
CHAPTER VII: STRATEGIES (3): TURKISH DEMOCRACY PROMOTION BY
THE TURKISH CIVIL SOCIETY ......................................................................186
1- TESEV .............................................................................................................189
2- Gulen Community ...........................................................................................190
3- MAZLUMDER ...............................................................................................193
4- Doctors Worldwide..........................................................................................194
Dependent or Independent ...................................................................................195
The CSO’s Strengths and Limitations .................................................................198
CHAPTER VIII: THE LIMITATIONS, STRENGTHS, AND SPECIFICITIES OF
TURKEY’S DEMOCRATIC ACTIVISM IN THE ME .....................................202
BMENA’s Perception of Democracy and the Turkish Role ................................202
The Effectiveness of the Turkish Democracy Promotion ....................................208
The Specificities of the Turkish Democracy Promotion......................................214
The Type of Democracy Turkey Promotes in the ME .........................................217
CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION ......................................................................................221
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................233

x

VITA ................................................................................................................................247

xi

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE

PAGE

1. Cleavages in Modern Turkish Politics Rooted in its Foundation .................................28
2. Turkey’s Socio-Economic Development.......................................................................31
3. Political Parties and Voters’ Profile on the basis of Voters’ Self-definition ................34
4. Turkey’s Economic Indicators.....................................................................................120
5. Turkish-Middle Eastern Trade Relations 1999-2012 .................................................121
6. Turkey's Development and Humanitarian Assistance ................................................152
7. TDA Components for 2012…………….....................................................................152
8. Total Amount of Turkish ODA by Regions, 2003-2012, in Million USD....…….….154
9. Turkey's ODA to the BMENA Countries for 2003-2012 in USD Million…..............156
10. Turkish Official OHA to the Syrian Guests in Eight Major Cities, in USD
Million……..……………………………………………………………………….161
11. OHA and ODA in Million USD 2001-2011…………..............................................166
12. The Number of Tourists from the BMENA to Turkey…..........................................180
13. Turkish Humanitarian Assistance by CSOs between 2009 and 2012 Million
USD………………………………………………………………………..……….188
14. Continuing Desire for Democracy……….................................................................203
15. People Think That Turkey Favors Democracy in the ME.........................................204
16. The Number of Tourists from the BMENA to Turkey..............................................204
17. Turkey’s Role in the ME...........................................................................................205
18. Institutional Infrastructure of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry.........................210

xii

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADK

Kemalist Thought Association

AFAD

Disaster and Emergency Management Office

AKP

Justice and Development Party

ATV

National TV Channel

BBC

British Broadcasting Corporation

BDP

Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party

BMENA

Broader Middle East and North Africa

CNN

Cable News Network

CSOs

Civil Society Organizations

DAD

Democracy Assistance Dialog

DI

Direct Investment

DP

Democracy Promotion

DTP

Democratic Left Part

DUP

Democratic Union Part

EEC

European Economic Commission

EU

European Union

FAM

Foreign Affairs Minister

FDI

Foreign Direct Investment

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

Hamas

Islamic Resistance Movement

HLSCC

High Level Strategic Cooperation Council

HRITC

Human Rights Information and Training Centre

xiii

HSCC

High Level Strategic Cooperation Council

ID

Identification

IHH

Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian
Relief

IOs

International Organizations

IR

International Relations

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

KRG

Kurdish Regional Government

LDC

Least Developed Countries

MAZLUMDER

Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed
People

ME

Middle East

MGK

National Security Council

MHP

Nationalist Movement Party

MIT

Turkey’s National Intelligence Service

MKYK

Central Decision Making and Implementation Unit

MP

Member of Parliament

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDI

National Democratic Institutes

NED

National Endowment for Democracy

NGO

Non-governmental Organization

NPWJ

No Peace without Justice

ODA

Official Development Assistance

OECD

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

xiv

OHA

Turkey’s Official Humanitarian Aid

OIC

Organization of Islamic Cooperation

OOF

Other Official Flows

ORSAM

Center for the Middle Eastern Strategic Studies

OSCE

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PKK

Kurdish Workers’ Party

PM

Prime Minister

SETA

Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research

SGIR

Standing Group on International Relations

TBMM

Turkish Parliament Statistics

TDA

Total Development Aid

TESEV

Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation

TIKA

Turkish International Development Agency

TNOC

Turkish National Observers Committee

TOBB

Union of Turkish Chambers of Commerce

TOKI

Turkey’s Official Construction Development Agency

TRT

Turkey’s official TV channel

TUBITAK

Research Council of Turkey

TUMSIAD

Whole Industrialists and Businessmen Association

TUSKON

Turkey’s Industrialists and Businessmen Confederation

TUSIAD

Secular Economic Elite

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UK

United Kingdom

xv

UN

United Nations

US

United States

USAK

International Strategic Research Centre

USD

United States Dollar

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

xvi

CHAPTER I: SIGNIFICANCE, THEORY, & METHODOLOGY
Context of the Study
“There exists an unmistakable demand in the Middle East and in the wider Muslim
world for democratization,” proclaimed Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the very onset of his
tenure in office as Prime Minister of Turkey in January of 2003 at Harvard’s Kennedy
School of Government. (International Strategic Research Organization 2003) This
announcement heralded the nature of his government’s initial public rhetoric and the
subsequent policy toward the Middle East. The view that democracy should be ‘exported’
and supported abroad is not new. Such diverse policy makers as John F. Kennedy, William
J. Clinton, and George W. H. Bush subscribed to it and actively promoted it. Thus,
“[d]emocracy promotion has become a pervasive feature of international politics mostly
because of the highly held belief that democratic regimes offer greater human freedom,
economic prosperity, and international peace.” (Peksen 2012)
While democracy has been traditionally promoted by wealthy Western states, in the
present research I focus on Turkey, a developing country that has promoted democracy in
the Arab Middle East over the past decade. My question is why and how Turkey, under the
leadership of a political party with roots in political Islam, is counter-intuitively engaged
in promoting democracy abroad. Conventional wisdom suggests that Turkey’s current
AKP (Justice and Development Party) government should have acted to preserve stability
and the regional status quo by supporting authoritarian political regimes, not by challenging
them. To address the aforementioned questions, I have developed a theoretical framework
that combines elements from two related but distinct categories of identity and strategic
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interests. The research has implications both for diverse sets of policy makers and
academics. In Chapter I, I develop my research question, show its significance, and
describe the theoretical framework and methodology in greater details.
In contrast to many expectations, during the AKP’s (Justice and Development
Party) rule, Turkey has emerged as a promoter of democracy in the Middle East (ME). In
2004, Turkey became a co-chair of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD) along with
Italy and Yemen within the framework of the Broader Middle East and North African
(BMENA) Initiative. (Bagci and Sinkaya 2006) BMENA initiative sets up a platform to
discuss and promote democracy in the Middle East. (Bagci and Sinkaya 2006) Although
participation in this initiative marked Turkey’s emergence as a promoter of democracy and
human rights, Turkey’s effort to promote democracy precedes the AKP government.
Initially, Turkey started advocating Turkish minority rights in Bulgaria, Greece, and Iraq
since its establishment as a republic. (Ozel and Ozcan 2011) Turkey did defend Muslims’
collective and individual rights during the collapse of the former Yugoslavia even though
Ankara was involved in human rights abuse against the citizens of Kurdish descent and,
ironically, its own practicing Muslims. Thus, Turkey’s human rights activism did not
receive serious attention and, whenever it did, was largely dismissed as hypocrisy. (Ozel
and Ozcan 2011)
Turkey started to develop a more balanced approach to the promotion of human
rights and democracy in its foreign policy after the AKP came to power. (Ozel and Ozcan
2011) The AKP has been involved in democratization both in domestic and in international
spheres simultaneously. (Kirisci 2012) The AKP’s support for democracy and human
rights has become more vocal since the beginning of the Arab Spring. (Kirisci 2012) The
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AKP has been involved in a number of initiatives and projects that aim to advance human
rights, good governance, and open market economies, in the Arab Middle East, during its
tenure in office.
The AKP’s decision to promote democracy raises many significant questions. For
example, what motivates the AKP to promote democracy? How does the outside influence
coming from the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) impact the way the
AKP promotes democracy? Richard Morningstar, in Promoting Democracy and the Rule
of Law: American and European Strategies, argues that “the critical point from the policymaking standpoint is that democracy and democracy promotion are multi-faceted concepts
that are difficult to define and often difficult to agree on.” (Morningstar 2009) As different
actors might have different understandings of democracy, it is particularly important to
question the AKP’s conception of democracy and the kind of democracy the AKP promotes
in the Arab Middle East. Therefore, the concern is whether the AKP promotes a liberal
democracy as it is understood in the West or a different type of democracy, distinct from
the Western conception of democracy.
I utilized a flexible theoretical framework to answer the aforementioned questions.
Also, I employed a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. The numerical
data was obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute, World-Bank, OECD, TIKA, and
United Nations’ web sources. Semi-structured interviews with the Turkish deputies were
also incorporated into the present research. Official and unofficial interviews with CSO
representatives, common citizens, and societal leaders were also incorporated into the
research. All these issues are further discussed in the following sections.
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Research Question
In this dissertation, I examined the question of why and how Turkey promotes
democracy in the Arab Middle East (ME), or to put it in a larger context, what are the
reasons that make Turkey behave the way it does in the ME since the AKP came to power?
To answer this question, the dissertation explored the reasons and conditions under which
Turkey promotes democracy. To be more specific, does the AKP support democratization
in the Arab Middle East for normative reasons or to advance national interests? Moreover,
I further examined the type of strategies and tools the AKP utilizes to promote democracy
in the region, such as coercion, diplomacy, and development aid. Most importantly, this
dissertation documented the strategies and initiatives through which Turkey supports
democratization in the ME. On a wider level, I intended to provide an assessment that
speaks to the leading debates in international and comparative politics about why, how,
and under what circumstances states promote democratization.
Significance of the Study
This research hopes to affect the terms of scholarly debates in the field of
international relations and comparative politics for at least three reasons. First of all,
democracy promotion is generally discussed from the perspective of the major powers.
Democracy promotion literature often examines the US and the EU’s democracy
promotion agendas. Scholars have been conducting research on the role non-governmental
organizations (CSOs), international organizations (IOs), and civil society organizations
(CSOs) play in promoting democracy in other states. (Peksen and Comer 2012)
Nevertheless, research on the role of regional powers, such as Turkey and Brazil, in
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promoting democracy is very limited. Consequently, researching Turkey’s democracy
promotion will significantly contribute to our understanding of how a regional power
differs from a global power in its promotion of democracy abroad.
In addition to Turkey’s regional power status, Turkey’s Muslim identity makes it
an interesting case for research on democracy promotion. Democratization literature often
argues that non-Western cultures are incompatible with democratic values, because of their
emphasis on the hierarchical societal order in such cultures, which are believed to
undermine individual freedoms. (Huntington 1993) Islam as an Eastern religion, then, is
described as irreconcilable with democracy. Nevertheless, the case of Turkey demonstrates
that democracy is promoted by the AKP, which is deeply rooted in political Islam, and
promoted by a wide range of Islamic CSOs aligned with the AKP. Democracy promotion
by Islamic political and social groups is a new development that needs a fresh examination
and a nuanced explanation. Thus, the research will contribute to the newly emerging
literature on Turkey’s support for the democratization in the Arab ME. The present
research will also help us understand the nature and degree of Turkey’s impact on the
transitioning Arab states.
Thirdly, Turkey is still a transitional democracy and an ongoing target of
democracy promotion from the US and the EU. As discussed earlier, democracy promotion
is often being debated from the perspectives of the US and Europe. These states are
wealthy, consolidated democracies. (Kirisci 2012) Turkey’s democracy, on the other hand,
is yet to be consolidated. In fact, the AKP promotes democracy both in Turkey and in the
Middle East simultaneously. Moreover, my research tries to uncover the relationship
between the Western democracy promotion in Turkey (target identity of Turkey) and
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Turkish democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East (donor identity of Turkey). In other
words, I will attempt to explain whether there is a connection between Turkey’s donor and
target (of democracy promotion) identities, and whether Turkey has learned anything from
its experiences with its Western donors. Therefore, I attempt to make a theoretical
contribution to our understanding of the link between target experiences and donor
experiences of a promoter state.
Theoretical Framework
The present research follows a top-down conception of the state similar to that of
neo-classical realists1. (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009) In this conceptualization,
states are represented by the national security executive, including the head of government,
ministers, and officials responsible for making foreign policy decisions. The chief
executive has access to privileged information about the international constraints, as well
as domestic issues from the responsible state institutions. Therefore, he is well-positioned
to frame issues of national interest. (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009) Although the
executive is potentially autonomous from the society, the institutional arrangements force
her/him to engage with the societal actors, such as economic institutions, representatives,
political parties, and the societal leaders. (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009) The
perceptions, norms, and values of the leader also influence his/her behaviors. (Rose 1998)

1

For more information about neo-classical realism, see Gideon Rose. Neoclassical Realism and Theories of
Foreign Policy. World Politics, 51: 1, 144-172, 1998; Randall L. Schweller. US Democracy Promotion:
Realist Reflections, in: Cox et al. 41-62, 2000; William C. Wohlforth. Realism and foreign policy, in:
Smith, Steve Hadfield, Amelia Dunne, Tim (eds.), Foreign Policy. Theories Actors Cases, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 31-48, 2008.
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To contextualize the propositions of neo-classical realism for Turkey, Turkey’s
democracy promotion policy is being carried out by the AKP government with deep roots
in political Islam. In Turkey, the head of the government, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, is also the national security executive.2 He makes foreign policy decisions
with his ministers (Ahmet Davutoglu being the most important), advisors, and experts from
relevant state institutions.3 The key AKP members are devoted Muslims. Therefore, their
ideas and values influence their policy priorities and foreign policy decisions. In fact, it is
not a coincidence that the Turkish state started to engage more assertively with the ME, a
region with predominantly Muslim population, during the AKP administration.
In addition, the leader formulates the national interest by conducting a risk
assessment calculation. He has to take into consideration the state’s relative power
capabilities and goals vis-à-vis the other states’ power capabilities and intentions.
However, the leader also needs to take into consideration domestic factors, such as public
opinion, as well as the domestic constraints that may limit or circumscribe his agenda.
(Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009) In the process of foreign policy formulation,
institutions – such as the MIT (Turkey’s National Intelligence Service), Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and Ministry of Domestic Affairs – provide the PM and his foreign policy circle
with privileged information to which the ordinary people do not have access. In Turkey,
during the AKP rule, the substantial domestic factors impacting Turkish foreign policy
have been the Kurdish separatist movement (the PKK), the Kemalist status quo, and public

2

The Turkish President has a more symbolic role in the Turkish political system. However, compared to
the other European parliamentarian systems, Turkish president has more power.
3

I make this claim on the basis of my interviews with a number of deputies.

7

opinion. The most significant external factors are the influence of the United States and the
EU over Turkey’s decision makers.
Finally, the national security executive needs to calculate the power capabilities of
his/her state to advance a foreign policy goal. There are various power instruments
available to states. These are soft power, hard power, and structural power instruments.4
Soft power refers to “the ability to get others to want what you want.” (Nye 2007) The
power of attraction, persuasion, credibility, and carrots (incentives) and sticks (coercion)
are important soft power tools. (Nye 2007) For example, Turkey’s democratization in the
last 12 years is strongly being influenced by the carrots and sticks of the EU membership.
On the other hand, hard power is “the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would
not do.” (Dahl 1957) Hard power has two components: military power (more important)
and economic power (less so). States, including Turkey, have sometimes employed hard
power to promote democracy abroad, such as in Japan and Libya. Finally, structural power
is the institution-building capacity of states, determined largely by economic factors.5
While the soft and hard powers are important in terms of the promotion and the spread of
the democratic values and institutions, the structural power arguments are especially
helpful in explaining the effectiveness of Turkey’s democracy promotion policy in the
target states. It is necessary to acknowledge the aforementioned approaches of power to

4

For a detailed analysis of Turkey’s power, see Osman Bahadir Dincer and Mustafa Kutluay. Turkey’s
Power Capacity in the Middle East: Limits of the Possible, An Empirical Analysis. International Strategic
Research Organization, USAK Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, USAK Report No: 12-04,
June 2012.
5

For structural power arguments, see Susan Strange, “An Eclectic Approach”, in Craig N. Murphy and
Roger Tooze (eds.), The New International Political Economy, Lynne Publishers, Boulder, 1991, p. 34.
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have a meaningful understanding of why Turkey does what it does and how much influence
Turkey has in the rapidly changing ME. (Kutluay and Dincer 2012)
In this dissertation, neoclassical realists give us a sense of context in which to
explain the democracy promotion policy of Turkey. However, Turkey’s identity will enable
us to better understand the specific articulation of Turkey’s foreign policy choices. In the
following section, I will broadly explain the interplay between the Turkish identity and
strategic interests.
Identity
The AKP conceptualizes Turkey as a “regional power” in the ME. However, before
going further in my analysis, I would like to briefly introduce the concept of regional
power. I define a region as a cluster of states that share a substantial amount of
commonalities with each other. An example of regional power is a major state that has the
capacity to generate substantial change in that region. As global powers also have interests
in that region, changes in the distribution of power at the regional level have global
implications. In this regard, Turkey, as a regional power, needs to take the interests and
policies of the global powers, such as the US, into consideration while engaging with the
ME. In fact, this research indicates that the US has a great influence on the calculation of
Turkey’s foreign policy goals.
However, there are several factors that determine whether or not a state is effective
in wielding power within a particular region. Firstly, regional power needs to have a role-
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conception6 towards the region. This role conception is the regional power’s vision of the
region. Secondly, the global powers have to be aware of the state endorsing itself as a
regional power. Thirdly, there should be a certain level of acceptance of the regional power
role of the state that endorses itself as such. Fourthly, a regional power needs to have the
power capabilities to realize its goals, such as military, economic, and institution building
capacity. (Thompson 1973) Turkey, as the second largest NATO army, 16th biggest
economy globally, and 6th biggest market in the EU, has a population of 75 million.7
Therefore, with these credentials, Turkey can play a regional power role in the ME.
Turkey’s historical relationship as the heir of the Ottomans with its neighbors also
strengthens its position as a regional power.
There are different explanations for why states promote democracy abroad.
According to some scholars, states promote democracy to serve their security8 and
economic9 interests; according to other scholars, democracy promotion is a result of the

6

For the impact of states’ role conceptions on their foreign behaviors, see, for example, Kalevi J. Holsti.
National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 14: 3, 233-309,
1970.
7

For a detailed analysis of Turkey’s power, see “Osman Bahadir Dincer and Mustafa Kutluay. Turkey’s
Power Capacity in the Middle East: Limits of the Possible, An Empirical Analysis. International Strategic
Research Organization, USAK Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, USAK Report No: 12-04,
June 2012.”
8

See, for example, Randall L. Schweller, US Democracy Promotion: Realist Reflections, in: Cox et al. 4162, 2000.

9

For more information about the relationship between states’ commercial interests and democracy and their
foreign policies, see Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics, in International Organization, 51: 4, 513-553, 1997; Robert Gilpin, (War and Change in the World
Politics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998) as a realist from the political economy field assigns
a greater importance to economic power than the traditional realists, such as Hans J. Morgenthau (Politics
among Nations, Alfred A. Knop, New York, 1962).
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projection of states’ democratic identity in the international arena.10 However, another
group of scholars argues that states promote democracy for a combination of strategic and
normative reasons. According to the third group, well-established democracies have both
a normative claim to and a genuine strategic interest in promoting democracy.11
I find the liberal approach, which is the third argument, the most appealing for the
Turkish case. However, the liberal approach needs to be put in its proper context. Similar
to Olsen, I argue that states could have both normative and strategic goals in promoting
democracy. However, when their strategic interests are threatened, their concerns for
strategic interests prevail over their normative goals.12 From the liberal perspective,
advanced democracies initially promote democracy to serve their own security and
economic interests. Secondly, states promote democracy, as it serves the collective interest
of the international society by paving the way for mutually beneficial economic and
security cooperation. Finally, states promote democracy, as it also serves the interests of
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the recipient societies, such as the protection of human rights, fostering social development,
economic growth, and domestic political stability.13 (Czempiel 1996)
Turkey as a regional power has a mixture of normative and strategic motivations
for promoting democracy in the ME. The AKP, which perceives Turkey as a regional
power,14 promotes democracy in the ME for three significant reasons: firstly, the AKP
promotes democracy to advance Turkey’s security, strengthen its strategic alliances with
elected, like-minded Islamist governments, and protect its economic interests in the ME.
Secondly, Turkey promotes democracy, as the AKP thinks that democratization in the
region will foster mutually beneficial economic (open market) and security cooperation. In
this regard, stability is crucial for sustainable economic and political relations between the
neighboring countries. Thirdly, the AKP thinks that democratization in the ME will foster
positive social change, such as diminishing inequalities between genders and races; will
increase economic development by fostering intra-regional trade; will rise the human
capital necessary for the functioning of the system; protecting human rights which is the
precondition of domestic political stability; and will lead to the enforcement of a clear rule
of law which is important both for the protection of human rights and economic activities
of the Turkish investors.
However, regardless of whether states promote democracy for their ideals or not,
when their substantial interests are threatened, their concerns for their strategic interests
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prevail over their ideals.15 The reason behind this is that promoting democratization is “a
complex and conflict-ridden process of political change.”16 (Wolff and Wurm 2011) In this
process, “(potential) rewards do not come quickly, while costs are immediate.”17 (Wolff
and Wurm 2011) To provide an example, “whenever the ideal of democracy clashed with
the US national security objective of containing communism during the Cold War, for
example, both Democratic and Republican administrations were willing to downplay the
authoritarian shortcomings of a variety of US allies, such as Ferdinand Marcos of the
Philippines, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, in favor
of their strong support for US anticommunist policies.”18 (Schraeder 2003)
Similarly, Turkey has been faced with substantial challenges that have threatened
its security, alliances, and economic interests while promoting democracy in the ME. When
this happens, Turkey tries to find a middle way not to backtrack from promoting democracy
and scarify its strategic interests. However, when the developments starts to threaten the
Turkish strategic interests, then Turkey makes the best use of available foreign policy tools,
such as military and diplomacy, to eliminate the threats. In such times, Turkey’s democracy
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promotion gains a highly strategic orientation.19 For example, Turkey’s support for
democratization in Syria and Libya in the process of the Arab Spring, and in Iraq after the
occupation of the US in 2003 is a good example of this case.
Another important question concerns how states promote democracy. There are a
number of tools available to the states when promoting democracy. These are diplomacy,
foreign aid, political conditionalities, economic sanctions, covert intervention (such as
coup d’états and psychological warfare), paramilitary intervention (such as funding a
guerilla organization), and finally military intervention. (Schraeder 2003) The examination
of the last twelve years of the AKP rule indicates that Turkey prefers to rely on noncoercive ways of democracy promotion, such as foreign aid, diplomacy, and mentoring.
However, when Turkey’s strategic interests are threatened, Turkey makes use of military
tools as well.
When the AKP started to promote democracy in the ME, it stressed a multilateral,
consistent, internally driven, and long term process of change. Turkey as a regional power,
which based its policies towards the ME on the notion of regional ownership, did not want
to see the occurrence of radical developments, such as foreign interventions, which could
destabilize the whole ME for the purpose of promoting democracy. Nevertheless, Turkey
was compelled to deviate from the aforementioned principles in the process of the Arab
Spring. Initially, when the Arab Spring arrived to Libya, Turkey was being engulfed into a
limited military intervention as a NATO member state. Next, when the conflict in Syria
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started to threaten the Turkish security interests, Turkey provided assistance to the Syrian
rebels and refugees in a number of ways, such as humanitarian aid, intelligence, and
weaponry. In both cases, Turkey’s military support was reluctant.
However, an important question is that although Turkey has major strategic
interests in other parts of the world, such as the Central Asia, the Balkans, and Iran, why
does Turkey, under the AKP rule, promote democracy in the ME? I argue that the identity
of Turkey’s policy makers influence the articulation of their foreign policy priorities. For
example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey under the nationalist conservative
government rule (Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party) prioritized Central Asian Turkish
Republics in its foreign policy. Similarly, Turkey under the AKP rule, which has deep roots
in political Islam and which assigns a “regional power role”20 to Turkey in the region,
promotes democracy in the Arab ME.
Furthermore, examining the AKP’s relations with the groups in the Arab ME, it is
seen that Justice and Freedom Party of Egypt, Justice and Construction Party of Tunisia,
Hamas in Palestine, and Justice and Development Party of Libya come out as important
partners of the AKP. This brings up the question, why does the AKP establish firm relations
with the Muslim Brotherhood, but not other groups? The reason is that the AKP’s
willingness alone is not enough; that is to say, the attitudes of the corresponding groups
towards the AKP matter just as much. In this regard, strong partnership requires the consent
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of both sides. Despite some divergences, both the AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood share
similar ideas and goals regarding the Muslim world. (Fuller, 2014) Therefore, the
ideological similarities that the AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood share facilitate the
formation of strong ties between them.
To sum up, in the present research, identity refers to the norms, perceptions, and
values of the AKP government. The AKP perceives Turkey as a regional power, which is
connected to the ME by common geography, culture, religion, and history. The AKP also
comes from the Islamist (political Islam) tradition. The AKP’s roots in political Islam
influences its choice of groups with which the AKP forms alliances, and the tools the AKP
utilizes to promote democracy in the ME. In this dissertation, Turkey’s strategic interests
refer to its survival (territorial integrity), alliances, and economic interests in the ME.
This research conceptualizes the impact of identity and strategic interests on
Turkey’s democracy promotion policy as: Promotion of Democracy = Security/Economic
Interests × Identity, where the multiplicative term represents the interactive impact of these
two factors. However, the impact of identity on states’ foreign policies is not constant. The
identity might have more influence at times, and less influence at some other times. In this
regard, when states’ immediate security risks are not present, their identities influence their
behaviors more. However, when they face a security threat, their identities matter less.
In the research, my main goal is to document Turkey’s democracy promotion case
in the Arab ME. Therefore, the non-Arab states will not be included in my analysis.
However, I will sometimes mention Turkey’s engagement with non-Arab states to better
contextualize the Turkish democracy promotion in the Arab ME.
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Methodology and Data Sources
My research explores why and how Turkey promotes democracy in the ME. In
order to answer these questions, I employed the neo-classical realist framework, asserting
that in order to understand a particular foreign policy choice, a researcher needs to take
into consideration domestic and international contexts in which that foreign policy decision
is formulated. In addition, the neo-classical realists attract attention to the role of identity
of the national security executive when formulating foreign policy decisions. Therefore, in
the dissertation, I first examined the domestic and international contexts in which the AKP
formulated its democracy promotion policy. Secondly, I explained how the AKP’s
perception of Turkey as a regional power and its roots in political Islam influenced the
specific articulation of its democracy promotion policy.
In order to explain why and how Turkey promotes democracy in the ME, I
employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. In my dissertation, I
advanced my thesis of Turkey’s democracy promotion in the Arab ME through the
examination of a number of its strategic interests, such as economy, security, and alliance
formation, which are directly related to regional stability in the ME. The impact of
Turkey’s economic interests on its democracy promotion policy was easy to quantify: I
employed statistical data that indicated changes in Turkey’s GDP per capita, export to the
ME, import from the ME, FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), and changes in Turkey’s trade
volume with the ME between 2002 and 2012. I easily found statistical data on these
variables from official sources, such as the OECD’s and Turkish Statistical Institute’s
webpages.
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However, it was not always possible to explain Turkey’s democracy promotion
solely on the basis of numerical data. For example, in the fourth chapter, in order to uncover
the relationship between Turkey’s core strategic interests in the ME and its democracy
promotion policy, I needed to explain why the AKP leaders thought that the developments
in Iraq, after the US occupation, and Syria, in the process of the Arab Spring, undermined
Turkey’s national security. Furthermore, while Turkey’s foreign aid to the elected political
parties connected to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia provided me with
numerical data to support my thesis, which asserted that the AKP backed political parties
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in the process of the Arab Spring, the statistics
did not explain why the AKP supported the Muslim Brotherhood over other groups in the
Arab ME. In such situations, my elite interviews and secondary sources substantially
helped me to fill the gaps.
In line with this mixed approach, King, Keohane and Verba argues that “in the same
research project, some data may be collected that is amenable to statistical analysis, while
other significantly important information is not.” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994) In light
of this view, I tried to address my research question in the best possible way, without
discriminating among the type of data – numerical or qualitative.
One way that I explained how the AKP formulated its democracy promotion policy
was by examining domestic and international contexts (Chapter II and III) in which the
AKP formulated this policy. I utilized a process tracing technique in these two chapters.
However, process tracing does not mean the exclusion of the numbers from the empirical
analysis. Collier argues that the goal of process tracing, which is generally used while
conducting qualitative research, is to take advantage of numerical analysis if it helps
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discover causal mechanisms between the dependent and the independent variables.
Therefore, I used both direct quotes from my elite interviews, secondary sources, and
numerical data to explain the process in which the AKP formulated its democracy
promotion policy by examining the AKP’s interaction with systemic and domestic actors
simultaneously.
Before explaining my data sources, I would like to elaborate further on process
tracing technique. Collier defines process tracing as: “process tracing examines diagnostic
pieces of evidence—often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or
phenomena—with the goal of achieving and refining causal inference.” (Collier 2011)
George and McKeown further argue: “the process-tracing approach attempts to uncover
what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to
arrive at decisions; the actual behavior that then occurs; the effect of various institutional
arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variables of
interest on attention, processing, and behavior.” (George and McKeown 1985)
In this dissertation, semi-structured elite interviews occupy an important place. I
conducted semi-structured, face-to-face interviews between Summer 2012 and Spring
2014. My interviewees included opinion leaders, TIKA experts, ordinary people, MPs,
diplomatic personnel, and CSO leaders. The interviews took place in Ankara, Istanbul,
Gaziantep, Hatay, Miami, and Fort Lauderdale. Although most of the interviewees were
from Turkey, I had the chance to talk to high ranking representatives from the US, Syria,
Kosovo, Yemen, and Egypt. My interviewees consisted of both males and females above
18 years of age. As I indicated previously, most of the interviewees are in leading positions
in their countries. However, I also had the chance to talk to the common citizens in Turkey.
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Because of cultural reasons specific to Turkey, I had to conduct unofficial interviews
sometimes.21 I focused on four sets of questions during my interviews. The first set
concerned the interviewees’ perception of Turkey; the second set of questions concerned
the interviewees’ perception of the ME; the third set of questions was related to the
interviewees’ opinion of the role Turkey could play in the ME. The fourth set of questions
measured

the

interviewees’

perception

of

democracy,

democracy

promotion,

authoritarianism, and regime change in the ME.
The other sources of data for my qualitative analysis are the official web-archives
of the Turkish state institutions, such as the Turkish Parliament and ministries, media, and
secondary sources, such as empirical books and articles. Often, my interviews were not
adequate for developing a cohesive argument. In such situations, I had to resort to either
statistical data or secondary sources.
The statistical data in this chapter is gathered from the web-sources of United
Nations, World Bank, various Turkish ministries, Turkish Statistical Institute, OECD
(Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development), Global Humanitarian
Assistance, TIKA (Turkey’s Development and Cooperation Agency) Development
Reports, and several public opinion research conducted by SETA (Foundation for Political,
Economic, and Social Research).
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In Turkey, high ranking officials were highly skeptical of me as a researcher for recording their voices.
This skepticism also prevented them from speaking freely. Therefore, in many instances, in order to
understand what was happening in the field, I kept the conversation informal. This way, my interviewees
were much willing to reveal their real opinions.
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The Plan of the Dissertation
My dissertation consists of nine chapters, the first and the last being the introduction
and conclusion. The second chapter examines the domestic context in which the AKP
started to promote democracy in the Arab ME. The domestic context entails Turkey’s
economic and political transformations under the AKP government.
In the third chapter, I examine how Turkey’s relations with the West influenced its
democracy promotion policy in the ME. I also explain the influences of the US and the EU
on Turkey’s democracy promotion policy.
In the fourth chapter, I explain Turkey’s economic and security interests and
Turkey’s alliances in the context of Turkey’s democracy promotion in the ME.
Furthermore, I examine the conditions under which Turkey applies military power to
defend its substantial strategic interests in the region. This chapter is a hybrid chapter in
the sense that it explains one of the important tools of democracy promotion, Turkey’s
military power, and Turkey’s motivations for promoting democracy in the ME.
In the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters, I document Turkey’s strategies of
democracy promotion in the ME. The fifth chapter examines Turkey’s democracy
promotion through Turkey’s Official Development Assistance (ODA). The sixth chapter
explains Turkey’s democracy promotion through mentoring, normative pressure,
demonstrative effect, conditionality, peace building, and enlargement. Finally, the seventh
chapter focuses on the involvement of the Turkish civil society in Turkey’s democracy
promotion in the ME.
The eighth chapter examines the limitations, strengths, and the specificities of
Turkey’s democracy promotion.
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CHAPTER II: DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE EMERGENCE OF TURKEY AS A
POWERHOUSE IN THE REGION UNDER THE AKP GOVERNMENT
Neo-classical realism argues that statesmen make decisions by taking into
consideration both domestic and international incentives and constraints. (Lobell, Ripsman
and Taliaferro 2009) Therefore, the relevant domestic and external factors that impact the
decisions of statesmen need to be taken into account while explaining states’ foreign
policies. 22 In this chapter, I examine the domestic factors which have affected the AKP’s
democracy promotion policy broadly. Furthermore, I argue that Turkey’s transformation
into a more open society and economic powerhouse has provided the AKP with favorable
conditions to exert Turkey’s regional power role more forcefully in the ME.
This chapter explains the transformation of Turkey into a more confident
democratic state under the AKP rule. When the AKP came to power in 2002, it was
constrained by political (the Turkish military and the Republican People’s Party),
economic (poverty and high inflation rate), and security problems (the PKK). Therefore,
the AKP was not able to act independently.
However, the AKP successfully changed the conditions in its own favor by 2007.
The AKP managed to retain the support of the Turkish masses and the West. As a result,
threats originating from the Kemalist status quo against elected political parties were being
eliminated. The most important step taken in this regard was the establishment of the
civilian control over the Turkish military. Also, by 2007, Turkey emerged as an economic
powerhouse and a more open society. In this new environment, the AKP started to
22
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formulate more independent foreign policy decisions. This resulted in Turkey’s selfendorsement as a regional power in the ME more assertively. Although the Arab Spring,
Gezi Park protests and the 17 December 2013 corruption scandal challenged the AKP’s
authority, the AKP remains to be the most powerful party in Turkey. (Fuller 2014) In this
chapter, I explain the process of this intricate domestic change through which Turkey has
emerged as a powerful state that aspires to lead the ME.
In this dissertation, my goal is to explain how and why Turkey promotes democracy
in the ME. However, without understanding the aforementioned domestic political and
economic transformations, as a result of which Turkey emerged as a powerhouse, it is
impossible to fully comprehend Turkey’s democratic activism in the ME. Turkey did
promote democracy before the Arab Spring. However, its promotion remained within the
normative framework until 2007. Nevertheless, after the subordination of its political
rivals, and Turkey’s accumulation of substantial wealth, the AKP started to promote
democracy more forcefully in the ME.
Turkey projected the power that it accumulated under the AKP rule particularly in
the course of the Arab Spring by providing the Arab Spring countries and the protestors
with foreign aid and military support. Interestingly, since 2004 Turkey’s democracy
promotion has gained a more strategic orientation, reaching its peak in the process of the
Arab Spring. In this chapter, I explain the process of Turkey’s economic and political
transformation under the AKP rule in detail. However, before explaining the AKP’s
impact, initially I would like to provide some preliminary information about the history of
democratization in Turkey dating back to its Ottoman roots.
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Democratization during the Ottoman Empire
Turkey’s first democratization attempts are often traced back to November 3, 1839,
which was the date of the Ottoman Empire’s Tanzimat Declaration, which, for a time,
transformed the empire into a constitutional monarchy.23 The main reasons for the reform
were to stop the separatist groups motivated by nationalist movements, to prevent the
outside intervention of the European powers in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire,
and to retain Western support in international issues. (Ozkan 2012)
The reformation process was deepened by Islahat Declaration in 1856.24 The
declaration improved minority rights, and further restricted the Sultan’s authority. (Ozkan
2012) By the late 1800s, Russia had increased its support for the Slavic Balkan nations
(which were still a part of the Ottoman Empire), and supported their separatist goals. As a
result, the Ottoman Empire decided to share the power with the Ottoman citizens in order
to prevent the partition of the Empire, resulting in the Mesrutiyet Declaration in 1876. By
the Mesrutiyet declaration, the citizens of the Ottoman Empire, including Christians, were
granted representation in the Ottoman Parliament. However, the parliament would only be
responsible to the Sultan and function only as an advisory body. (Ozkan 2012)
However, these reform movements did not produce the desired outcomes. As a
result of nationalist movements, the Christian minorities in the Balkans, supported by the
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European powers, separated from the Empire. Eventually, the Young Turks, a group of
well-organized and western educated Turkish intellectuals, revolted against the Ottoman
Empire in 1908. (Ozkan 2012) The revolt resulted in the redistribution of power among the
Ottoman’s political institutions. For instance, the responsibility for governing shifted from
the Sultan to the parliament. However, these reforms were also short-lived due to the
participation of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, followed by the War of
Turkish Independence, which resulted in the establishment of the Modern Turkish
Republic.
Certainly, the reform process in the Empire was triggered by the desire to prevent
the external intervention in domestic affairs. (Cansu 2006) Another reason was to stop
separatist movements of the Christian populations, such as Greeks, Serbians, and
Bulgarians. (Gumus 2008) However, it also led to lively debates among influential
Ottoman elites, such as scholars and governors, regarding the concept of democracy and
its compatibility with Islam. There were three main lines of thinking: the first group argued
that The Quran commanded that the ruler should be consulted before making decisions,
and non-Muslims along with the Muslims could serve in such an advisory institution. The
second group suggested that Islam only allowed the representation of Muslims in such an
institution since non-Muslims could not be trusted. The last group declared that the nation
was not mature enough to adapt a system that considered representation. (Tekin 2000) Most
importantly, the idea of democracy was associated with freedoms and consultation, and
faced with no significant opposition.
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The Establishment of the Modern Turkish Republic
In 1923, the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Republic of Turkey was founded
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. It was established on four core values:
secularism, democracy, Turkishness, and Sunni-Islam. (Ergil 2000) Within this context,
three groups were given minority status, Armenians, Jews, and Greeks. (Grigoriadis 2006)
Although there were substantial ethnic and sectarian minorities among Muslims, their
differences were not recognized by the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic. The
foundation of the Turkish nation would be Islam. In 1920, when Ataturk opened the first
national assembly of Turkish Republic, he reiterated that “the national assembly did not
consist of Turks, Cerkes, Kurds, or Lazs, but instead consisted of Islam, that included all
these components.”25 Paradoxically, as Ataturk was building a strictly secular state, he tried
to consolidate national unity defined by religion. The institutionalization of Sunni Islam as
the state religion has caused tensions among Sunni-Alevi and secular-religious citizens of
Turkey ever since.
The problem, however, was that the young Turkish state expected the Muslim
minorities to meld within the Muslim (Sunni)-Turkish identity. (Yegen 1999) Therefore,
the pillars on which the Turkish nation was being built also produced the cleavages around
which the parties and the voters would organize. For example, the distinguishing principle
among the Turkish political parties has been their religious-secular orientations (such as
AKP vs. CHP), as well as their ethnic-national identities (such as BDP vs. MHP). Both
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religious and nationalist parties are considered to be on the right wing in the Turkish
context; whereas the secular and ethnic parties are considered to be rather on the left wing.
The Turkish state remained as a one party system until 1946; nevertheless, it was
compelled by the domestic and international developments to introduce the multi-party
system. (Akcapar, et al. 2004) On the domestic front, Turkey had to answer its citizens’
demands for a political system established on pluralistic representation. On the
international level, Turkey had to fulfill NATO’s membership criteria by transitioning to a
multiparty system, which would serve the main goal of Kemalism—westernization of the
country. However, beginning from 1960, Turkey’s democratization process was
interrupted by the military several times.
Table 1. Cleavages in Turkish Politics Rooted in its Foundation

Cleavages in Modern Turkish Politics, Rooted in its
Foundation
Turkish Identity
Sunni Identity

Kurdish Identity
Versus

Alawi Identity
Demand for Religious
Tolerance

Strict Secularism

The May 27, 1960 military coup resulted in constitutional changes that introduced
liberal political reforms as well as proportional representation. (Esmer 2002) According to
Duverger, representation determined by “single member plurality district” produces a twoparty system, while “the double ballot majority system” and proportional representation
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produces a multiparty system.26 (Duverger 1972) The reconfiguration of the Turkish
election system on the basis of proportional representation produced multiple competing
groups, such as Islamists, nationalists, and leftists in the political arena. (Grigoriadis 2006)
From that moment on, the Turkish political system has rarely experienced a single party
government in power. (Esmer 2002)
The constitution adopted after the 1980 military coup brought some political
restrictions. For instance, it introduced a 10% national threshold to reduce the number of
political parties to a more manageable level. (Özbudun 2000) Three other articles had a
substantial impact on the way the Turkish society organized itself politically. Article 33
prohibited associations from pursuing any kind of political goals, including, but not
restricted to engaging in political activities, receiving support from political parties, and
cooperating with public organizations and foundations. Article 81 prohibited the formation
and operation of political parties defined by ethnic, racial, or religious lines. Article 58
prohibited the use of any other languages except Turkish for political campaigning. Finally,
the 1980 constitution also banned the use of Kurdish names. As a consequence, the Kurdish
village names were replaced by the Turkish ones.27
However, according to Martin Lipset, countries with political parties organized
around deep cleavages have healthy democratic systems, (Lipset 2000) and as suggested
by Moshe Maor, in Europe, cleavages emerged as a result of the national (French) and
industrial (British) revolutions. (Maor 1997) Contrary to Lipset and Moar, the ground for
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Turkey’s constitution which was introduced after the 1980 military coup.
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democracy in Turkey was unlike those in France and Britain. In Turkey, parties are
organized around secular (left)-religious (right) and ethnic (left)-national (right) lines as a
result of the definition of Turkey’s core values which were Turkishness, Sunni Islam, and
secularism. Turkish military elites prohibited parties to organize around religious and
ethnic lines, as exemplified in the 1980 constitution. (Tachau 2002) As a result, the existing
deep cleavages within the society were exacerbated.
The 1980 constitution, which restricted political rights and freedoms and
introduced neo-liberal economic policies, had a complex impact on Turkish political life.
Modernization indicators, such as urbanization, literacy and GDP rates dramatically
increased (See Table 2). As a result, Turkey’s middle class grew substantially. Groups,
emerging around the already existing cleavages, faced political restrictions in 1980s. Thus,
while religious groups had to go underground, leftist Kurdish groups started to launch
attacks against Turkish armed forces. Despite political openings and economic
development, the leftist Kurdish groups still continue their militant struggles. There has
been a deep divide between the Kurdish and Turkish nationalists and the secular and
religious groups in Turkey.
In the early 1990s, Turkey went through a political liberalization process once
again. Political and cultural rights of the minority groups were improved. The educational
levels of individuals significantly increased. The introduction of liberal economic policies
produced new economically powerful classes in Turkey, such as the conservative
bourgeoisie. (Taspinar 2012) In this process, globalization trends, the EU membership
process, advancements in mass communication and economic and educational
developments have greatly contributed to the formation of a pluralistic society in Turkey.
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However, this era is also marked by the political instabilities caused by the coalition
governments, resulting in mismanagement of economic, political, and social problems.
(Coskun 2003)
Table 2. Turkey’s Socio-Economic Development
GDP %
Capita

Urbanization

Literacy rates

1980

43%

65%

$1.56

1990

53%

79%

$2.78

2000

64%

86%

$4.19

2013

72%

94%

$15.30

Year

*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute
In 2001, Turkey experienced a severe economic crisis, triggered by a political crisis
under the Democratic Left Party (the DTP) rule. Inflation rates dramatically increased. For
example, in 1994, inflation rates went up to 120.21%, and remained around 70% until 2000.
In 2002, when the AKP came to power, inflation rates decreased to 29.75%. In 2012, it
was measured as 7.40%. (Worldwide Inflation Data 2014) In the 1990s, Turkey could
hardly find an international institution to borrow from. Those that did stipulated high
interest rates.28 Also, unemployment rates increased in this period. Furthermore, Istanbul
was hit by a major earthquake in 1999, resulting in over 60,000 casualties and the
destruction of massive cities like Istanbul and Balikesir. The casualties associated with the
violent activities of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) exceeded 30,000. (Teymur and
Smith 2008) The Turkish status-quo did not know how to deal with problems of this
magnitude. The Kemalist establishment (military, Republican People Party (the CHP), and
28

For example, Public Debt Management Report (April 2003), prepared by the Turkish Treasury, indicates
that between 1992 and 1999, the average interest rates in Turkey was 32 %.
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their allies in the other sectors of the society) continued to remain the de facto power.
However, people started to lose their faith in the secular Kemalist elite. (Cagaptay 2011)
All these developments also marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish politics.
The AKP Era
Under the AKP rule, Turkey went through substantial political and economic
transformations. As a result, Turkey emerged as a powerful actor in the ME. The AKP
promoted democracy similtenously inside and outside the country. However, until Arab
Spring, Turkey promoted democracy through normative chanels in the ME, and until then
Turkey’s democracy promotion policy was more idealist than realist. However, Turkey’s
support for democratization in the ME became more strategically driven in the course of
Arab Spring. Meanwhile, we witness the militarization of Turkey’s democracy promotion
in the region. It is important to realize that Turkey would not have been able to play such
an assertive role, if the Turkish military had not been taken under civilian control and if
the Turkish economy had not grown at such great extents (See Table 2).
In the following part, I will examine the AKP’s impact on Turkey’s democratic
transformation in three phases. The initial phase is characterized with the AKP’s promotion
of liberal democracy, the second phase is associated with conservative democracy and the
third phase is identitfied with authoritarianism and a deviation from universal democratic
standards. In each consequtive phase, the AKP’s democracy promotion policy gains more
strategic orientation.
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The First Phase: Liberal Democracy
As I indicated earlier, after obtaining power in the 2003 national elections, the AKP
had to deal with problems in three main areas: economy (poverty, high inflation rates,
unemployment, low growth rates, inefficient banking sector, and corruption); rights and
freedoms (minority rights, religious rights, freedom of expression and association, and the
strictly secular military that dominated the elected civilians); and security (fighting against
terrorism emanating from the PKK and reforming the security sector to subordinate
military to the civilians). The AKP’s domestic and international policies are driven by
attempts to address these three sets of issues.
Initially, the AKP needed to survive in an international and domestic environment
un-friendly to Islamic groups. On the domestic front, the AKP declared its commitment to
Turkey’s secular values and accepted westernization as the priority of its foreign policy.
The AKP tried to address the concerns for the Islamization of the country by prioritizing
the practical needs of people such as food, security, and justice in their party agenda. (Yakis
2012)
In order to survive in the crude political environment, which was unfriendly to the
Islamic political groups, in Turkey, the AKP launched a strategy which had both
international and domestic components. Internationally, the AKP took steps that reinforced
its domestic moves: the AKP started Turkey’s EU accession process negotiations, which
was initiated by the Helsinki process in 1999. The AKP declared strong interests in
cooperating with the US to solve regional problems. (Erdogan 2003) As a result, the AKP
was able to retain the support of the EU and the US. The AKP also successfully received
the support of a large portion of Turkish citizens (See Table 3). Afterwards, the AKP
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constantly increased its votes; consecutively, from 36% to 42%, from 42% to 47%, and
from that to 50% in the following elections and referenda, which indicated people’s support
of the AKP. (Yakis 2012)
Table 3. Political Parties and Voters’ Profile on the basis of Voters’ Self-definition

The Political Parties

The AKP

The Voters Profile on the basis of Voters’ Self-Definition
Religious (42%), Conservative (34%), Nationalist (35.7%), and Kemalist
(24.3%) (A lower middle class party; a lower economic and educational
status comparing to the RP)

The RP

Kemalist (85%), Social Democrat (42.6%), nationalist (28.9%), Democrat
(26.3%) (An upper class party; the highest economic and educational
status)

The MHP

Nationalist (84.3%), Kemalist (52.9%), Religious (23.5%), Conservative
(18.6%)

The DTP

No idea (36.2%), Democrat (34%), Religious (14.9 %), Nationalist (10%)
(Very low educational and economic status)

* This table is drawn on the basis of A&G (2008) Public Opinion Poll.

The EU’s impact on Turkey’s Democratization during the AKP Rule
The AKP passed a series of harmonization packages to bring Turkey closer to the
EU. Freedom of expression was extended; freedom of religion, association, assembly, and
press were improved. Furthermore, the death penalty was removed from the penal code
and the right to a free trial was improved. Some other improvements were made regarding
the equality of the sexes, making the closure of political parties by the constitutional court
more difficult, civil-military relations, and cultural and lingual rights. (Park 2012) For
instance, the MGK (National Security Council), which was previously dominated by the
Military, was assigned a civilian chair, and its function was reduced to an advisory
institution. (Park 2012) The MGK used to be an institution over which the military
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exercised control over the civilian authorities. Its reorganization on the basis of democratic
principles helped civilian authorities to have greater control over the military. Moreover,
restrictions on Kurdish language and cultural rights were removed. Moreover, a TV
channel broadcasting in Kurdish, TRT6, was established for the first time, and restrictions
over the associations, which were introduced by the 1980 constitution, were removed. (Park
2012)
Consequently, the EU accession process had a significant impact over
democratization of Turkey under the AKP rule. Furthermore, the democratization reforms
that were carried out in the AKP’s initial term were liberal in nature. However, this would
slowly change towards conservative reforms after the AKP’s second electoral victory.
Before explaining the second term of the AKP rule, I would like to introduce the impact of
the US on domestic politics of Turkey under the AKP rule.
Eliminating the domestic threats with the support from the US
The AKP’s initial support for Turkey’s democratization was a matter of its survival
given the domestic and international constraints at the time. (Casier, Jongerden and Walker
2013) At home, constraints included demands for greater rights and freedoms, security
problems stemming from the PKK, and economic problems. Whichever of these was to be
dealt with, the AKP had to either obtain the approval of the military or had to confront its
objections. As it had been recorded before, almost all the previously elected governments
were able to deal with such issues as much as and in the way that was permitted by the
Military. Indeed, a party like the AKP, which has roots in political Islam, had to be extra
cautious about the military, which disliked the Islamic political groups.
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Needless to say, the international political conditions were both fruitful for
objectives of the AKP and the USA. The USA was after the idea of promoting democracy
in the ME so as to prevent the spread of radicalism.29 Also, the AKP was after exerting its
conservative democratic ideals in an environment where the biggest opponent was thought
to be the Military. The new US approach to the ME led the US to support the election of a
moderate party with deep roots in Turkish political Islam. (Aydogan 2012) An important
element of the US’ BMENA (Broader Middle East and North Africa) project required the
inclusion of Islamist groups in the political system to moderate them. (Dalacoura 2010)
Turkey presented a fertile ground for the implementation of the BMENA project. (Aydogan
2012) The AKP transformed into a pro-western democratic party. Therefore, the US helped
the AKP obtain power. However, this does not mean that there were negotiations and direct
US assistance to bring the AKP to power. The US just adopted a supportive attitude
towards the AKP before and after it was being elected. Nursel Aydogan, the BDP MP,
reiterated that:
The US wanted to redesign the ME on the basis of its BMENA
project, which was being discussed before the AKP obtained
power in Turkey. BMENA requires the establishment of the
moderate Islam in the region. In this regard, the US helped the
moderate Islamists, the AKP, obtain power in Turkey… The
actor that helped the AKP obtain power is also the actor that is

29

For further details, see Dalacoura, US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion in the Middle East:
Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Recommendations, 2010; Also, see Bagci and Sinkaya, Greater Middle
East Initiative and Turkey: AK Parti’s Perspective, 2006; Furthermore, see Akcapar, Akgun, Altunisik, and
Kadioglu, The Debate on Democratization in the Broader Middle East and North Africa: A Civic
Assessment from Turkey, 2004.
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trying to redesign the ME. The US is now presenting the AKP to
the ME as the representatives of the moderate Islam. Also,
regionalization is an important component of globalization. By
bringing the AKP to power, the US also got rid of the ethnic
nationalist Ergenokon group (Turkey’s deep state). As the strong
opponent of Kurds and Arabs, Ergenekon would prevent the
regionalization in the ME. Regionalization was an important
element of the BMENA project. (Aydogan 2012)
However, the AKP still needed to prove to the US that it could become a credible
partner. The AKP’s commitments to the westernization of Turkey and to Turkey’s possible
EU membership played a crucial role in creation of an environment of trust between the
Islamic AKP and the US. Also, the AKP got involved in a number of beneficial cooperation
with the US, such as helping the US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Carol 2002) The
AKP’s cooperative attitude towards the US fostered the US idea that if the military did not
constrain the AKP, the AKP could become a much useful partner for the US. (J. Barkey
2005) Soon, the military would be taken under the civilian rule. Aydogan would suggest
that “Think about that, the AKP imprisoned the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey,
incarcerated 50 top military officials, and put the top Ergenekon leaders into the jail. And
the AKP is claiming that it did all these by itself. I do not believe in this. It is unbelievable.
I think the US provided a substantial help to the AKP in this process.” (Aydogan 2012)
The AKP’s pro-democracy, pro-secularism, and pro-neoliberalism, which combine
to generate pro-Westernism, calmed the initial concerns about its Islamist background. The
AKP’s commitment to the EU process reinforced the pro-western AKP perception of the
West. Domestically, the threats from the Kemalist establishment, which had strong ties
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with the US and Europe, was being eliminated. Then, the AKP would only be bound by
subsequent elections, rather than extralegal mechanisms, such as military coup d’états.
Furthermore, western support created advantages for the AKP in the Muslim world, since
for the first time an elected Islamist government had good ties with the West. The Western
support contributed substantially to the AKP’s pursuit of its goals in the ME.
On the other hand, the AKP balanced the secular economic elites by allying with
conservative economic groups. The emerging Anatolian—religious—bourgeois in
Gaziantep, Kayseri, Malatya, and Sivas (called Anatolian tigers) provided strong support
for the AKP. (Taspinar 2012) TUMSIAD (Whole Industrialists and Businessmen
Association) and TUSKON (Turkey’s Industrialists and Businessmen Confederation) are
two conservative major business associations that backed the AKP. Thanks to these two
establishments, the AKP reached an equilibrium with the TUSIAD (the secular economic
elite).
On the other hand, TUSIAD did not act quite in line with the BMENA project30 of
the US that aimed to democratize the ME. As reported by an American diplomat, “Union
of Turkish Chambers of Commerce (TOBB) with which Sak is affiliated, has been actively
seeking to encourage trade with the Middle Eastern countries. He contrasted this interest
with TUSIAD (which represents the large, Istanbul- based conglomerates) which has not
participated in fora like BMENA. Sak finds TUSIAD myopically focused on the EU,
missing the point that a Turkey with stable, developed economic ties to its Middle Eastern
neighbors is a more attractive candidate for EU membership.” (Wikileaks 2014) This might

30

See Chapter III for detailed information about the BMENA initiative.
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be one reason due to which the AKP obtained western support despite the opposition of
TUSIAD and other forces of the Kemalist status quo.
The AKP’s cooperative attitude with the West strengthened the AKP’s role in
domestic and international politics. The AKP reoriented itself as a promoter of human
rights, open markets, and democracy. “This ensured that the AKP gained international
legitimacy. Building coalitions internally as well as externally – with liberals at home and
the Western powers on the international stage – was a way for the AKP to gain power and
secure its hold on it.” (Ozpek 2014) However, it would be naïve not to see the AKP’s initial
idealism for promoting human rights in the region as well.
After the AKP’s second election in 2007, the domestic rivals were already
subordinated, and the trust of the western powers was already secured. By the end of the
AKP’s first term in office in 2007, Turkey had already reached substantial levels of
economic development, and had transformed into a more open society. Therefore, the AKP
was able to formulate more independent domestic and foreign policies within this newly
emerging environment of freedom. Furthermore, the substantial growth of Turkey’s
economy would provide the AKP with capability needed to play a more assertive role in
the ME. In the following part, I will be explaining the second term of AKP in power,
associated with an environment of freedom and increased conservatism.
The Second Phase: Conservative Democracy
The second phase of the AKP rule, 2008-2011, is associated with conservative
policy initiatives. It began with victory in the parliamentary elections in July 22, 2007 and
continued in August in the presidential elections, which were won by Abdullah Gul, a key
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AKP leader. The elimination of threats from status quo forces allowed the AKP to govern
with more confidence. In July 2008, the AKP faced a closure case in the Supreme Court
on the basis of the complaint that the AKP was incrementally Islamizing the secular
Turkish state. The AKP was accused of increasingly becoming the center of anti-secular
acts, such as freeing the turban.31 (ntvmsnbc 2008) However, 5 out of 11 members of the
constitutional court voted against the closure of the AKP. As a result of the absence of the
support of a qualified majority, the case resulted in non-closure of the AKP.
The failure to close the AKP started a new era for the AKP’s political orientation.
After the closure case, there was neither a military, nor a Supreme Court threat that could
confine the AKP. The checks which once existed in the Turkish system were no longer as
big of a threat. The Republican Party had been turned into a small opposition force, and
the military had returned to its barracks. Furthermore, the AKP reorganized the
constitutional court on the basis of the Copenhagen Criteria of the EU membership. By the
2010 referendum, the closure of the political parties was banned by law. (Secim Haber
2014)
Under these new circumstances, the AKP started to enact socially conservative
policies. The AKP’s initiative for tightening up abortion procedures32 and the regulations
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Turban is a head covering made from a long piece of cloth that is wrapped around the head as defined by
the Cambridge online dictionary.
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You can find further information on abortion debate in this link http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/kurtajda10-haftayi-dusurme-calismasi/gundem/gundemdetay/30.05.2012/1546745/default.htm you can also find
The AKP’s policies concerning women from this link:
http://www.akparti.org.tr/upload/documents/Women_Of_Turkey_Steps_Of_Home.pdf
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for the sale and use of alcohol33 were the most significant conservative policy drafts. Both
of these restrictions contributed greatly to the emergence of Gezi Park protests in Summer,
2013. After Gezi Park protests, the AKP would continue to pursue conservative policies,
such as expressing interest in monitoring male-female mixed student houses.34
Although, the conservative policy drafts were few in number, when combined with
Erdogan’s ambitious conservative speeches, they managed to further alienate seculars and
liberals, as well as a small group within the conservative class considering such actions to
be harmful for Turkey’s ongoing democratic development. The fact that Gezi Park
Protestors consisted of mainly leftist, liberal, and a small group of conservatives protestors
is evident for the groups feeling strained by the AKP policies.35 According to a survey
conducted on Gezi Park protestors, only around 4% claimed that they protested for
environmentalist cause; the rest felt that their liberties were under threat. (Ozpek 2014)
This clearly indicated that Gezi Park protests symbolized the difficulties of the new
democratic Turkey that the AKP had to deal with.

33

You can find detailed information about regulating the use and sell of alcohol from this link:
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/23250986.asp
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You can listen to Recep Tayyip Erdogan regarding his opinions on male-female mixed student houses
from this Youtube video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z68UIyy_6ac
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For further Information, see http://democracyandsecurity.weebly.com/security.html; I visited the areas
Istanbul’s Gezi Park in Taxim during the demonstrations in Summer 2013. I investigated the groups that
participated in the protests by taking pictures of their signs and the name of their organizations. The
outcome indicated that there was a liberal, socialist, Marxist, and Leninist, (leftist) coalition in Gezi Park
(in Turkey religious parties are considered to be rightist and secular parties are considered as leftists). Also,
Alevis, some Leninists Kurdish groups, a small group of conservative Muslims, calling themselves anticapitalist Muslims, were also present in Gezi Park. In terms of media, the secular media, such as the
Hurriyet and the Radical, and conservative media, such as the Today’s Zaman (center right), criticized the
AKP government, and released stories more empathetic to the protestors. While the protests started as an
environmentalist cause, it turned into anti-capitalist, anti-Western, and anti-AKP demonstrations after its
initial stages.
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Furthermore, there are international consequences of the political and economic
transformation of Turkey under the AKP. For example, the US and the EU would step back
from promoting democracy in the ME when the Islamic groups gained power in 2005 and
2006 region-wide. (Tocci 2011) In contrast to the West, Turkey provided a robust support
to the elected Islamist parties in the region. As a result, Turkey, under the AKP,
strengthened its alliance with Islamic parties in the ME. On the other hand, the new
geopolitics that was emerging with the Arab Spring in the ME compelled the US, the EU,
and Turkey to work together more closely, at least until each actor made a cost benefit
calculation of their possible moves. Therefore, until Gezi Park movement, Turkish-US and
Turkish-EU relations continued to improve despite some set-backs. However, Gezi Park
protests initiated a new era in the Turkish-Western relations. In the following section, I will
explain how the AKP started to deviate from the universal democratic principles at home
as a result of challenges in the process of Arab Spring.
The Third Phase: Increased Authoritarianism
The third phase of the AKP rule started when the Arab Spring hit Syria and the
AKP sided with (and aided) the opposition. However, when the conflict in Syria continued
longer than the AKP expected, the AKP started to feel insecure. Yasar Yakis declared that
“In foreign policy, you never put all of [your] eggs in one basket. Turkey had bet that Assad
would fall in no time and that it would be the first to reap the rewards… The way things
stand now, if Turkey continues to insist on a Syria without Assad it will be left isolated.”
(Yakis 2014)
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There were several reasons for the AKP’s insecure feelings. Firstly, the conflicts
near Turkey’s borders caused the deaths of several Turkish citizens living in villages near
Syria, not to mention hundreds of thousands of deaths in Syria, causing a societal unrest in
Turkey. Secondly, Turkish Alawis started to indicate their wrath to over interference of the
AKP in Syria, which they found as a Sunni response to an Alawi government out of hatred
as a result of secterian differences. Thirdly, the Gezi Park protests started as an
environmentalist protests, but it turned into an anti-AKP movement later on. Six Alawi
citizens of Turkey lost their lives during the protests. The death of Alawi youths created
the fear that some hidden forces were trying to pull Turkey into the Alawi-Sunni conflict
which had already been present in the region.36
Fourthly, counter-movements against Islamists in Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia,
created substantial suspicions in Turkey. The AKP administration started to think that some
secret coalitions, consisting of domestic opposition forces in the Muslim countries and
international capital owners, collaborating with western ambassadors and media were
planning to dismantle the AKP rule.37 Fifthly, all the allies of Turkey abondened Turkey

36
Interestingly, all individuals that lost their lives during the Gezi Park Protests were of Alevi background:
Abdullah Comert, is an Alevi, and was killed in Antakya; Ethem Sarisulluk was killed in Ankara; Mehmet
Ayvalitas died in Istanbul; Mustafa Sari was killed in Adana; Irfan Tuna was killed in Ankara; Ali Ismail
Korkmaz was killed in Istanbul. http://www.haberself.com/h/1914/
37

Yenisafak, Faiz Lobisini Cildirtan Iki Rakam (Two numbers that make the interest lobby go crazy), 15
June 2013. http://yenisafak.com.tr/gundem-haber/faiz-lobisini-cildirtan-iki-rakam-16.06.2013-533055;
Ibrahim Karagul, Asil Hesaplasma Secimden Sonra (The Real confrontation is after the Elections), Yeni
Safak, 11 March 2014. http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/IbrahimKaragul/asil-hesaplasma-secimsonrasinda/50736; AKP friendly Presses, such as the Star, and the TV channels, such as the Kanal A, also
have published OPED and stories in the same line.
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in its support for a regime change in Syria,38 and these created a hostile and economically
burdensome environment for Turkey.
For many political analysts and the national and global audience, the attitude of the
AKP was quite lenient towards the abusive police and highly disappointing for the Gezi
Park protestors. Both for the analysts and the national and global audience, this signified
a new type of authoritarianism in Turkey, in the wake of Kemalist status quo.
The AKP’s authoritarianism which was actually triggered by the Syrian conflict
gained a new momentum with the Gezi Park protests. After the begining of the Syrian
conflict, the AKP increasingly based its actions on the notion that some western capital
owners, which has been called interest rates lobby by Recep T, Erdogan, and their local
accomplices39 were scheming to overthrow the AKP.40 During the AKP administration,
Turkish interests rates decreased substantially, which caused a decline in the revenue of
interest rate lobby (big banks and financial institutions), which had long enjoyed high rates
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For further information, see Abdulbari Atvan. Turkiye Suriye Krizinde Yanlizlasti (Turkey has become
lonely during the Syrian Conflict). BBC Turkce, 10 October 2013.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2013/10/131010_abdulbari_atvan_suriye_turkiye.shtml; Cumali
Onal, Erdoganin Sert Soylemleri, Turkiyeyi Ortadoguda Yanlizlastirdi (The Harsh Rhetoric of Erdogan
Pushed Turkey into Loneliness in the ME). Zaman Gazetesi, 2 February 2014.
http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_erdoganin-dis-politikadaki-sert-soylemleri-turkiyeyi-ortadogudayalnizlastirdi_2197036.html.; Nick Tattersal, Analysis: Turkey's 'worthy solitude' sidelines Erdogan in
Middle East. Reuters, 18 September 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/18/us-turkey-isolationidUSBRE98H0K620130918
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Although Erdogan included the Gulen Group and the Turkish status quo in “local accomplices” group, he
has never clarified how these groups were related to each other. I only try to explain why the AKP behaves
authoritarian since the beginning of conflict in Syria. I assert that the AKP has become more authoritarian
because of their perception of the aforementioned conspiracy.
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See John Perkins, Youtube Video, 16 February 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zi0MFZFaNM.; Suleyman Yasar. Nedir Faiz Lobisi: Erdogan Neden Lobiyi Isaret Etti (What is interest rates
lobby and why Erdogan highlighted it?). Sabah Gazetesi, 10 June 2013.
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/yasar/2013/06/10/nedir-faiz-lobisi-erdogan-niye-lobiyi-isaret-etti.
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of return and a prestigious status. (ntv-msnbc 2013) The local groups, unsatisfied with the
AKP, coalesced with the interest rates lobby according to this theory.41 From that time
onward, the AKP would read any development that challenged its authority through this
conspiracy lenses.
There were several developments that strenghtened the AKP’s stance; firstly, the
Gezi Park movements, secondly, the removal of Islamist Mursi from power by a bloody
military coup in Egypt, thirdly, the murder of the nationalist leader in Tunusia which
caused serious political turmoil and almost created a civilian coup d’état against the ruling
Islamist Al-Nahda Party, fourthly, the ongoing Syrian internal conflict, which has
detrimental impact over the societal cohesion of Turkey due to high numbers of Turkey’s
Alawi and Kurdish citizens, and finally the 17 November, 2013 corruption scandals in
which four ministers of the current ruling the AKP are involved. The AKP perceived these
developments to be the consecutive steps to remove the AKP from power, not by elections,
but by the other coercive means. Recep T. Erdogan perceives the 17 December 2013
corruption scandal in Turkey as the latest episode of a larger scenario to remove the AKP
from power. According to Recep T. Erdogan, dismantaling the AKP by operations, such
as the Gezi Park protests and the 17 December 2013 corruption scandal, was a part of
replacing political parties with Islamic traditions in power with the secular and Westernfriendlier ones region wide in the ME.
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According to John Perkins, Koc Group in Turkey called IMF in, after the Gezi Park Protests and 17
December Corruption Scandal; this means that Koc group is the Turkish branch of corporate (Perkins call it
Corporatracy) network that tries to control the world. John Perkins, Youtube Video, 16 February 2014.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zi0-MFZFaNM.
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Finally, it is important to put the AKP’s approach to democracy in the right context.
First of all, the AKP has conceptually and practically supported democratization of
Turkey.42 However, as Recep T. Erdogan suggested, there were two processes of
democratization for Turkey: introducing democratic rules and their enforcement. In
enacting rules, evidently the AKP has become highly successful in itroducing democratic
reforms, as I explaned in the section on the AKP’s liberal era. However, the implementation
phase needs time, as the AKP itself needs to learn how to act within a liberal democracy
during times of crisis. The 17 December 2013 corruption scandal that ended up with the
arbitrary dismissal of hundreds of police officers and reassignment of thousands of police
staff by governmental decree is a good example of the problems with democratic
internalization and implementation of Turkish institutions. However, Turkish civil society
that has gained substantial power, and rule of law, which has become more democratic,
under the AKP rule, could constrain some of the AKP’s anti-democratic tendencies.43
Gezi Park Protests has been an important tiping point for the AKP’s approach to
democratization in the region. These protests have created deep suspicions in the AKP
circles about the real intentions of the West in Turkey. These suspicions have deeply
impacted the AKP’s behaviors both domestically and internationally. In the following
section, I would like to explain the Gezi Park Protests in more detail.
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For further Information for the AKP’s conception of democracy, see Justice and Development Party, Ileri
Demokrasi Yolculugu (Advanced Democracy Journey): AKP Iktidarinda Turkiyenin Demokratik Degisimi
ve Gelisimi (Turkey’s Democratic Change and Development under The AKP Rule), 2002-2012. Justice and
Development Party, 2012.
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For the role of civil society in democratic consolidation, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic
Transition and Consolidation, 1996.
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The Gezi Park Protests
I believe those who have started these protests and are giving them direction/leading them
are aiming to overthrow the government and remove it from office. But the security services
and the cautious approach by the government have prevented those harbouring this aim
from achieving it. I don’t believe they will attempt to engage in such action anymore.
Former Minister of Justice Mehmet from the AKP, Ali Şahin, 2013
The rhetoric of “the internal collaborators of an international capital group” was
initially used by the AKP during the Gezi Park Protests. The protests started on May 28,
2013. That day some protestors went to the Gezi Park in Taxim, Istanbul to show their
reaction to the damage given to the green areas in the park. They installed their tents there
and waited for a night in a peaceful manner. Next day, police used water and pepper-gas
excessivelly to end the protests. When the police brutality against the protestors became
national news, many people gave a negative reaction to excessive use of force by the police
and went to the area to support the protestors. Then, people who were disturbed by the
government’s perceived authoritarian approach after 2007 national election also joined the
Gezi Park protestors.
When the protests grew, political parties and groups started to join in, either to make
their voices heard or to take advantage of the protests. Among such groups, there were the
Republican People’s Party, Turkish Socialists, Marxists, and the PKK (Kurdish Workers
Party).44 Furthermore, some Alawi groups also joined the protests because of their
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I visited Gezi Park during the advanced stages of the protests. I had interviews with several participants. I
investigated the participant groups. I photographed the signs and slogans they used to understand their
social and political backgrounds. Most of them disclosed their identities as they carried signs that indicated
the name of their associations. Some others used slogans, which could easily reveal their ideologies. My

46

disapproval of the name of a bridge (Yavuz Sultan Selim, who Alawis believed scattered
their ancestors during Otto-Persian war) to be build on the Bosphorus. Therefore, while
initially the protests had started for apparantly an environmentalist cause by a small
environmentalist group, after the over-use of force by police, the nature and the
combination of the protests changed and it turned into an anti-AKP, anti-neo-liberalist, and
anti-capitalist movement.45
The demands of the protestors ranged from liberty to Kurds, to a socialist order,
and to respect for the secular life-style. However, it was obvious that there was a leftist
coalition in the area, unsatisfied with Erdogan’s harsh rethorics as well as policies
signalling increasing authoritarianism in the country. (Ciplak 2013)
However, Erdogan defined the Gezi Park protests as an attempt by the internal
coloborators of an international socio-economic and socio-political establishment to end
the AKP rule in Turkey and to take Turkey to the bad old days. According to Erdogan,
It (Gezi Park protests) was prepared very professionally... Social
media was prepared for this, made equipped. The strongest
advertising companies of our country, certain capital groups, the
interest rate lobby, organizations on the inside and outside, hubs,
they were ready, equipped for this. (Hurriyet Daily News 2013)
For Recep T. Erdogan, the Gezi Park protestors wanted to remove the
democratically elected AKP government from power forcibly. While in Tunisia,

goal was to understand what the protestors wanted, who the protestors were, and whether they were
accurately being represented in media or not.
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You can find more information about the anatomy of Gezi Park Protests and the groups that were
involved in the protests from this link: http://democracyandsecurity.weebly.com/security.html
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addressing the Gezi Park protests, Recep T. Erdogan reiterated that “the majority dicta over
the minorities is unacceptable; however, no one should expect us to accept the minority
dicta over the majority either.” (Euractive 2013) This was an obvious indication of
Erdogan’s perception that a conspiracy was being carried out to shift power from the
majority to the minority in Turkey.
At the end of the protests, hundreds of journalists and activists were detained and
imprisoned. “By 24 June, there had been roughly 4,900 detentions in relation to the Gezi
Park protests across Turkey.” (Amnesty International 2013) In terms of media workers, in
July 22, Turkey’s Journalists Union reported that 59 journalists lost their jobs, and 34 were
detained. (Amnesty International 2013) Among them, there were very well-known
journalists, such as Yavuz Baydar (The co-founder of P24, the Platform for Independent
Media) and Can Dundar (A columnist of the Cumhuriyet Newspaper). Not to mention, the
terrorization of those who attended the protests or who supported the protestors by
providing them with materials, such as medicine and food.
Shortly after the Gezi Park Protests, this time, the AKP’s authority was challenged
by the December 17, 2013 corruption scandals. This also had detrimental effects over the
AKP. The corruption scandal reinforced the idea that some hidden forces were trying to
dismantle the elected government via undemocratic means within the AKP circles. This
idea also found wide acceptance within the Turkish society. The AKP received 45% of the
votes in March 30, 2014 local election. Therefore, it is important to give a detailed
explanation about the 17 December 2013 corruption scandal.
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The 17 December 2013 Corruption scandal
On December 17, 2013, financial crime unit of the Turkish police detained at least
52 people according to Todays Zaman. Among them, there were the sons of Interior
Minister Muammer Güler, Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan, and Environment and Urban
Planning Minister Erdoğan Bayraktar. Detainees also included Istanbul’s Fatih district
Mayor Mustafa Demir, Iranian- businessman Reza Zarrab, Turkish construction mogul Ali
Ağaoğlu, Halkbank General Manager Süleyman Aslan, Emlak Konut General Director
Murat Kurum, and many bureaucrats from the Environment and Economy ministries.
The bribe investigation was carried out by Zekeria Oz, “the prosecutor who
launched the investigations into Ergenekon, a clandestine criminal network accused of
working to overthrow the government.“ (Todays Zaman 2013) The suspects were “accused
of rigging state tenders, accepting and facilitating bribes for some major urbanization
projects, obtaining construction permits for protected areas in exchange for Money.”
(Todays Zaman 2013) This particular investigation concerned Agaoglu, the well-known
businessman, and the bureaucrats that played a role in giving the permit for the urbanization
projects on protected areas, illegal to build, and rigging state tenders. The accusations also
included “helping foreigners to obtain Turkish citizenship through falsified documents,
involvement in export fraud, forgery of documents and gold smuggling.” (Todays Zaman
2013) Investigation for this particular accusation concerned the Iranian businessman Reza
Zerrab, the interior affairs minister, and the related bureaucrats. “There are also claims that
the suspects illegally sold historic artifacts that were unearthed during excavations of the
Marmaray project, which connects Europe and Asia with a railway tube under the
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Bosphorus.” (Todays Zaman 2013) The final investigation concerned the Mayor of FatihIstanbul, and the other related bureaucrats.
One of the AKP’s central promises for coming to power was to fight against
corruption in the country. Therefore, the corruption scandal created a major unease within
the AKP as the corruption accusations could be the very reason to end the AKP rule in
Turkey. In Recep T. Erdogan’s conception, the global establishment was behind the 17
December 2013 corruption scandal: they tried to remove the AKP from power by the Gezi
Park protests, but they failed; afterwards, they tried to dismantle the AKP by the corruption
scandal. Erdogan attracted attention to the timing of the emergence of the corruption
scandal by pointing out the nearing local elections.
Recep T. Erdogan reiterated that in terms of the graft and corruption operations,
they were in the realm of justice, and it would be resolved within that realm. (Haberler
2013) However, he also attracted attention to the international aspect of the graft operation.
According to RTE, an international coalition had been built against the AKP, and some
local media and capital owners, and some groups cooperated with it as their local
collaborator.46 Recep T. Erdogan reiterated that:
Pay attention to the TVs, newspapers, and capital owners and
organizations. Pay attention to those well-known groups inside
and outside the country. They could never come together in the
past. These establishment and groups are acting together against
the government, national will, and democracy. The alliance that
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For further information, check ntvmsnbc, Erdogan: Faiz lobisinin neferi oldular (Erdogan: They
became the soldiers of interest rate lobby), 23 June 2013; John Perkins, Youtube Video, 16 February 2014.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zi0-MFZFaNM.; Suleyman Yasar. Nedir Faiz Lobisi: Erdogan Neden
Lobiyi Isaret Etti (What is interest rates lobby and why Erdogan highlighted it?). Sabah Gazetesi, 10 June
2013. http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/yasar/2013/06/10/nedir-faiz-lobisi-erdogan-niye-lobiyi-isaret-etti.
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was being established only during the military coups d’états have
again been established. (Haber 3 2013)
Furthermore, for Erdogan, the goal of this international coalition was creating chaos
by dispowering the AKP in the upcoming local election, which would result by the demise
of the AKP rule in Turkey. From this point of view, the graft probe, which involved four
AKP ministers, was perceived as a military coup-like operation orchestrated by a
cooperating group of international and domestic forces against the AKP government. The
end result of such a situation would be a chaos, as Turkey would turn back to coalition
governments, unable to govern Turkey in the present complex international environment.
(BBC Turkish 2013)
Some dirty hands cannot create chaos in my beautiful country.
No matter which organization they use, no matter which tong,
which agent, and which betrayer they use. This nation, for its
future, knows how to give the needed answer to these
international establishments. Everybody should know their
limits. These (acts) are left behind in May 27, September 12, and
February 28.47 This nation has been awakened and empowered.
No one can subdue this nation, this country. (BBC Turkish 2013)
Covered under the graft dress, completely illegal, (it is) an
extremely dirty, dark ambush. The goal of this conspiracy, which
was put forth last week, is clear: to ruin peace and stability. We
will overcome this trick played on Turkey. (The Wall Street
Journal 2013)
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These are the military coup d’états carried out in 27 May, 1960, September 12, 1980 and February 28,
1997. By mentioning these, Erdogan tried to say that the last corruption operation against the three
ministers in the government were a result of a dirty campaign carried out by a ruling international coalition.
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As during the last corruption scandal, any recent international or internal
development, which touches the AKP one way or another, has been met with serious
suspicions by its leaders, and have been responded very harshly. In this tense psychological
environment, the AKP sometimes has taken anti-democratic steps: a good example of this
anti-democratic step is the shifts and dismissals of the police chiefs and staff who were
working on the graft and bribe operation until it came to the media attention, from their
posts. From the beginning of the graft probe operations in 17 December 2013 until 23
December 2013, hundreds of police chiefs were dismissed from their posts for being a part
of the so-called gang that initiated graft probe operation and thousands of police staffs’ and
prosecutors’ work places have been shifted.
For Recep T. Erdogan, all these officers were related to Fethullah Gulen48 and acted
on the basis of his orders. Therefore, their loyalty was to Gulen rather than to the Turkish
State. In Erdogan’s conception then this was a problem for the state, as the state does not
and could not recognize any parallel authority. The end product was the dismissal of
hundreds of police officers from their positions. According to Recep T. Erdogan, the Gulen
group was in coalition with the local forces, such as Republican People’s Party, Nationalist
Movement Party, and the Peace and Democracy Party, (Haber 3 2013) and an international
interest lobby, which included some foreign mission representatives, such as American
Ambassador Frances Ricciardone, and some international capital and media owners. (The
Wall Street Journal 2013) However, Gulen did not accept the accusations, yet he pointed
out that the issue of corruption cannot be undermined by such accusations.
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Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish Imam, preacher, and Islamic scholar, as well as the leader of a major civil
society movement, is residing in Pennsylvania, the US at the present.
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In conclusion, until 1945, Turkey’s transition to a multiparty system, it was ruled
as a one party dictatorial regime. Afterwards, Turkey experienced several military coups
with an approximate frequency of one in a decade. In addition to military coups, Turkey
had to fight a war against the PKK, which caused the loss of over 30,000 lives, substantial
resources, and economic stagnation. Nevertheless, Turkish democracy has been able to
survive, and under the AKP rule, Turkey emerged as a more open society and a stronger
economy. In this regard, I have described three phases of the AKP. In the first phase, the
AKP tried to ensure its survival in the unfriendly domestic environment dominated by the
Kemalist status quo. The AKP did so by retaining a greater societal support and
strengthening its relations with the West. As a result, the AKP successfully subordinated
the military to the civilian control as a part of its broader democratization agenda.
In its second phase, which started after the 2007 presidential election, the AKP
started to engage with the ME more forcefully. Due to the subordination of the status quo
forces, the AKP started to formulate more independent foreign policy decisions. Under the
AKP rule, Turkey became the largest economy in the ME, the 6th largest in the EU zone,
and 16th largest in global level.49 The improved economic power of Turkey enabled the
AKP with capabilities to realize its regional goals. It is in the intersection of these two
developments that the AKP started to promote democracy more forcefully in the region.
In the third phase, which started with the escalation of conflict in Syria in the course
of Arab Spring, the AKP was bothered by developments in Arab Spring countries, such as
the military coup d’état in Egypt, Gezi Park protests and the 17 December corruption
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For Further information on Turkey’s economic indicators, see CIA World Facts Book
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scandals in Turkey. The AKP perceives these developments as a part of a broader global
agenda to replace the Islamic governments with secular ones region-wide, including the
AKP in Turkey. Just as in its first term in office, the AKP again feels the threat of its own
survival, and therefore, acts on the basis of the preservation of its rule in Turkey. This has
direct relation with the AKP’s democracy promotion policy in the ME. Turkey’s
democracy promotion policy in the region has become more and more strategically driven
since 2004. Under the present circumstances, particularly in Syria, Turkey’s democracy
promotion is no more than a realist endeavor. (This will be explained broadly in the
following chapters)

CHAPTER III: TURKEY, THE WEST, AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
Turkish foreign policy is guided by both our democratic values and our interests. … Turkey
has always been encouraging the administrations to address the legitimate expectations of
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their people and undertake the necessary reforms. However, now, given the home-grown
and irreversible march toward more democracy in the region, Turkey has stepped up its
efforts to support this process.
Ahmet Davutoglu, 2012
Neo-classical realism argues that statesmen make decisions by taking into
consideration both domestic and international incentives and constraints. (Lobell, Ripsman
and Taliaferro 2009) Therefore, the relevant domestic and external factors that impact the
decisions of statesmen need to be taken into account while explaining states’ foreign
policies. I explained the domestic political context in which the AKP developed its
democracy promotion policy in the previous chapter. This chapter examines the external
factors that influence Turkey’s democracy promotion.
My main argument is that the US grand strategy to fight radicalization in the
Muslim world after the 9-11 attacks is the origin of the official Turkish democracy
promotion policy in the ME. In order to fight radicalization, the US designed a two-legged
strategy: liberal interventionism in Iraq and Afghanistan and the BMENA Initiative. As a
result of the convergence of the Turkish and American Interests in the ME in the early
2000s, Turkey became an active participant of the BMENA initiative. The EU on the other
hand had an indirect impact on Turkish democracy promotion policy by transforming the
Turkish state structure into a more democratic one.
In the present chapter, I will initially explain the origins and the development of the
US approach to democratization in the ME after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. Next, I will
examine the Turkish reaction to the American approach to democratization in the ME.
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Finally, I will focus on the EU’s reaction to the US’ BMENA Initiative and the EU’s impact
on the Turkish democracy promotion policy.
In the present chapter, my goal is to explain the systemic influences on Turkey’s
democracy promotion policy. I consider the US and the EU as two relevant systemic actors
that need special attention. However, the main focus of this chapter is not the US’ and the
EU’s approaches to democracy promotion in the ME or elsewhere. As I am primarily
interested in Turkey, I will explain the US’ and the EU’s policies to the extent they help
me understand the Turkish democracy promotion policy in the ME.
The American Democracy Promotion after 9-11
In the post-cold war environment, the US and its allies emerged as the winners. The
EU, previously a common market, started to turn into a political union to further expand.
The number of democracies as well as the quality of democracy in transitional democratic
countries considerably increased. However, the Middle East was still characterized by
poverty, dictatorship, and the worst of all, lack of prospects for change. In this environment,
some groups started to resort to violence, resulting in tragedies, such as the 9-11 terrorist
attacks.
On the verge of the collapse of the Soviet Union, some prominent American
scholars as well as policy-makers debated the new challenges that awaited Western
civilization. They pointed at Islam as a major obstacle and source of conflict. For example,
Bernard Lewis’s, in his work, The Roots of Muslim Rage, which was published in the
Atlantic Monthly in 1990, argued that Muslims were being defeated in three stages.
Initially, they lost the battle to the West in the world domination, then they were defeated
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in their own countries as a result of the flow of Western ideas and culture, and finally their
authority was being challenged even in their own house by their emancipated women and
children. All these have made a confrontation between Muslims and the West inevitable.
Samuel Huntington, borrowing the concept of Clash of Civilizations from Lewis argued
that “the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological
or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and dominating source of
conflict will be cultural.” (Huntington 1993) According to Huntington, while language,
ethnicity, and traditions would matter, religion would be the main determinant of these
civilizational divisions.50 Although the claims of conflict of civilization received
substantial opposition from scholars,51 after the 9-11 terrorist attacks, such civilizational
arguments gained a new momentum. For example, New York Times declared Clash of
Civilization as the best seller shortly after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. (Kashefi 2013) The
line of thinking resembled in the Clash of Civilizations was also being reinterpreted into
popular culture by Hollywood and mass media outlets.
Huntington’s theory was a response to Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History.
Fukuyama believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the history as
no significant ideology was left to challenge the Western liberalism. Fukuyama argued that
“what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a
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For more information about the reactions to Huntington’s thesis of the Clash of Civilizations, see Pippa
Norris and Ronald Inglehart. Islam & the West: Testing the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Thesis. John F. Kenefy
School of Government, 2002. Also see Gabriele Marranci. Multiculturalism, Islam, and the Clash of
Civilizations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia. Culture and Religion 5 (1), 2004.
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particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point
of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy
as the final form of human government.” (Fukuyama 1992) To Fukuyama, the end product
would be the victory of liberal democratic values, deeply rooted in Western civilization.
However, few scholars and commentators expected that the new challenge would
actually come from radical religious groups. In 2001, the US went through the tragic 9-11
terrorist attacks. A group of extremists from the Middle East carried out suicide attacks
against World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon near Washington DC. The
results were 3000 casualties. These attacks demonstrated the magnitude of radicalization
in the ME. If the US did not provide the ME with the necessary attention, this radicalization
could threaten the American interests globally for decades to come. In this psychological
context, the American elites (politicians, scholars, and analysts) situated lack of freedom
and economic development as the root cause of terrorism and radicalism in the ME.
(Taspinar 2003) “The so-called ‘participation-moderation’ thesis - that the inclusion of
Islamists in a democratic process would encourage them to move away from extremism
and terrorism towards a more moderate interpretation of Islam – now served as a
foundation” (Dalacoura 2010) for the US policy towards the ME. Considering that the new
security challenges to the US at its own soil came from non-state actors, the idea of
democratization in the ME gained more credibility.
The 9-11 tragedy occurred at a time when the US policy circles and academics
declared that the US had attained world-wide hegemony after subordinating the Soviet
Union. (Dalacoura 2010) After the September-11 attacks, Nathalie Tocci suggested,
neoliberals and neo-conservatives would try to reconcile the tension between pessimistic,

58

as resembled by Lewis and Huntington, and optimistic views, represented by Fukuyama,
by promoting democracy through one-size-fits-all institutional design and through the
cultivation of pro-American elites in the Middle East. (Tocci 2011) Dalacoura, on the other
hand, suggested that the victory of democracy over the communist world motivated the US
to promote democratization in the ME as well, and the 9-11 tragedy enforced the view that
lack of democracy was the main cause of radicalization in the Muslim world. (Dalacoura
2010)
Within the post-9-11 ideational context, to fight radicalization, the US designed a
two-legged strategy within the framework of its Middle Eastern policy under George W.
Bush Administration in January 20, 2001. (Dalacoura 2010) Initially, the US would use
coercion to deter the states sponsoring terrorists. The obvious manifestation of this policy
was intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. By intervention, the US would also try to install
democracies in these countries. Democracy promotion by military intervention is called
liberal interventionism. The second of the two-legged strategy stressed democracy
promotion, to resolve radicalization in the Muslim world. In this new context, the US policy
circles redefined the Muslim world as the Broader Middle East and North Africa
(BMENA). The BMENA included the whole Arabic peninsula, Arabic speaking North
African states, and non-Arab states, such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
The US administration started to give the first official sign of its new approach to
the BMENA by launching the Middle East Partnership Initiative in December, 2002. The
Middle East Partnership Initiative would be followed by the 2004 BMENA Initiative in
order to address the need for democratization of the region in a well-structured and welldisciplined manner. In May 2004, the US invited the countries in the ME, members of the
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NATO, the G8, and the EU to discuss the future of the ME, on the Sea Island. The
conference was called the Broader Middle East and North African (BMENA) Initiative.
(Akcapar, et al. 2004)
The BMENA Initiative had three particular goals regarding the region. The first
one was that democratization —good governance, respect for human rights, free exchange
of ideas, and the participation of society in decision making, and the rule of law—
necessitated reforming political sphere of the states. The second goal was to promote
freedom of expression, educational opportunities for all, and gender equality in the social
sphere. The final goal of the initiative was to create jobs, promote entrepreneurship, expand
trade and investment through intra-regional trade, increase access to capital, and to provide
support for financial reform in the economic sphere. (G8 Research Group 2005) As a result,
an official document, “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Broader
Middle East and North African Region,” was released to express commitment of the G8
countries to pursue cooperation with regional governments, businessmen and civil society
in the ME to realize the goal of democratization. (BMENA Initiative 2004) However,
because of objections of the Europeans, the participants excluded Pakistan and Afghanistan
from the list of BMENA countries.
The DAD (Democracy Assistance Dialog), a project under the “Forum for the
Future,” was designed to provide a platform for the Middle Eastern scholars, politicians,
journalists, and activists to exchange opinions on political, social, and economic matters.
(Bagci and Sinkaya 2006) The DAD also aimed to facilitate dialog between the countries
in the region and CSOs, to promote women’s rights and electoral assistance in the ME.
These practices, if repeated, would turn the civil-society and government interaction into a
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routine, crucial practice for democratic reforms. Thus, panels, conferences, lectures, and
workshops were organized to discuss the ways to strengthen human rights, good
governance, and transparency in the Middle East. The participants included the Middle
Eastern and Western civil society organizations (CSOs) and government representatives.
For example, Doha, Sana, Alexandria, and Istanbul conferences in 2004 were good
practices of CSO-government opinion exchanges. The DAD program placed a special
emphasis on the improvement of the role of women in the political, economic, and social
sectors of their societies in the ME. (DAD 2005-2006)
When the BMENA Initiative caught the attention of the Middle Eastern media, it
attracted substantial criticisms from the political elites in the region. For example, AlHayat, an Arabic newspaper in the UK, revealed to its readers the Western plans to promote
democracy in the BMENA. This was followed by an outcry of the governments in the ME.
They considered Western democracy promotion as the imposition of Western values over
the Muslims and intervention of the West in the domestic affairs of the Muslim states. (G8
2004)
On the other hand, debates on the need for reform in the ME, led by the US, and
the subsequent initiatives, produced a greater space for political freedoms in the BMENA
region. For example, the Egyptian government gave greater freedoms to the activities of
the political and civil society organizations. In this context, the Kifaya movement would
organize a demonstration bringing together the Islamist and secular groups in Egypt for the
first time. (Dalacoura 2010) Furthermore, Mubarak amended Article 76 of the Egyptian
Constitution to allow multi-party presidential elections in Egypt. (Schemm 2005)
Similarly, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States decided to hold elections to form various
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councils and assemblies. (Dalacoura 2010) Although these reforms were considered to be
too little to make a meaningful change and to be acts intended to appease the US on
minimal terms, such small steps set an important cornerstone for the mobilization of people
that led to the Arab Spring afterwards. Such movements were organized as a result of
pressure from the hegemon and encouraged ordinary people to struggle for their freedoms,
and frightened the dictators in the region.
Despite such positive developments, by 2006 the US withdrew its support from
promoting democracy in the ME. The election of Hamas (the Islamic Resistance
Movement) in Palestine in January 2006, the relative success of Hezbollah in Lebanon’s
elections, the strong comeback of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’s elections winning
88 seats in the Egyptian parliament in 2005, and the election of the radical sectarian parties
in Iraq in 2005, which had ties with suicide bombers, were seen as counter-productive for
Western interests. According to the West, democratization only benefitted the Westernunfriendly groups in the ME. As a consequence, the West removed its support from the
promotion of democracy in the region. (Youngs and Wittes 2009) An official from the
Turkish foreign mission pointing at the Israeli factor reiterated that:
One of the major reasons that the US removed its support from
democratization of the ME, which left Turkey alone in this
endeavor, was the isolation of Israel in the ME and its
encirclement by the Muslim Brotherhood from Turkey to
Tunisia. The US means Israel and Israel means the US. It would
be naïve to expect the US to remain silent during a Westernunfriendly,

so

Israel-unfriendly,

geo-political

formation.

(Interview with a diplomat from Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2014)
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There were some other factors that clearly indicated the withdrawal of the US
support from promoting democracy in the ME. The first was an increased amount of aid to
the militaries in the region. (Youngs and Wittes 2009) The non-recognition of the Hamas
government by the US after the popular elections in Palestine and the provision of an
increased amount of aid to the Egyptian military were the other indicators of the US policy
change in the region. Barack Obama, during his Cairo Address after his election in 2009,
clearly accepted the US backtracking from supporting democracy under the George W.
Bush administration.
I know there has been controversy about the promotion of
democracy in recent years, and much of this controversy is
connected to the war in Iraq. So let me be clear: no system of
government can or should be imposed upon one nation by any
other. That does not lessen my commitment, however, to
governments that reflect the will of the people. (Obama 2009)
Although Obama tried to indicate the US support for democratic transformation in
the ME again, the US was still concerned about its strategic interests. Therefore, the US
would continue to work on finding a more balanced approach on the promotion of
democracy and maintaining strategic interests in the ME. (Ozel and Ozcan 2011)
The US Interest in Turkish Model
The history of Turkey’s presentation as a model by the US precedes the BMENA
Initiative. Turkey was initially presented to the post-Soviet Central Asian Republics as a
model in 1990s. In this regard, Turkey started to engage with the Central Asian Turkik
Republics politically. However, this did not create the desired impact due to Turkey’s
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domestic problems, such as economic stagnation and human rights abuses. (Ozel and
Ozcan 2011) Therefore, this initial Turkish political activism was often dismissed as
hypocrisy by the target states. (Ozel and Ozcan 2011)
Turkey had been promoted as a model by the US for a second time after the 9-11
tragedy; but this time to the Arab ME. In 2002, when the “Forum for the Future” was being
introduced, George W. Bush reiterated that “Turkey provided Muslims around the world
with a hopeful model of a modern and secular democracy.” (Peterson 2009) Also,
Condoleezza Rice stated that “Turkey represents an excellent model: a 98% Muslim
country that has a great importance as an alternative to radical Islam.” (Peterson 2009) In
2004, the US invited Turkey to become one of the co-chairs along with the US.
Similarly, Graham Fuller, in Turkey’s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities,
claimed that Turkey’s progressing democracy and accommodating political system makes
Turkey an attractive model for the Muslim world. According to Fuller, Turkey was
emerging as “a genuine model that finally offers[ed] a degree of genuine appeal to the
region.” (Fuller, 2014) Fuller argued that Turkey has recently emerged both as a Western
and Eastern power simultaneously: Turkey exercises greater sovereignty supported by its
citizens, progresses in resolving its substantial problems, such as the Kurdish issue, is more
confident in taking independent foreign policy decisions, and is more willing to engage
and solve regional problems. To Fuller, this Turkey could finally play the desired role in
the ME. (Fuller, 2014)
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On the other hand, some scholars and policymakers pointed out some features of
Turkey that could actually weaken the Turkish role in the ME. According to Taspinar52, a
Turkish role might not be accepted so readily by the religious Arab public as a result of
Turkey’s historical experience as a colonial power, its negative experience with its staunch
secularism, and its warm relations with Israel, disliked in the ME. He warned the American
policy makers to be conscious of these factors. Similarly, Steven Everts, in “An Asset but
not a Model: Turkey, the EU and the Wider Middle East,” argued that Turkey could be a
source of inspiration for the region, but could not be a model. (Everts 2004) He presented
three main reasons for that. First, historically Turkey has enjoyed strong ties with the West.
Furthermore, Turkey’s secular system guarantees the peaceful change of power between
different groups, pointing out the AKP as a case in reality. Lastly, the EU membership
accession process strengthens Turkey’s democracy. According to Everts, these three
conditions were absent in the ME. Thus, the Turkish model could not be emulated by the
wider ME. Yet Turkey could become a source of inspiration for them.
Regardless of the debates over the specificities of the Turkish model, there was a
general consensus in the US that Turkey should play an important role in the ME. However,
Turkey had to resolve some of its domestic problems to become a credible model in the
region. Therefore, the US would provide Turkey with substantial assistance in its
democratization process under the AKP. Madeline Albright (Federal News Service 2012)
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Taspinar’s article provides a good framework for understanding the role that was attributed to Turkey in
democratization of the ME, by the West. (Omer Taspinar, An Uneven Fit, the Turkish Model and the Arab
World. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brooking Institution, Analysis Paper Number 5,
2003)
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successfully summarizes what Turkey means for the US, what kind of problems it has, and
what it can do in the ME:
I think stability in the Middle East is obviously one of the big
ones, and in terms of relationships with Europe, I think issues
also on -- energy issues. They are sitting in a geographically
amazing place, in terms of various connections of pipelines,
discoveries of new fossil fuel, a variety of different aspects, and
then also, I think, on a variety of political relationships as a
country that has a Muslim majority party, I think, and a secular
one -- that it has a role to play in terms of how it operates within
the Arab Awakening. And I also think, in terms of looking at
more global outreach, I believe, that the United States is better
off if we are operating in partnership with other countries… And
in terms of the areas that are important -- of how to deal with
terrorism, how to deal with nuclear proliferation, how to deal
with that growing gap between the rich and the poor, energy and
environment -- those are all areas in which I think we can have a
good relationship with Turkey. (Federal News Service 2012)
So we think that actually, Turkey's participation with us can help
us be more effective in places like the Middle East, and the kind
of new partnership we're talking about can help Turkey be more
effective in its diplomacy so its confidence can, in some sense,
become -- it can start punching at its weight in the future. That's
the potential of the new partnership we talk about. (Federal News
Service 2012)
Obviously, Turkey occupied a prominent place in the American democracy
promotion initiatives in the region, mainly because of its identity as a pro-Western,
democratic Muslim nation. Nevertheless, in 2006, the US backtracked from promoting
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democracy in the ME. Since then they have been working on formulating a more balanced
approach between supporting democratization and advancing its strategic interests in the
region. The process of Arab Spring has made this even more difficult for the US. However,
Turkey continued to support democratization in the region. Disagreements over supporting
Islamic groups in the Arab ME have sometimes brought Turkey at loggerheads with the
US. In the following section, I will provide a detailed examination of Turkish reactions to
the American approach to democratization in the ME, during the AKP rule.
Turkey’s Reactions to the American Democracy Promotion in the ME
Initial Talks between Turkey and the US
Turkish official democracy promotion policy in the ME starts with the American
BMENA initiative. However, it is crucial to address the interaction between the US and
the Turkish officials before the BMENA initiative in order to fully comprehend the Turkish
role in the process. The AKP discussed the democratization of the ME with American
policy makers long before the 2004 BMENA meeting in Sea Island. Before coming to
power, Erdogan traveled to the US, and delivered a speech in Harvard, Kennedy School of
Government on January 30, 2003, shortly before the US intervention in Iraq on March 19,
2003. Meanwhile, Erdogan had not become the prime minister yet. As he was imprisoned
for reciting a religious poem, considered to be a threat to Turkey’s secular rule by the status
quo, his party had to make some legal changes to provide him with the legal space he
needed to become the PM. He finally became the prime minister on March 14, 2003.
Therefore, this early speech had a symbolic importance for the US as it would indicate
Erdogan’s conception of democracy, open markets, and globalization. Erdogan’s clear
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emphasis on cooperating with the West, supporting an open market economy, and
promoting democratic governance in the ME was in line with the US interests.
However, during his Harvard Address, Erdogan raised some objections over the
method of promotion of democracy in the ME. For example, Erdogan clearly declared that
democratization in the ME had to happen incrementally as an internally driven process.
Recep T. Erdogan opposed the US liberal interventionism in the region. According to
Erdogan, the West, namely the US and the EU, had the responsibility to provide a
supportive environment to the democratization of the region by only encouraging the Arab
governments to reform. By this Erdogan indicated his opposition to the imposition of
Western values over the ME. Finally, Erdogan strongly opposed the US’ one-size-fits all
approach. According to Erdogan, if these factors were taken into consideration, democracy
promotion in the Muslim world would not be perceived as a neo-crusade against Muslims.
According to Erdogan, if the process was rightly managed, the region could finally enter
the process of modernization. Erdogan argued:
I believe determined and consistent yet gradual processes will
enhance the chances of success in democratization. The
foundations of democratic transition should be laid in accordance
with a sincere and committed strategy that is supported by
various policy tools, and implemented wisely. And, the
governments in the region must be made aware that this is
necessary and thus be encouraged. (Erdogan 2003)
According to Erdogan, “democratization in the Middle East is an outcome that must
be attained.” (Erdogan 2003) Therefore, for him, the question was not whether such
democratization was possible, “but instead how to meet the yearning of the masses in the
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Middle East for democracy; in other words, how to achieve democratization in the Middle
East.” (Erdogan 2003) In Erdogan’s views, “there exists[ed] an unmistakable demand in
the Middle East and in the wider Muslim world for democratization.” (Erdogan 2003)
However, Erdogan focused attention on different historical and political conditions of the
states in the ME. For Erdogan, democracy promoters needed to take into consideration
such country-specific reasons to initiate and maintain a successful democratization process
in the region. Erdogan argued:
The purpose cannot be creating self-styled democracies, but
rather encouraging steps that are conducive to establishing
democratic rule at universal standards. Obviously, this would be
a formidable journey… I take the debate on the method of
promoting of democracy seriously. (Erdogan 2004)
Despite his strong support for the democratization of the ME, Erdogan disagreed
with the way the US approached the issue of democratization towards the region. Erdogan
believed that the US was stuck between democratization and the stability of the ME, crucial
for its interests. By this, Erdogan simply pointed out the US traditional support to the antidemocratic regimes in the ME, such as Mubarak in Egypt. Erdogan noted that
democratization emerges in a stable (not chaotic) environment. According to him
democracy and stability could go hand in hand incrementally as an internally driven
process. Erdogan pointed out,
I am aware of the thesis that the United States has long since
invested exclusively in stability and this has obviated democratic
transformation in the Middle East. The theory that expects
healthy democratization to emerge out of an environment of
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instability could not be substituted as a wholesome policy.
(Erdogan 2003)
However, Erdogan had another good reason to oppose the approach that gave
priority to stability over democratization. The US strategy that ignored the strong demand
of people in the region for democratization to keep the so-called stability created deep
suspicions towards the US involvement in the regional issues. In the people’s view, the socalled American democratization mission was only another way to exploit their resources,
reinforcing American domination in the region. (Dalacoura 2010) Erdogan suggested that
this skepticism of Western intentions has always been problematic for the Western
promotion of democracy, and more so in the ME. Furthermore, the suspicions towards the
US have fed the radical elements in the region. According to Erdogan,
A confidence problem exists on the part of the people of the
region who desire democratic rule in principle, but remain
suspicious of both the fashion with which democratization is
presented and the purposes of the democratic world. Therefore,
the observation must be explicitly made: In the Middle East and
in the Muslim world, suspicions linger concerning the objectives
of the West and notably the US. These suspicions exist both at
the level of states, and more importantly at the level of societies
and individuals. This creates a resistance in the region and feeds
radical elements and their abuse of the issue of religion. (Erdogan
2003)
The Turkish government opposed the unilateral approach of the US government in
the regional issues from the beginning. According to Ahmet Davutoglu, the current Foreign
Affairs Minister of Turkey, the problems of the ME were so complex that they could not
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be resolved without the contribution of the local actors. Therefore, Erdogan stressed the
importance of a multilateral process of decision making. Multilateralism for Turkey meant
that the governments, CSOs, and intellectuals had to participate in the democratization
process of their countries. In this regard, Turkey stressed a process of democratization
through regional ownership, gradual change, consistency, multilateralism, and Western
support without the imposition of Western values over the Muslim nations in the region.
(Akcapar, et al. 2004)
After Erdogan’s Harvard Address, Turkey promoted democracy more forcefully in
subsequent regional summits. For example, on May 12, 2003, soon after the speech of
George Bush at Bulgaria’s Bourgas Free University, Abdullah Gul, the foreign minister at
the time and the current President, invited all parties concerned with the ME to carefully
think about democratization of the region. This is known as the first Turkish attempt to
support democratization in the Middle East. (Akcapar, et al. 2004) On May 28, 2003,
during the summit of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Tehran, Gul declared
that “first we need to put our own house into order” to the Muslim leaders, pointing out the
necessity of democratic transformation in the ME. (Akcapar, et al. 2004) Also, Gul
expanded his ideas on democratic transformation of the region during a conference
organized by Economic Research Foundation (Iktisadi Arastirmalar vakfi) in Istanbul, and
during the World Economic Forum in Jordan on June 22, 2003. (Akcapar, et al. 2004)
Further, during the Istanbul Summit (June14-18, 2003), ministers of the OIC member states
discussed the need for reform in the Muslim World. As a result, it was decided that
democratic representation and implementations in the member states should be
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strengthened. For the first time, the secretary of the OIC was popularly elected, and the
member states supported the idea of domestic dialog for democratization among the
member states rather than external demand for democratization from the West. (Akcapar,
et al. 2004)
Turkey’s Response to the BMENA Initiative
When the US presented its plans to promote democracy in the BMENA region
within the context of the BMENA Initiative, Turkey fiercely supported it. Initially, there
was a convergence between Turkish and the American interests in the Middle East in
seeing a stable region, buying inexpensive energy, combatting radicalization, supporting
entrepreneurship, and promoting an environment of freedom. (Bagci and Sinkaya 2006)
Secondly, Turkey wanted to repair its weakened ties with the US as a result of the rejection
of the famous legislation, which became famous as the March-1 Bill, by the Turkish
parliament that did not allow the US to use Turkish territories, air space, and harbors to
occupy Iraq. (Aydogan 2012) Thirdly, the BMENA Initiative provided Turkey with a
chance to discuss the security threats, such as spill-over effect of ethnic and sectarian
violence, emanating from the American occupation of Iraq on Turkey’s national security.
(Bagci and Sinkaya 2006) Finally, the AKP, which perceives Turkey as a regional power,
has aspired to adopt a proactive role in shaping the future of the ME. The US Grand
Strategy to combat radicalism in the region created an opportunity for the Turkish
government to realize its regional goals.
Turkey was willing to contribute to political, economic, and social change in the
ME. However, not only as a model which does not have any agency, but also as an actor
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that has substantial interests in democratic transformation of the ME. Therefore, Turkey
became one of the co-chairs of the BMENA along with the US. Also, Turkey, along with
Italy and Yemen, held the co-chair position of “Democracy Assistance Dialog” (DAD).
(Bagci and Sinkaya 2006) “The Governments of Italy, Turkey and Yemen, as Government
Sponsors of the DAD, have undertaken a consultation process with their NGO
counterparts, which led to the presentation of a DAD program at the Forum for the Future
meeting held in Rabat in December 2004. The DAD partner CSOs are the Human Rights
Information and Training Centre (HRITC, Yemen), No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ,
Italy), and the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV, Turkey).” (DAD
2005-2006) Turkey appointed Ambassador Omur Orhun as the head of BMENA Initiative
to represent Turkey.
According to TESEV (Akcapar, et al. 2004), Turkey could play an important role
in some particular areas in the ME. TESEV urged Turkey to play the role of a moderator
in the solution of Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which necessitated mediation between Syria
and Israel as well, to help build a democratic, fully sovereign, and territorially intact Iraq
to promote the idea of benchmarking as Turkey could help set the criteria for a Muslim
democracy, and to help create a security environment on the basis of regional ownership
and cooperation, which would result in further regionalization of the ME. All these
premises were completely in line with the premises of “Partnership for Progress and a
Common Future with the Broader Middle East and North African Region.” The
suggestions of TESEV were important as the history indicates that Turkey has tried to
fulfill all the aforementioned tasks in the last 10 years under the AKP administration.
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The involvement of Turkey in BMENA caused controversies in Turkey. The AKP
government was harshly criticized by the opposition. The deputy president of the
Nationalist Movement Party, Tugrul Turkes perceived BMENA as another project that
aimed at the American domination in the ME. According to Turkes, “the AKP assertively
got involved in the project to capture a role in the ME.” (Turkes 2012) He further argued
that “if the US was sincere in democratization of the ME, it should have started with its
closest ally in the region, Saudi Arabia; why does the US not tell them to democratize.
Why does the US not use its influence to convince its closest ally in the region? This is just
ironic.” (Turkes 2012) He further suggested, “Turkey should not intervene in the domestic
affairs of other countries; if you intervene in their domestic affairs, they will intervene in
yours.” (Turkes 2012) Turkes further asserted that such an intervention could lead to
political disasters in the region, including Turkey. Therefore, for Turkes, the AKP made a
strategic mistake by partaking in the BMENA initiative.
Turkey’s Response to the Backtracking of the US
The backtracking of the US from supporting democratization in the ME generated
a negative reaction in Turkey. According to the AKP administration, the US treatment of
devoted Muslim politicians in the ME was both unfair and irrational. The AKP strongly
believed that if the West was sincere in promoting democracy in the ME, then it needed to
be more inclusive. In this context, democratization in the region had to be carried out by
the involvement of all the relevant actors in the process (the AKP’s multilateralism
principle). The Islamic political groups were important actors that always influenced the
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political processes of their countries. Therefore, Turkey opposed the West when it stopped
supporting democratization in the region.
Also, withdrawal of US support from democratization in the ME created a
substantial level of mistrust against the US in the AKP administration. The AKP started to
question the real intentions of the US in the region. In the same process, Turkey adopted a
more independent (from the US) foreign policy in the ME. In this regard, the AKP’s warm
relations with Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah in 2006-2009 would anger the US, to the
extent of questioning the Turkish membership in NATO. Emrullah Isler, the AKP’s MP
and the advisor of the Erdogan on the ME, indicated his disappointment with the removal
of the US’ support for democratization of the region:
When this project was first introduced, I came to believe that
democracy will come to and spread in the region. However, then,
we witnessed that this project was not being realized or could not
be realized. Perhaps, the reason behind the non-implementation
of this project was the negative reaction of the dictators to it in the
region… They (the West) actually, also saw that these dicta
regimes would not continue this way. Therefore, this project
underlined some matters regarding democratization of the region.
We, then, became really hopeful. However, our hope was broken
by the abandonment of this project. (Interview with Emrullah
Isler 2012)
Turkish decision makers believed in the sincerity of the US in the promotion of
democracy. Believing in the strategic value and moral superiority of democracy, Turks in
coordination with Western policymakers started to promote human rights and democratic
opening in the region more forcefully. Isler revealed this point as:
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Yes. This region needed human rights and democracy. Women
rights, cultural rights, educational rights. We accepted this project
(BMENA) as we thought it would contribute to the economic
development and growth of the region. However, who stepped
back from this project later on? Again those who came up with
this project. What is now? This time, people revealed their wills,
(it’s implicit meaning was that) only we decide on our future and
on what is good for us. They indicated that they did not want such
(dictatorial) regimes (in the Arab World), by putting their free
wills forward by the Arab Spring. (Interview with Emrullah Isler
2012)
Althouh the US withdrew its support from the promotion of democracy in 2006,
Turkey continued to provide a strong support for the challenging democratic forces in the
Arab ME. Therefore, Turkey developed substantial relations with groups, such as the
Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. This issue is disscussed in more detail in the fourth
chapter.
Turkey’s Reaction to the US Interest in the Turkish Model
As indicated in the previous section, the US had a strong interest in the presentation
of Turkey as a model. (O’Sullivan 2003) Turkey provided Washington with the opportunity
to showcase a successful example of a secular democracy in the ME. (Taspinar 2003) What
was more important was that, Turkey was also willing to play this role under the AKP
administration. For example, shortly after Erdogan’s Harvard Address, during his
Washington trip, Murat Mercan, the deputy governor of the AKP, stated that Turkey could
provide the ME with a great model of the cohabitation of democracy and secularism in a
Muslim nation. Furthermore, Mercan believed that Turkey could contribute to the solution
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of security problems in the region through the promotion of democracy. According to
Mercan,
Turkey can inspire some Arab countries in terms of democracy.
One of the cornerstones of the Turkish democracy is laicism, and
religion has no place in the state system. If the elements, such as
democracy, laicism, and open market economy, could be
established in the region (Middle East), the security risks that
emerge in the region and threaten the whole world can largely be
resolved. Turkey can contribute to this process significantly.
(Mercan 2003)
Furthermore, Turkey’s self-promotion as a model state was being reflected into the
work of influential Turkish scholars. For example, Sinan Ulgen tried to clarify what the
Turkish Model actually was in his work From Inspiration to Aspiration, which could also
be called the Turkish model from the Turkish perspective. Ulgen broke the Turkish
political model into various categories, such as Turkish political party and security systems,
housing and private sectors, regional economic integration, and financial institutions. He
argued that the Arab states could learn from the Turkish experience in these particular
areas. (Ulgen 2011) His goal was to provide the Middle Eastern countries with concrete
answers on how the Turks conducted their business. Similarly, Kemal Kirisci, in his work
Turkey’s Demonstrative Effect and Transformation of the Middle East, argued that
Turkey’s rapidly growing economy, progressing democracy, and proactive foreign policy
could be the areas in which the ME could learn from Turkey. However, he also argued that
the Turkish model was already being processed into the Arabic societies because of the
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substantial levels of interaction between Turkey and its neighbors under the AKP rule.
(Kirisci 2011)
The self-promotion of a moderate Muslim democracy by a political party rooted in
political Islam in Turkey had significant importance for the US. The AKP’s transformation
from an anti-Western to Western-friendly Islamic political force increased the hope in the
West towards the transformation of similar political movements in the same direction in
the wider Muslim world. As the US generally supports the American-friendly groups,
(McFaul 2007) such a transformation would strongly benefit the US. Under the AKP rule,
the Turkish model continued to gain credibility both in the West and the Muslim world.
This credibility was a product of the AKP’s initial peaceful foreign policy, economic
success over time, and its ability to perform in a secular democratic framework, strongly
impacted by the AKP’s commitment to the EU membership process. (Akgun and Gundogar
2013-2014)
Turkey also wanted to play a regional power role that maintained and controlled
the transformation in the ME. Therefore, in the coming years, Turkey would turn into a
safe haven for panels, conferences, and meetings where CSOs, intellectuals, journalists,
and governmental officials exchanged ideas to promote democracy in the ME. On the other
hand, the EU played a great role in strengthening the Turkish role by turning Turkey into
a center of attraction, increasing Turkey’s international credibility.53 However, the AKP
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still needed to resolve its domestic political problems, such as the Kurdish issue, to play
that regional role.54
As a part of the promotion of the Turkish model, the US increasingly started to refer
to Turkey as a “moderate Muslim country.” However, this labeling by the US received
negative reactions from Turkish political elites. Erdogan (RTE) declared that “these
descriptions are very ugly; it is offensive, and it is an insult to our religion. There is no
moderate or immoderate Islam. Islam is Islam and that’s it.” (Milliyet 2007) In many other
instances, Erdogan would stress that “Islam is the religion of peace.” (Time Turk 2011) On
the other hand, Turkish secular elites considered the redefinition of Turkey on the basis of
moderate Islam as problematic and harmful for Turkey’s secular identity, which is formed
over centuries of struggle and for which Turkey has been singled out as a distinct country.
(Turkes 2012) Due to these reactions, the US had to revisit its definition of Turkey, calling
Turkey a source of inspiration for the region from that point on. (Migdalowitz 2002)
In the following section, I will initially explain the EU’s reaction to the BMENA
Initiative and then I will examine the EU’s indirect impact on Turkish democracy
promotion policy.
The EU’s Impact on Turkey’s Democracy Promotion
The EU and the BMENA Initiative
The present section is written for those who wonder whether the EU had any impact
over Turkey, and if it did, what kind of influence it had. The EU’s role on Turkey’s
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A number of deputies who I interviewed confirmed this point.
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democracy promotion is not direct and not as important as the role of the US. Therefore, I
will only explain the areas where the EU impacted Turkey, by mostly relying on secondary
sources.
After September 11, 2001, similar to the US, the EU started a democracy promotion
initiative, called “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.” This policy was a continuation of the
1995 Barcelona Process. By Barcelona Process, the EU wanted to promote democracy in
the Mediterranean area. Like the US, the EU believed that lack of democracy in the ME
was the primary cause of radicalization in the Muslim world, and that this has progressively
harmed Western security. In this regard, Western interests could better be served by
democratic transformation in the ME. (Youngs and Wittes 2009)
On the other hand, the EU and the US had some different opinions regarding the
promotion of democracy in the ME.55 For example, Europeans considered the American
way of promoting democracy as ineffective as a consequence of its instant and instrumental
nature. It was instant because the US believed that democratic transformation in the ME
could happen in a very short period of time. It was instrumental as the US promoted
democracy in the ME only to advance its security interests. Furthermore, Europeans
criticized the US for making decisions unilaterally. The EU argued that Arab-Israeli
conflict was an equally important source of radicalization for the Muslims, in addition to
lack of democracy in the region. Thus, the EU suggested that promotion of democracy and
the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict had to happen at the same time. The EU also
suggested an incremental and consistent process of long term democratization via
55
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participation of the governments in the region and their CSOs. (Interview with an American
Diplomat 2013) According to the EU, the BMENA as a region was too wide. Therefore,
the EU demanded the exclusion of Afghanistan and Pakistan from the list to implement a
more effective democracy promotion policy in the BMENA region. This resulted in the
exclusion of these two countries from the BMENA.
However, there seems to be a parallel relationship between the US and the EU
democracy promotion policies in the ME, regardless of the aforementioned differences.
Like the US, the EU shifted its support away from the democratization of the ME when the
Islamic groups gained power during the elections in 2005 and 2006 due to their highly
critical stances towards the roles of Israel and the West in the region. In the following
section, I would like to explain the EU’s impact over Turkey’s democracy promotion
policy in the ME.
The EU’s Influence over Turkey
Turkey-EU relations have a different pattern than the Turkish-US relations.
Turkey’s relations with the EU have been driven by its membership process, which has
deeply shaped its institutional and normative structures. On the other hand, Turkey’s
relations with the US have been motivated by its geostrategic interests. Turkey took part in
the BMENA initiative as a European and Middle Eastern power at the same time. It was
also involved as a country whose democracy was in the making and which could contribute
to democratization in the ME substantially. While Turkey partook in the initiative, it was
still receiving substantial assistance from the EU to improve its own democratic standards.
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Yet at the same time, Turkey started to provide support for democratization in the ME by
participating in the BMENA Initiative.
For the sake of parsimony, I will examine the EU’s impact on Turkey through four
significant stages. Firstly, the EU helped Turkey to institutionalize democratic norms.
Secondly, Turkey has learned a great deal about how the EU conducted its business through
its membership in EU institutions. Thirdly, the EU contributed to the growth and influence
of the Turkish CSOs. Finally, the EU membership process increased the credibility of
Turkey in the Muslim World.
The EU and Institutionalization of Democratic Norms in Turkey
As indicated in the previous chapter, Turkey started on its path to democracy long
before the establishment of the modern Turkish republic. However, the two significant
external sources of the institutionalization of democratic values have been the NATO
membership and the EU accession process. In this section, I will examine the particular
impact of the EU on democratic transformation of Turkey, which directly impacted
Turkey’s foreign policy formulations.
EU-Turkey relations in the last five decades have had a substantial influence on
Turkey’s democratization. In 1963, Turkey was granted the Associate Member Status to
the European Economic Commission (EEC). Turkey became a member of the European
Customs Union in 1995. In 1999, Turkey was offered the accession status during Bulent
Ecevit’s coalition government. In 2001, a 1000-page National Program was prepared by
the government to bring Turkey in line with the Copenhagen Criteria of the EU
membership. In 2004, the AKP started accession negotiations with the EU. And in 2005,
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the AKP passed several EU harmonization reform packages in Turkey. (Park 2012) Each
stage helped deepening democracy in Turkey.
Countries in the process of EU membership experience a Europeanization in their
domestic systems and international affairs. This Europeanization is identified with the
civilian control over the military, an increased role of CSOs in the political decision
making, and the utilization of diplomacy rather than hard power in the realization of foreign
policy goals. (Terzi 2010) Turkey has gone through this transformation in the EU accession
process under the AKP rule. The Turkish military was taken under the civilian control; the
Turkish political parties have become more democratic; the Turkish government started to
follow a diplomacy-intensive foreign policy; and finally the Turkish CSOs became more
involved in Turkey’s decision making processes. (Terzi 2010) This process has resulted in
an increased confidence in the Turkish government, leading to a more assertive Turkish
role in the international realm.
Turkey’s Learning from the Regionalization in the West
One way the EU has impacted the orientation of the Turkish foreign policy is
through Turkey’s membership in European institutions. Turkey has gained substantial
experience by getting involved in Western institutions, such as the European Commission,
the European Common Market, The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), and NATO. Turkey’s membership to the OSCE has provided Turkey with
invaluable experience in the areas of political economy of regional integration and the
importance of human rights for long terms stability in a region. (Turkey Foreign Affairs
Ministery Website 2013) Turkey has been a part of the OSCE since 1975. During its
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involvement, Turkey learned a great deal about how modern Western states conducted their
businesses. Emrullah Isler clearly pointed out the role of positive example of the EU in the
formation of Shamgen, which is a free-trade-zone between Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria:
Real-politic necessitates the existence of the states which are in
strong solidarity and cooperation and the states which are in
regional cooperation. Like in the EU, we (Turkey) have laid the
foundations of this. We have removed the visa requirements
between Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. This initiative would
spread wave by wave... When governments elected via elections
come to power in the region… Regional integration in the ME
will become much easier. (Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012)
Taking into consideration that Turkey has had stable interaction with the West for
almost a century, it will be clearly seen that through this interaction, Turkey actually
transferred the experience that it gained from the West to the ME. This automatically
benefited the West as Turkey was involved in transferring the values that the West wanted
to promote in the region for a long period of time. Yet, when the Islamic parties came to
power in 2005 and 2006 region-wide, the West backtracked from promoting democracy in
the region. This also put Turkey in a difficult position when Turkey continued to support
democratization after the election of the Islamic groups in the region.
The EU’s Impact on the Turkish CSOs
The democratic institutionalization on the basis of European harmonization
packages provided the Turkish civil society with a fertile ground to flourish both in number
and in influence. The CSOs grew by 44% between 2001 and 2011. (Saglam 2011) The
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rapid increase in the number of CSOs is related to three factors: the transfer of the
supervision of the CSOs from police to local governments, being able to receive funds from
foreign donors without governmental approval, (Zenn 2011) and the overall increase in
educational and economic indicators of Turkey in the process of the EU membership since
2004. The major foreign donors that contribute to the budget of the Turkish CSOs are the
EU and its members.
In the course of the EU membership, CSOs acted much more independently, rapidly
growing in their performances and influence. Furthermore, partnership with the EU
provided Turkey with further credibility, and Turkish CSOs were well-received wherever
they operated in the ME. Although the EU is the largest donor of foreign aid for the Turkish
CSOs, the Islamic CSOs that have done the most regarding humanitarian work are not
ecstatic with this source of aid. The reason behind this is the notion that “the Western aid
is conditional: if they give you financial aid, then they ask you something in return, and we
do not want to be bounded by that.” (Unsal 2012) The EU and the US are not very keen to
support Islamic groups unless they are seen as moderate. (Youngs and Wittes 2009)
Secular, women, youth, and LGBT CSOs are the predominant recipients of aid from the
EU. However, these secular CSOs do not perform humanitarian activities in the ME.
The EU’s impact over Turkey’s Soft Power
In the 1990s, Turkey often “reflected the predominance of hard power in the pursuit
of foreign policy goals.” (Terzi 2010) Nevertheless, diplomacy has gained a prominent
place in Turkish foreign policy in the last 10 years, transforming Turkey toward utilization
of soft power. (Terzi 2010) The main reason behind this change was the reconfiguration of
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the Turkish political system on the basis of democratic norms and the strategic calculations
of the AKP within this new political framework. Abdullah Gul indicated on several
occasions that the EU membership process created a very positive image of Turkey in the
ME. It is this positive image that actually facilitates the diffusion of Turkey’s democratic
values in the ME as people in the Middle East wanted to live in a system similar to that of
Turkey afterwards. In this regard, Turkey provides the ME with a positive role model as a
secular, democratic, and economically powerful Muslim nation. (Kirisci 2012)
The level of social, cultural, economic, and political interaction with the ME clearly
indicate the increased soft power of Turkey under the AKP administration. For example,
the numbers of Arab tourists that have visited Turkey substantially increased.56 The number
of students that have come to continue their education in Turkey, the number of regional
conferences being held in Istanbul, and the number of Turkish schools and cultural centers
all around the world, including the ME, drastically rose.57 Furthermore, the dramatic
increase in Turkish Airlines’ flights to all regions in the world, substantial development of
the Turkish economy, substantial increase in Turkish humanitarian aid recognized by the
UN, watchers of Turkish TV series that could be indicated by hundred millions (Kirisci
2012) and finally the respect that the Turkish leadership gets from the region are all
important indicators of Turkey’s increased soft power. Due to the increased interaction
with Turkey through the aforementioned channels, people in the ME gradually wanted their
country to be like Turkey.
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Hitherto I have explained the impact of the complex interaction between the USTurkey and the EU-Turkey on Turkey’s democracy promotion policy in the ME.
Nonetheless, this chapter will remain incomplete, if I do not explain their stances in the
course of Arab Spring. In the following part, I would like to explain briefly how these
actors responded to the emergence of the Arab Spring.
The Arab Spring
“Some people think the Arab Spring is a conspiracy: like someone pressed the
button from some hidden places. This is not correct. People decided that it was enough,
and they wanted to make their own decision. People risked their lives for this, they crossed
the wall of fear of dictators, and this is why this transformation and evolution is happening
in the ME… However, great powers could manipulate this process by shaping the
developments in favor of their own interests in the course of the Arab Spring,” said
Emrullah Isler, the advisor of Erdogan on the ME. As this clearly indicates, both Turkey
and the West were caught unprepared by the Arab Spring. Isler would later suggest that
“ordinary people took over the task of democratizing the ME when the great powers
backtracked. While the democratization of the ME was decided top-down (pointing out
BMENA), it happened bottom-up later on.” (Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012)
Turkey considered the Arab Spring to be a part of the larger picture, - the global
demand for democracy, the open market economy, and the rule of law. (Interview with
Emrullah Isler 2012) The AKP administration thought that as the demand for the
aforementioned factors was global, the wave of democratization could not be stopped in
the region. According to the Turkish administration, the advancement of mass
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communication, such as social media and more traditional global media networks played a
crucial role in this regard, by bringing the positive political, social, and economic
conditions of the developed world to the attention of ordinary young people living in the
impoverished and authoritarian ME. Furthermore, an AKP MPs suggested that Turkey, as
a rapidly developing Muslim democracy, provided the Muslim societies around the world
with a good example of what a Muslim nation could become, if properly governed. In this
respect, he argued, “If Turkey’s good example was not there, Arab Spring would not be
happening today, it would happen, but may be ten years later.” (Interview with Emrullah
Isler 2012)
By the time Arab Spring started, Turkey had consolidated its status as a regional
power. (Alessandri and Altunisik 2013) Turkey developed strong relations with Syria, Iran,
Russia, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood prior to the Arab Spring. Turkey’s
warm relations with the aforementioned actors angered the West, accusing Turkey of
betraying its Western allies. Turkey had also become a center of attraction for the Arab
people as a result of its EU membership process stemming from its rapidly growing
economy, and most importantly its political approach that loudly voiced the opinions of
people of the ME in global and regional summits.
More importantly, the role of Erdogan in this process cannot be underestimated.
For example, A Syrian doctoral student reiterated that “Erdogan is more Arab than the
Arab leaders, so we wish Erdogan was our leader,” (Interview with A Young Syrian
Scholar in Miami 2012) indicating that finally a Muslim leader voiced the opinions of
people of the region in a powerful yet peaceful manner. Many other individuals that I had
the chance to discuss from the Arab ME expressed similar thoughts. In the same line, Isler
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also reiterated that “as Arab streets did not see the leadership that Erdogan displayed in
their own leaders, they accepted Erdogan as one of their own. Erdogan displayed a
leadership that was missed and looked for in the region for a long time.” (Interview with
Emrullah Isler 2012) However, the popularity of Erdogan, the democratically elected
Turkish leader, would anger the authoritarian Arab leaders at the same time.
When the Arab Spring started, Turkey was compelled to take a side. In the Turkish
psyche, democratization was good for the region as ordinary people would finally have the
chance to create a system where they were being truly represented. Democratization of the
region was good for Turkey as well due to democratic system’s compatibility for long term
business transactions and sustainable political cooperation. Democratization of the region
would also facilitate the reintegration of the Middle Eastern nations that share a common
history, religion, culture, and geography. Ahmet Davutoglu58 referred to the uprisings as
“the normalization of history in the ME.” Although the AKP supported democratization, it
wanted the transition to democracy to happen in a peaceful way, without chaos,
provocations, and instabilities. (Alessandri and Altunisik 2013) Thus, Erdogan would call
on Mubarak to step down:
Mubarak, we are human beings. We are not immortal… When
we die the imam will not pray for the prime minister or for the
president, but he will pray for a human being. It is up to you to
deserve good prayers or curses. You should listen to the demands
of the people and be conscious of the people and their rightful
demands. (Today's Zaman 2011)

58

Ahmet Davutoglu is Turkey’s foreign affairs minister.

89

Most importantly, Turkey’s early reaction to the uprisings in the Arab world was
motivated by its humanitarian concerns and strategic interests in a democratic ME.
However, when the spring arrived to the next door, Syria, and when the Islamic parties
came to power one by one in the Arab Spring states, Turkish motivation for supporting the
opposition turned into a more strategically driven endeavor. The Arab Spring indicated the
limits of Turkish power. Turkey understood that it was not capable of determining the
future of the ME alone.
The Arab Spring also reshaped alliances in the ME. Due to its support of the rebels
in Syria, Turkey has been at loggerheads with Iran and Hezbollah in the region. Although
this position brought Turkey closer to the US and the EU in their approach to the ME
initially, when the conflict escalated in Syria, the Turkish and Western policies towards the
ME started to diverge. The West was scared of the empowerment of the radical religious
groups; therefore, did not provide full support to the opposition in Syria. Furthermore, the
victory of the Islamic parties after the Arab Spring compelled the US and the EU, which
tried to balance their short term strategic interests with their desire for the democratization
of the ME, to work with them reluctantly.
The Arab Spring worked against Israel’s interests: Israel was forced into isolation,
losing its closest Muslim ally, Turkey, as a result of its harsh reaction to the Mavi-Marmara
that ended with the death of nineteen human rights activists, and also losing its closest Arab
ally Egypt when the Muslim Brotherhood party was elected in the course of the Arab
Spring. Furthermore, the Islamic administrations in Turkey, Egypt, Palestine, and Tunisia
started to cooperate more forcefully, favoring Palestine against Israel. This substantially
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changed the attitude of the US towards the democratization of the region as the Israeli
security has been one of the crucial strategic interests of the US in the region.
Initially, the US tried to influence the newly elected parties in Egypt and Tunisia
towards adopting a liberal democratic approach, not-hostile to the West and Israel. The US
wanted the Arab Spring countries to organize their political systems on the basis of
secularism, similar to that of Turkey. The US, the EU, and Israel constantly pointed at
Turkey as a role model that could and should be emulated. However, Turkish model was
being diminished to the AKP model actually. When the political parties tied to the Muslim
Brotherhood obtained power in the post-Spring Arab states, the West hoped that they
would adopt a political stance similar to that of the Turkish AKP, such as being open to
cooperation with the West, being willing to operate within a secular framework in their
native countries, and supporting the institutionalization of liberal democratic norms.
While the Muslim Brotherhood indicated their admiration for the success of the
AKP within the secular framework of Turkey, they suggested that Arab states had different
conditions from those of Turkey. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood said that Turkey
could not be emulated as a role model in its fullest extent. However, they argued, some
experiences of Turkey could surely be emulated. In comparison, in Tunisia, Ganushi’s
elected Al-Nahda party was more willing to emulate the AKP model.
It is fair to argue that at some level, Egypt under Morsi’s leadership aimed to
establish itself as an alternative model to Turkey. For example, when Erdogan visited Egypt
after the Arab Spring, the Deputy President of Egypt’s Justice and Freedom Party reiterated
that “we welcome Turkey and we welcome Erdogan as a prominent leader, but we do not
think that he or his country alone should be leading the region or drawing up its future.”
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(Reuters 2011) Similarly, one of my interviewees, a top administrator in the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood, argued that “Morsi could not take Turkey as a role model completely.
(Interview with a Top Representative of the Muslim Brotherhood 2012) He further stated
that “Egyptian people do not want a secular state; they want Islam to be combined in the
Egyptian civil law. In Egypt, even Communists go to mosque and pray. A person might be
Communist in ideology, but when it comes to worshiping, we all worship in the same line
together. And this is the difference between Turkey and Egypt; Turkish communists don’t
pray.” (Interview with a Top Representative of the Muslim Brotherhood 2012) He further
argued that the new political leadership in Egypt wanted to build the economic system of
Egypt following Islamic values that excluded interest rates. When I asked whether they
had human capital to build such a complex economic system that needed to be successful
to solve urgent economic problems of Egypt, he said “yes.”
The West did not get the answers it expected, particularly from Egypt. Considering
the backtracking of the US and the EU from democracy promotion, when the Islamic forces
gained power in the ME in 2005 and 2006, their subsequent reactions to the demands of
the Egyptian Islamists could easily be predicted. When the military coup d’état occurred
in Egypt, the West remained silent, and did not refer to it as coup d’état. The West only
raised its voice when the Egyptian military employed extreme violence against protestors,
which resulted in several deaths. Similarly, the US administration did not provide the Morsi
government with substantial support. Only one month before the military coup, the US
approved 1.5 billion dollars aid to the Egyptian military, (Stanly, 2013) which was
considered as financing military coup d’état of July 3, 2013 in Egypt.
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The military coup in Egypt could also be interpreted as the Western attempt to
compel the Egyptian Islamists to go through the same experiences that the Turkish
Islamists went through before the 2002 national election in Turkey. After the 1999
postmodern military coup d’état in Turkey, the AKP, separating from the Turkish Islamist
party, emerged as a pro-West, pro-democratic, and pro-secular political force, playing a
constructive role in the international politics. The military coup in Egypt might be an
attempt to get similar results, transforming the Egyptian Islamists into a moderate party
like the AKP.
In conclusion, Turkey has traditionally been regarded as a trusted ally of the US.
After the AKP came to power, Turkey was initially projected as the model of democracy
and secularism for the Muslim world by the West. In this regard, the AKP, which had deep
roots in political Islam, was attributed an important role initially by the West as it provided
a litmus test for the cohabitation of secularism and Islam, increasing the hope for the
transformation of the Islamic political forces into Western friendly, democratic, and secular
political movements that supported globalization. However, this projection has not been
consistent. Turkey itself attracted substantial criticisms when it approached the regional
and global powers that the West perceived to be its rivals.
Turkey had substantial interests in promoting democracy in the ME. Initially,
Turkey’s support of the Western democracy promotion brought Turkey’s foreign policy in
line with that of the EU and the US. Turkey’s emphasis on democracy in its foreign policy
towards the ME empowered Turkey’s domestic and international roles, and eliminated the
possible opposition of these two great powers against its political activism in the ME.
Moreover, the US and Turkey had convergence of interests in interacting with a politically
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stable region, buying inexpensive energy, combatting radicalization, supporting
entrepreneurship, and promoting an environment of freedom in the ME. As Turkey shared
a common population, geography, religion, and culture with the ME, the developments
directly impacted the Turkish strategic interests.
Despite Turkey’s considerable support for the American initiatives, launched to
promote democratization in the ME, the AKP raised some objections. The AKP supported
an internally driven, long-term, and consistent democratization process in the ME. In this
regard, the AKP opposed the liberal interventionism and one-size-fits-all methods of the
American democracy promotion. The AKP stressed that the West had to confine its role
with the provision of a supportive international environment for democratic transformation
in the ME.
Although the EU did not have a direct impact on Turkey’s democracy promotion
policy, it has had profound impacts over the Turkish state structure by democratizing it.
Turkey has learned a great deal about how the modern West conducted its business from
the EU. Turkey’s EU process transformed it into a soft power that the ME started to watch
with admiration. In the new liberal environment, fostered by the membership process, the
Turkish Islamic CSOs acted more independently. As a result, some of major humanitarian
and democratic projects of Turkey have been carried out by Turkish Islamic CSOs in the
ME.
Turkey started 2007 as an economically and politically more powerful country. It
also started as a country which developed substantial ties and alliances with the actors in
the region. These alliances were in line with the BMENA Initiative premises, which
stressed the socialization of Turkey with the other states in the region. However, when the
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AKP upgraded its relations with Hamas, Iran, and Syria, the West strongly criticized
Turkey, as they found this move of Turkey as a departure from its Western orientation. As
the West already backtracked from promoting democracy in the ME, they also started to
oppose the previously set roadmap for the promotion of democracy in the region.
Therefore, they wanted Turkey to backtrack from supporting democracy in the region as
well, instead of respecting its agency. However, this did not happen, at least willingly for
Turkey. As a response, Turkey accused the West of not doing what it preached; respecting
the democratic choice of people.
The Arab Spring caught the world unprepared. Turkey, the EU, and the US were
compelled to take stances. In this regard, Turkey welcomed the process of Arab Spring,
and called on the authoritarian leaders in the ME to introduce changes regarding the rightful
demand of the protestors. On the other hand, while the US wanted the region to go through
political change, it also has tried to shape the developments to create a more conducive
environment for its strategic interests. The EU’s stance has been very similar to that of the
US.
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CHAPTER IV: TURKEY’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
TURKEY’S APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER
The ME has been largelly ignored by the Turkish governments since the inception
of the modern Turkish Republic in 1920 despite Turkey’s cultural affinity and geographic
proximity with the region and its vested strategic interests there. Turkey, which claims a
regional power role in the ME, is linked to the region by shared culture, populations,
religion, history, and geography. Also, the ME abounds in natural resources, such as oil
and natural gas; it contains substantial Kurdish and Alevi populations, which could threaten
Turkey’s territorial integrity during crisis times. Moreover, the ME is a great potential
market for the Turkish industrial products. Despite so many favorable variables, Turkey
failed to develop meaningful relations with its southern neighbors until the AKP came to
power. The AKP does not only consider Turkey as a Middle Eastern country, but due to
the aforementioned connectednesses, it defines Turkey’s role as a regional power which
aspires to lead the region.
As I argued in the previous chapters, Turkey started its official democracy
promotion policy in the ME by BMENA Initiative of the USA in 2004. The AKP has
both a normative claim to, and strategic interest in, the promotion of democracy in the ME.
Turkey has interests in a politically stable region, buying cheaper energy, deradicalization,
supporting entrepreneurship, and promoting an environment of freedom in the ME. (Bagci
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and Sinkaya 2006) Examining each of these variables, it is obvious that Turkey under the
AKP rule promotes democracy for at least three substantial reasons:59 Firstly and most
importantly, to promote its own security and economic interests; secondly, for the benefit
of the people (human rights, decreasing inequalities, etc.) in the target states; and thirdly,
for the benefit of the region (f.e., inter-state trade) as a whole, in which the AKP considers
Turkey as a leader.
The guiding premise of this chapter is that the primary concerns of states are their
strategic interests, (Morgenthau 1962) and strategic interests dominate the values when
they are being threatened.60 Yet, these strategic interests are being articulated within
respective cultural environmens of the leading actors. 61 Therefore, the strategic choices
between states might differ. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that states do promote
democracy to help the target states. It means that states could have humanitarian agendas.
However, when their immediate interests are threatened, states become preoccupied with
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Overall, the interviewees had a negative image of the ME. The MPs as well as the administrators of the
Islamic CSOs associated the ME with wars, conflicts, bloodshed, pains, dictatorial regimes, lack of human
rights, lack of freedoms, Israeli aggression over the Palestinians, oil, imperialism, oppression, and the
center of radicalism. Also, some of the interviewees identified the ME with positive factors, such as being
the foundation of religions and the origins of human civilizational developments. On the other hand,
Turkey was associated with Ottoman legacy, Europe, pains of democratization, strong secularism, the
leader of Muslim world, economic growth, and sometimes negative issues, such as the conflict with
Kurdish citizens. In this regard, in the Turkish self-perception, Turkey is better than the ME, and at some
point, Turkish decision makers think that Turkey has a historical responsibility towards the ME. However,
this line of thinking is especially dominant among the AKP MPs. The CSOs, on the other hand, claimed
that considering the human resources of Turkey, Turkey should only play a humble role in the ME. In
regards with democracy and secularism, my interviewees found the democratic and secular identities of
Turkey as an asset.
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defending their immediate interests.62 However, this does not mean that they abonden their
ideals.
It should be noted that Turkey’s initial engagement with the ME is not as
strategically oriented as the later stages of Turkish democracy promotion, which began
around 2007. Between 2003 and 2007, Turkey’s democracy promotion in the Arab ME
remained as a principled stance, except in Iraq where Turkey had to engage with advancing
its national security interests. However, by 2007 Turkey had established tight economic
relations and firm alliances in the ME. When the Arab Spring started, Turkey had vested
economic and strategic interests in the ME. As a result, Turkey has forcefully tried to
eliminate the challanges against its own security and economic interests by promoting
democracy through the utilization of diverse power instruments since the begining of the
Arab Spring.
There are many soft and hard power tools avalibale to Turkey while promoting
democracy in the ME. However, Turkey’s preffered way for promoting democracy in the
ME has been soft power instruments, such as diplomacy and foreign aid (See the following
chapter for details). When Turkey’s democracy promotion policy in the region is examined,
it is seen that Turkey started to utilize hard power in the process of the Arab Spring when
its substantial economic and security interests are threatened. During the years before the
Arab Spring, the AKP stuck to soft power tools to promote democracy in the ME. Even at
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present, the bulk of the AKP’s democracy promotion is carried out with a diverse set of
soft power tools.
When Turkey’s interests are being hurt, application of hard power tools to promote
democracy is not automatic. Turkey often tries very hard to abstain from the utilization of
hard power in the region. However, as it will be shown in this chapter, Turkey is being
engulfed into and compelled to use hard power to eliminate the emerging threats towards
its interests in the process of change in the ME. In this regard, in the following section, I
would like to give an account of under what conditions Turkey applies military power to
eliminate these challanges, and when Turkey abstains from the utilization of military
power, even when its substantial interests are being threatened. In this regard, I examine
the cases of Iraq, Syria, and Libya to explain this complex situation.
However, before disscussing these specific cases, I would like to explain how the
AKP relates democratization of the region to its strategic interests. First of all, the AKP
thinks that stability in the region is the precondition for the establishment of sustainable
economic and political ties in the ME with which Turkey wanted to establish firm relations
after the AKP came to power. However, lack of freedoms and substantial human rights
abuses are the crucial impediments against the regional stability. (Interview with Ali Sahin
2012) To state it more clearly, people whose rights are constantly being violated, whose
opinions are not being respected, whose grievences are not being heard, and who do not
have a source of income could apply and have applied violent means of self-expression in
the region. (Erdogan 2003) In this regard,

shortages of freedom and economic

oppurtunities in the region have caused radicalization. Invasion of Iraq in the wake of the
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9-11 tragedy, which has had destabilizing impacts over the whole region is a good example
for that.
Moreover, democratization in the region would result in the election of like-minded
governments which make better partners in trade and politics due to the shared democratic
processes and mechanisms. When human rights violations decline and when power
changes hand peacefully, the system becomes more legitimate, and legitimacy brings more
stability. (Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012) Democratization of the region will also help
escape from the post imperial regional order, established on the basis of artificial borders
between states and nations, paving the way for a greater integration in the ME. (Interview
with Ali Sahin 2012)
In the following section, I would like to disscuss how the AKP conceptualizes
Turkey’s democracy promotion in the ME. Then, I will start to explain the cases in which
Turkey’s democracy promotion becomes more strategically driven and militarized.
Problematizing the Promotion of Democracy
Turkish policymakers and officials have a different understanding of Turkish
democracy in the ME. The MPs of the opposition parties, such as Turkish nationalist MHP
and Kurdish nationalist BDP strongly oppose the idea that Turkey, under the AKP
administration, supports democratization in the region. According to the members of the
opposition parties, Turkish democracy is not mature yet; and therefore, the AKP
administration is not in any position to promote democracy elswhere. However, as
indicated in the previous chapter, by participating in BMENA Initiative, the AKP’s
involvement in promoting democracy in the ME became official. (Kirisci 2011)
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The deputies representing the AKP do not perceive their acts as democracy
promotion in the ME. According to the AKP deputies, they have no intention whatsoever
to bring democracy to or to change the regimes in the region. The AKP MPs pointed out
that promoting democracy would mean the intervention in domestic affairs of brotherly
nations; and they argued that this was not in any way what the AKP intended to do.
(Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012) Furthermore, they argued that while Turkey still had
problems with its own democratization, such as its problems with its Kurdish citizens, how
could it claim a democratizer mission elsewhere. For the AKP MPs, what they did was to
provide help to the friendly nations when it was demanded. (Interview with Ali Sahin 2012)
They also indicated that they only warned the non-democratic Arab states about what could
happen if they did not transit to democratic system, when the Arab Spring started. In this
regard, an AKP deputy (2012) suggested, what we are doing is to maintain stability in the
region in the long run, which serves the interests of the people in the region. Without
stability, there cannot be development and progress. The wave of Arab Spring is
threatening the stability in the region, and the only way to deal with this is to give people
what they want.63
However, the paradox was that, often, in their speeches they explained how they
helped the Middle Eastern states to develop their political and economic systems by sharing
Turkey’s experiences, and how they trained the political parties in Egypt and Tunusia to
maintain effective political campaigns. These acts were “de facto” promotion of
democracy. I could not interpret this as unconscious promotion of democracy as the AKP
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leadership provided a substantial support to the 2004 BMENA Initiative to democratize the
ME. However, for the interviewees, these were the attempts to create a fertile ground for
developing long term fruitful political and economic relations.
Islamic CSOs in Turkey opposed the idea that Turkey promotes democracy in the
ME. According to some of the top officals I interviewed, Turkey still had substantial
problems with its own democratic, social, and economic developments. (Interview with
CSO members in Ankara 2012) Considering these shortcomings of Turkish democracy,
Turkey was not in any position to promote democracy in the ME. However, they added
that it was true that the AKP administration had the ambition to play a major role in the
region.
The CSO reresentatives provided a more rational framework for what Turkey could
do. According to them, simply Turkey’s human capital and economic power was not
sufficient to play the role that the AKP administration wanted it to play. (Interview with
CSO members in Ankara 2012) Therefore, they argued that Turkey should only try to make
humble contributions to the sollution of the problems in the region through diplomacy and
humanitarian aid. If not, Turkey could risk its national security. They both opposed the
neo-ottoman tendencies of the AKP administration and suggested that Turkey should
approach the people in the region as equals. (Interview with CSO members in Ankara 2012)
Nevertheless, the CSO representatives also accepted the self-criticism that, they often
acted as if they were superior in their interractions with partners in the region.
The CSOs ideas about the extent of Turkish role was also shared by TIKA (Turkish
Developmental Agency) experts who worked on the field to provide humanitarian
assistance to the needy areas in different parts of the world, such as Asia, Africa, and
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Europe. They often criticized the AKP administration for exaggerating the Turkish role.
According to them, the way Turkey provided aid did not have a long-term strategy. They
argued that when the Turkish aid was provided this way, it did not benefit the Turkish
interests in the long run, as the provider and the benefits it provided were forgotten after a
while. (Interview with TIKA experts in Ankara 2013) One of the intervieewes argued that
“when we deliver aid to people, people have no clue about who did it. When the West does
it, it uses tools such as signs and boards that indicate the identity of the provider, they
organize opening ceremonies and parties to celebrate it. Also, we as the Turkish state do
not still know how to turn this aid into strategic benefits.” (Interview with TIKA experts in
Ankara 2013)
However, what cannot be ignored is the fact that Turkey has been involved in a
modest act of promoting democracy in the ME. Turkey did support democratization in the
region in principle and through a number of intergovernmental initiatives. Yet, Turkey does
not call what it does as the promotion of democracy. For Turkish officials, the term
promotion of democracy means an intentional effort to alter regimes, and Turkey does not
have any intention to change the regimes in the ME.64 (Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012)
Instead of promoting democracy which would mean intending to change the regimes and
which would basically refer to interfering with the affairs of ME, what they attempt to
do is to share experience to create positive change and to maintain stability in the region as
they want the region to prosper as a whole.65 (Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012) They
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argue that they do not try to change the regimes in the ME, nor does Turkey have the
capability to do it. Nevertheless, Turkish officials have difficulty in explaining Turkey’s
participation to the BMENA, which is an initiative designed to democratize the ME.
There are a number of reasons for this confusion. One of the most important is that
Turkish democracy is still in the making, so is the Turkish democracy promotion policy.
Therefore, Turks find it difficult to accept the case of democracy promotion by a
democracy in transition, like Turkey. Also, the term “bringing democracy” contains some
sort of cynicsm in the Turkish psyche as the Turks associate this concept with the
exploitation of the natural resources of the poor countries by the Western states. Moreover,
Turkey lacks a well designed institution or structure, formed for the purpose of promoting
democracy. (Kirisci 2011) The West has been trying to change the regimes elsewhere for
a long period of time; therefore, Western nations are experienced in this whereas Turkey
is quite inexperienced.
Hitherto, I argued that Turkey has both strategic and idealist reasons to promote
democracy in the ME. In this regard, Turkey’s promotion of democracy is mainly geared
to the advancement of its strategic interests. However, democratization also will improve
the conditions of people in the region in terms of factors, such as human rights and
inequalities. Finally, democratization is good for the region as a whole in terms of creating
conditions for sustainable economic and political ties beytween the states in the region.
(Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012) In this context, Turkey does promote the interests of
the people that it feels close to. However, when Turkey’s strategic interests are threatened,
its concerns for its immediate strategic interests dominates its ideals towards the region. At
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this point, Turkey’s democracy promotion itself becomes an instrument to eliminate the
challanges towards its interests.
Therefore, in the following section, I would like to give a detailed account of how
Turkey behaves when its immediate security and economic interests are being threatened.
I detected three substantial strategic interests for Turkey in the course of Arab Spring,
which are survival, economy, and alliances. I indicate that when these interests are being
threatened, Turkey applies a combination of hard and soft power tools to eliminate the
challanges towards itself. In this regard, sometimes Turkey is compelled by its allies to
apply military power to fix the problems emaneting in the proces of change in the region.
Survival
Under the AKP administration, Turkey has faced two developments that threatened
its national security. The first one was the American occupation of Iraq in 2003 under the
George W. Bush Administration. The second development is the escalation of conflict in
Syria in the course of Arab Spring. In both cases, Turkey’s democracy promotion gained a
highly strategic orientation. Democracy promotion itself became a tool to ensure the
national security.
Turkey’s national security dominates its democracy promotion agenda particularly
when it deals with its immediate neighbors, such as Syria and Iraq. There are a number of
reasons for that. Turkey shares a long border with Syria and a long and mountainous border
with Iraq. There is a substantial drug trafficking that follows the Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq,
and Turkey routes, which then connects to Europe as a final destination point. Moreover
Turkey has problems with its Kurds. Iraq, Syria, and Iran also contain large Kurdish
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populations. These three countries also include different confessional groups in Islam. In
this regard, substantial political developments in these countries directly impact Turkey’s
national security. (Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry 2014) As a result, Turkey tries to
engage with surrounding countries to diminish the security risks originating from political
developments.
In the following section, I would like to introduce the cases of Iraq, Syria, and Libya
in more detail. Iraq and Syria are discussed within the framework of threats against
Turkey’s survival or territorial integrity. Libya is discussed within the framework of threats
against Turkey’s economic interests. I argue that due to the presence of the US in Iraq,
Turkey was not able to utilize its military power to reduce the security risks emerging in
Iraq. In the case of Syria, Turkey supports democratization, but it avoids the overt
utilization of the military power due to its fear of being associated with the radical groups
and due to the possibility of direct military confrontation with the Assad regime. In Libya,
Although Turkey promoted NATO intervention against France’s unilateral intervention, it
tried to avoid becoming a part of a militarized solution in Libya. However, Turkey was
compelled to partake in the military intervention against Gaddafi by the US when the
operations in NATO lasted longer than expected.
A-Iraq
After the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the US designed a two-legged strategy to fight
radicalization in the ME. The first leg suggested military intervention in countries like Iraq
and Afghanistan to deter the terrorists. The second leg suggested the launching of the
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BMENA initiative to promote democracy in the ME. As a result, the US invaded Iraq on
March, 2003.
However, as I argued in the previous chapter, Turkey opposed the thesis of liberal
interventionism clearly, when Erdogan visited the US in January 30, 2003. The Iraq
intervention in March 19, 2003 indicated that Turkey’s opposition to the US liberal
interventionism did not matter. Furthermore, the unilaterality of the US decision for the
intervention in Iraq caused dissatisfactions among its European allies, (Youngs and Wittes
2009) including Turkey that constantly stressed the importance of multilateralism.
Before the military campaign, the US was hopeful that the Turkish parliament
would pass a bill that enabled Turkey to become a part of the coalition forces in Iraq led
by the US. This bill would also enable the US to use Turkish harbors, airbases, and land as
an initial entrance point to Iraq. However, the March 1, 2003 bill was disapproved by 250
against 260. This was a shock for the US. However, this did not mean that the AKP
administration did not support the idea of being a part of the coalition. Actually, the opinion
of the top officials in the newly formed AKP was quite supportive of approving the March1 Bill. Fatma Sahin, the former AKP minister, reiterated that:
Right after we were being elected as MPs, they brought the
March-1 Bill in front of us. They were asking us to make a
decision regarding an issue, crucial for Turkey’s and the region’s
future. We were new and unexperienced. We did not even know
what our responsibilities were then. Some MPs approved of the
bill and some others disapproved. But all of us were shaking, as
we were inexperienced MPs, yet voting for such a crucial
decision. The outcome was the disapproval of the bill. Thanks
god it was not approved. Its disapproval caused the creation of a
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very welcoming international environment for the AKP
government, in those inexperienced days. (Fatma Sahin 2014)
There were two particular reasons for the AKP’s support for joining the coalition
that intervened in Iraq. The first was that if there was a new regional formation or
development in the ME, Turkey had to partake in them to protect its interests or to depict
an image as such to calm the public; and the second was that the AKP feared that that the
US would remove the financial and diplomatic support of Turkey at home and
internationally. (Sol Portal 2012) At the beginning of this matter, the US had offered
Turkey USD 6 billion conditioned on the approval of the bill. (Sol Portal 2012)
However, despite all the efforts of the AKP to get the bill approved, the parliament
opposed the March-1 Bill, causing a cold shower effect in the Bush Administration and
negatively impacting the Turkish-American relations. Fatma Sahin reiterated that “we
needed that money so much. It (the stipulated US aid) was crucial for the new AKP
administration. Turkey has gone through substantial economic growth under the AKP, and
looking at those old days, we really need to be quite happy about our current economic
situation.” (Fatma Sahin 2014) Turkish financial sector was also upset about the
disapproval of the March-1 Bill. (Sol Portal 2012)
As a natural extension of the aforementioned concerns, the parliament approved of
the second bill which allowed the US to use its Incirlik military base, located in Adana
province of Turkey, for the US air force operations in Iraq. The second bill was approved
of to save the alliance with the US, as it was considered quite beneficial strategically. As
the rejection of the first bill dominated the public discussions globally, the approval of the
second bill did not attract much attention.

108

Therefore, the disapproval of the March-1 Bill caused a warm welcome to the AKP
administration in the region. The opinions, previously constructed by being the “puppet of
the West” were replaced by an anti-war and peaceful Turkey that was independent enough
to oppose the US, which was its close ally. Turkey was perceived as more confident.
However, many attributed the Turkish rejection of the bill to the Islamic orientation of the
AKP, although in reality the AKP’s key figures worked very hard to pass the March-1 Bill.
The war in Iraq had detrimental effects on the regional security in the ME, which
was one of the principle reasons that Turkey opposed it. Iraq turned into a platform where
the terrorists were being trained. Every other day, suicide bombers would explode
themselves in the crowded centers of the Iraqi cities, turning them into a living hell.
Ironically the US involvement in Iraq ignited more terrorism. Furthermore, an autonomous
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) was established. This created substantial fears in the
ME. This fear was the fear of destabilization of the surrounding countries which contained
substantial Kurdish populations and the fear of re-formation of the ME on the basis of
Alevi-Sunni sectarian lines.
Although the American intervention in Iraq was a nightmare for Turkey, Turkey
had to work to protect its strategic interests in Iraq. Significant Turkish interests in Iraq
included preventing the division of Iraq on the basis of ethnic or sectarian lines that could
lead to the formation of an independent Kurdish state in oil-rich northern regions. Such a
formation could motivate the Turkish Kurds to separate from Turkey; protecting the small
Turkish-speaking Turkmen minority living in northern Iraq; preventing the establishment
of “a potentially hostile nondemocratic fundamentalist Iraqi state; finally, preventing the
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violent activities of the PKK, the Kurdish rebels, which had been using northeastern Iraq
as a training camp. (Barkey 2005)
As the Iraqi state was controlled by the US after the invasion, Turkey did not have
much choice to work towards realization of its security goals except supporting the
establishment of democratic mechanisms in Iraq, a project designed by the US within its
grand strategy to fight radicalism in the ME. However, Turkey was also aware that
considering the conditions of the time, only a functioning democratic state would be able
to keep all different ethnic and confessional groups together. Kurds would not accept the
superiority of any other group any more, particularly at a time when they had substantial
gains as a result of their cooperation with the US during the Iraq war.
Turkey had to engage in Iraq’s domestic affairs in order to influence the
developments in Iraq in its own favor. Turkey decided to support democratic mechanisms
in Iraq to help establish an Iraqi state that could survive and that could control its borders.
Turkey tried to mitigate the aforementioned negative outcomes of war by establishing
multilateral institutions, such as “Iraq’s Neighboring Countries Process”, founded in 2003
in the eve of Iraq war. (Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry 2014) The purpose of this
organization was to develop a supportive international environment to reintegrate Iraq to
the neighborhood. This has been a useful process for the peace, prosperity, and
development in Iraq and security and economic interests of its neighbors.
As a part of its agenda to influence the developments in Iraq in its own favor,
Turkey paid special attention to the 2005 Iraqi national elections. Before the elections,
Turkey tried to convince Sunnis, who had previously decided to protest the elections, to
participate. The statistics indicated that 70% of Iraqis went to vote, and Sunnis secured 19
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seats as a result of Turkey’s activism. Shias formed the majority in Iraq, and Jalal Talabani,
a politician of Kurdish origin, became the president. This was good news for Turkey, as
the participation of such diverse Iraqi groups provided a certain level of legitimacy to the
new Iraqi government. Before the 2010 national elections, Sunnis confessed that they made
a strategic mistake by protesting the elections in 2005, as a result of which the Shias gained
most of the seats in the Iraqi parliament. Ambassador Celikol suggested that:
We want an Iraq that is in peace with its neighbors and its
citizens, as well as a pluralist, democratic Iraq. In order to
establish this Iraq, we, as Turkey, are doing whatever we can
contribute. Some positive developments are happening in Iraq
nowadays. First of all, an administrative law is being accepted in
Iraq. Elections were held in January and November in Iraq.
However, as a result of the nonparticipation of the Sunnis in
January elections in Iraq, the Iraqi parliament had problems in
terms of representing the Iraqi people as a whole. Therefore, we
tried to convince the Sunnis to participate in November elections.
This way we wanted the new parliament to be representative of
the whole Iraq. In our meeting with the Sunnis, we stressed that
they certainly had to participate in the new political process. The
Iraqi parliament that will gather in the upcoming days has gained
a way more representative nature than before. (Celikol 2006)
In addition, Turkey mentored the Iraqi state in setting its legal economic
framework. For example, Turkey helped the Iraqi state in creating the new democratic Iraqi
constitution and laws. (TUSIAD 2012) After the war, Turkey started to share technical
know-how and experience with Iraq. For example, Turkish economic associations, such as
TUSIAD, helped Iraq substantially in drafting a framework for its economy. (TUSIAD
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2012) Turkey also tried to create multilateral institutions to reduce the security risk
emanating from Iraq to the region to minimum levels.
In the process of engagement with Iraq, trade ties between the two countries
considerably improved. At the present, Iraq is one of Turkey’s biggest trading partners. By
2012, Iraq had become the second largest destination for Turkish industrial export
products. In 2008, High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) between Turkey
and Iraq was founded. This framework was created to strengthen the trade ties between the
two countries by the participation and coordination of relevant ministers and bureaucrats.
(Turkey Ministry of Trade 2014)
To sum up, Turkey had no chance except promoting democracy through soft power
tools in Iraq under the American occupation. Turkey promoted democracy through
engaging with different groups and through mentoring the Iraqi authorities. Turkey did so
to ensure Iraq’s territorial integrity. If Iraqi state fell apart, its divisions on the basis of
ethnic and sectarian lines could have impacted the Kurds and Alevis in Turkey. Therefore,
by promoting democracy in Iraq, Turkey tried to ensure its own security. Turkey rarely
applied the military power to deter KRG from supporting the PKK, which was using North
Iraq as a training base. In the following section, I will explain how Turkey dealt with
developments in Syria.
B-Syria
Turkey and Syria had antagonistic relations before 1998 for a number of reasons,
and the most crucial of which being Syria’s claims over Hatay, Syria’s support to PKK,
and disputes over the share of water between Syria and Turkey. However, Turkey and Syria
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signed the Adana Agreement in October 20, 1998, after Syria expelled Abdullah Ocalan,
the leader of the PKK, from its borders. From this point on, Turkish Syrian relations
substantially developed in a number of areas, such as politics, economy, and culture.
(Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014) (See Table 5 and Table 6)
However, the Arab Spring created a destabilizing impact over the ME, including
Syria and Turkey. Turkey was threatened by four particular factors. These are the Syrian
refugees crossing the Turkish border, the new Kurdish formation in Rojava, sectarian
unease, and the new radical religious formation (ISID). Therefore, Erdogan declared: "We
do not see Syria as a foreign problem, Syria is our domestic problem because we have a
850 kilometer border with this country, we have historical and cultural ties, we have
kinship." (The AKP 2014)
The very first challenge to Turkey came from the Syrian refugees. After the conflict
escalated in Syria, over a million Syrians sought refuge in Turkey. “There are more than
400 thousand refugees in the region of Gaziantep alone” (Zander 2013) and over 1 million
refugees in Turkey.66 Some Syrians crossed the Turkish borders with a valid passport, but
most of them did not possess a passport. While Turkey turned a blind eye to the entrance
of most of the Syrian refugees into Turkey, due to the difficulty of controlling the border,
many other entered without Turkey’s consent. While Turkey found it unacceptable to close
its borders to innocent Syrian civilians, Turkey was also frustrated as suicide bombers and
the spies of the antagonistic Syrian regime could enter Turkey. An example of this was
when a car full of explosive materials exploded in Reyhanli town of Hatay, leaving 52
66

The official data on the number of Syrians in Turkey is unreliable, as most of the Syrians cross the
Turkish borders without the approval of the Turkish authorities.
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deaths and 155 injured behind.67 Not to mention the fear that it created in the public. The
attackers (Nasir Eskiocak and Ergin Ordek) confessed that they met with Assad and his
high ranking officials before the attacks several times to plan the attacks. (Mehmet Sahin
2014) An interviewee from Reyhanli reiterated that Assad promised large amount of
money to some of his distant relatives in a village near Reyhanli to explode a car in the city
center of Ankara, which was changed to Reyhanli later on when the Turkish Intelligence
Service (MIT) became aware of their plans.
The second threat to Turkey came from the Kurdish Formation in Rojava, Syria. A
large group of Kurds in Syria, which had structural ties with the PKK, wanted to create an
autonomous government, similar to that of Iraq. This threatened Turkey in two ways:
firstly, this formation could encourage the Turkish Kurds to do the same; and, secondly, as
the Rojava Kurds had close ties with the PKK, this formation would strengthen the PKK,
an organization that had caused the lives of around 40 thousand in Turkey.
The third threat to Turkey came from the Alawi-Sunni conflict in Syria. Syria is
governed by the Alawi minority, and in Turkey, there is a substantial group of Alevis that
identify themselves with Alawis in Syria. It means that Turkey has been supporting the
opposition against the Alawi Assad regime. Turkish Alevi minority reads this attitude of
Turkey from sectarian lenses as they see it as a Sunni act against Alawis as a group. Similar
to the Turkish Alevis, 54% of the Syrians think that Turkish policies towards Syria are
sectarian. (SETA 2013) The death of six individuals with Alevi backgrounds during the
Gezi Park protests further strained the Alevi population in Turkey as they started to think
67

Some of the people that I talked and who live in Reyhanli told me that the number of deaths and injured
was way greater than what the officials revealed.
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that there was an intentional violent campaign against the Alevis in Turkey. However, this
frustrated the Turkish state as well. The Turkish officials started to think that some hidden
forces tried to pull Turkey into sectarian conflicts in the ME. As a result, the sectarian
conflict in Syria started to affect the relations between different sectarian groups in Turkey
negatively.
The fourth factor that poses a threat to Turkey’s national security is the radical
religious formations in Syria. In February 3, 2014, the media, using the Turkish intelligence
services as their sources of information, revealed that 20 suicide bombers, who were the
members of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISID), crossed the Turkish borders to
explode themselves in three major cities of Turkey, namely Ankara, Istanbul, and Hatay.
(Taraf 2014) In addition to the violent campaigns carried out by the Kurdish rebels crossing
the borders, this time Turkey had to deal with the threats posed by the Assad regime as
well as the members of the ISID, angered by Turkish policies towards them. All these
brought the difficulties of controlling the southern borders of Turkey and the AKP’s overly
relaxed border control policy into question.
Turkey’s support for democratization turned into backing the opposition at all costs
against the Assad regime when the conflict in Syria started to harm Turkish national
security. Thus, supporting anti-Assad groups had become a tool of engagement in Syria to
eliminate the threats towards the national security. Turkey’s initial idea was that the
immediate removal of Assad would provide stability in its southern borders after a short
term of political unease. However, the Turkish administration had finally understood the
complicacies in Syria. Yasar Yakis, the former foreign affairs minister of Turkey, was quite
critical about Turkey’s Syrian policy and reiterated that:
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In foreign policy, you never put all of [your] eggs in one basket.
Turkey had bet that Assad would fall in no time and that it would
be the first to reap the rewards… The way things stand now, if
Turkey continues to insist on a Syria without Assad it will be left
isolated. (Yakis 2014)
To sum up, when the Arab Spring arrived to Syria, Turkey had to make a decision,
whether to support Assad or support the opposition. Initially, Turkey tried diplomacy to
push Assad to introduce some reforms demanded by his people for seven months. When
Assad resisted, Turkey started to support the opposition. There were a few important
reasons for this. Firstly, Turkey’s pro-democratic stance during the protests in Tunisia,
Libya, and Egypt created an expectation that Turkey should react similarly in Syria as well.
Secondly, Turkish CSOs pressured the government to oppose the Syrian government’s
violent campaigns against the protestors. Most importantly, Turkey thought that if it
supported the opposition, Assad would fall in no time, and Turkey would reap the rewards
when the new government came to power in Syria.
However, when the conflicts continued longer than the AKP imagined, it resulted
in security risks for Turkey. Consequently, Turkey started to support the Syrian opposition
in many ways. For example, first, Turkey let the Syrian opposition to organize in Istanbul.
Secondly, Turkey opened its doors to the Syrian refugees whose numbers have exceeded
1 million until at the present. Thirdly, when the Syrian Kurds indicated their will for the
formation of an autonomous Kurdish region and when the radical ISID formation emerged,
Turkey started to provide military assistance to the Free Syrian Army that worked for a
democratic and territorially intact Syria. Turkey trained the Free Syrian Army in Reyhanli
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Refugee Camp, (Kemal 2012). However, there is no official data about the extent and type
of Turkey’s military assistance to the Syrian Sunni opposition.
Finally, Turkey has been providing substantial humanitarian assistance in the form
of food and shelter to the Syrians within Syria. The official data from AFAD indicates that
Turkey has already spent USD 2.5 billion on Syrian refugees in the form of humanitarian
assistance since the conflict escalated. (See the following chapter) Regardless, the Turkish
democracy promotion policy has partly been militarized at the present as Turkey is being
threatened by the aforementioned developments in Syria.
Turkey has become more and more isolated due to its emphasis on a Syria without
Assad. Turkey’s Western allies do not share this opinion with Turkey. Considering the
radical elements in Syria and Iraq, which are busy establishing the ISID, the US and the
EU finds the Assad regime as less frightening. On the other hand, the Assad regime has
obtained Russian and Iranian support in material terms, and Chinese diplomatic support.
Therefore, Syria has empowered its position against the Syrian opposition and countries,
such as Turkey, Saudis, Qatar, and the West, that supported the oppoition. Although
Turkey wants to redesign its Syrian policy, it seems that Turkey does not have much option
left.
In the following section, Turkey’s economic interests as another reason for
Turkey’s democracy promotion will be explained. I also demonstrate how Turkey’s
democracy promotion is militarized in Libya to protect its economic interests.
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Economic Interests
Once trade relations between countries reach a meaningful level, they start to
concern themselves with the safety and stability of their economic interests in the
corresponding states. Democracy promoter states often think that democracies make better
trade partners. (Russet 1993) There are three particular reasons for this: Firstly,
democracies have legal mechanisms to channel the grievances of their people. This
prevents the occurrences of radical movements harmful for investment and security in that
country. (Aviles 2012) Thus, respecting human rights means long term stability in the
markets. Secondly, enforcement of a clear rule of law in democratic systems provides a
greater security for the investors in terms of protection of their capital and business
transactions. Finally, in order to facilitate its economic interaction with others, states try to
harmonize their market rules and regulations with the other states’ regulations. The EU
enlargement process is the best example for this. Therefore, I argue that Turkey’s
democracy promotion helps to create sustainable markets for its investments by
harmonizing the targets’ economic and legal frameworks with those of its own. When
Turkey’s economic interests are being threatened, Turkey tries to eliminate these threats
by utilizing a diverse set of foreign policy tools, such as coercion and diplomacy.
Turkey’s rapidly growing economic relations with the ME is a considerable factor
that motivates Turkey to support the institutionalization of the democratic norms and
values in the ME. (Turkey Ministry of Economy 2014) Turkey’s industry has displayed a
substantial improvement in the last twelve years under the AKP rule. The increased
industrial production necessitated finding stable markets for the Turkish products.
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(Kulaklikaya and Nurdun 2010) As the West was going through financial crisis, the ME
seemed to be a life-saving market for the rapidly growing Turkish industry.
Tables 4 and 5 indicate that Turkey’s export to the ME increased along with
economic development at home. While in 2002, Turkey’s export to the ME was USD 4.44
billion and its import was USD 3,09 billion, in 2012 its export increased to 33,25 and its
import to 17,64 billion dollars. As the statistics indicate the main beneficiary of the
increased trade volume between Turkey and the ME has been Turkey.
Table 4. Turkey’s Economic Indicators
Turkey’s Economic Indicators
Column1

GDP

Growth Rates

GDP % Capita

GINI index

in Billion Dollars ($)

(% )

in (thousands)

1990

150

9.2

2,7

-

1995

169

7.8

2,8

-

2000

266

6.7

4,1

-

2001

196

-5.6

3,0

-

2002

232

6.1

3,5

42.7

2003

303

5.2

4,5

43.4

2004

392

9.3

5,8

42.6

2005

483

8.4

7,1

42.5

2006

531

6.8

7,6

40.3

2007

647

4.6

9,2

39.2

2008

730

0.6

10,2

38.9

2009

615

-4.8

8,5

-

2010

731

9.1

10

-

2011

775

8.5

10,5

-

2012

1125

-

-

-

*Source for Table 4: the Turkish Statistical Institute Website
Table 4 indicates that in 2002, when the AKP came to power, Turkey’s overall
GDP was 232 billion dollars; and it went up to 1125 billion dollars under the AKP rule.
This meant that Turkey displayed high levels of economic growth in the last decade. If we
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do not consider the decline in 2008 and 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis, the
average for Turkey’s economic growth under the AKP rule has been 6.44% between 2002
and 2012. The overall export of Turkey went from 39,3 billion dollars in 2003 to 152,6
billion dollars in 2012.68 On the other hand, “Turkey’s general imports have increased from
a 55,6 billion dollars in 2003 to 236,5 billion dollars in 2012.”69 Most importantly,
Turkey’s improving trade ties with the ME is an important part of Turkey’s economic
growth.
Table 5. Turkish-Middle Eastern Trade Relations 1999-2012
Turkish-Middle Eastern Relations 1999-2012

Ye ars
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Value: Billion Dollars
Export to the ME Import from
($)
the ME ($)
3.676.894
3.416.675
3.359.010
5.462.082
4.079.652
5.027.569
4.448.081
3.095.397
6.675.410
4.203.113
9.677.673
5.250.389
12.229.495
7.475.826
13.528.786
10.065.346
17.683.329
12.503.176
28.907.378
16.386.510
24.842.752
9.568.391
28.508.171
16.318.007
31.968.565
24.082.631
33.252.927
17.647.838

ME Tourists
visiting Turkey
762.226
764.133
780.431
880.935
1.031.226
1.288.538
1.285.507
1.617.553
1.917.329
1.955.402
2.192.773
2.438.206
-

*Source for Table 5: the World Bank Website70
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Republic of Turkey, Ministery of Economy, Countries & Regions: Middle East, 02/17/2014.
http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&region=4

69

Republic of Turkey, Ministery of Economy, Countries & Regions: Middle East, 02/17/2014.
http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&region=4

70

http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#
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Turkey’s main export items to the ME include “stones and precious metals, iron
and steel, electrical machinery and equipment, vehicles, machinery and mechanical
appliances, mineral fuels and oils.” (Turkey Ministry of Economy 2014) Turkey mainly
imports raw materials, such as fuels and minerals, “pearls, stones and precious metals,
plastics and articles thereof, organic chemicals, aluminum and articles thereof.”71
Furthermore, as stated by the Turkish Ministry of Trade, “the total value of projects
undertaken by Turkish contractors in Middle East countries exceeded 65,8 billion dollars
by the end of 2012. When we take into consideration the figures for projects undertaken in
2012, which was about 11 billion dollars, the importance of Turkey’s achievements will be
more visible. Prestigious projects such as construction of new airports, undergrounds,
refineries and other facilities for petrochemical industries are also among the projects
undertaken by Turkish contractors in these countries.” (Turkey Ministry of Trade 2014)
Moreover, the growing economic relations resulted in Turkey’s will to create a
predictable rule of law to facilitate and sustain this interaction. The AKP has supported the
creation of a predictable trading environment in the region in principle since the early days
of its administration. Turkey’s Ministry of Trade clearly stresses the importance of a
predictable trading environment by revealing that “the Middle East has been an important
export destination for Turkey and Turkey attaches great importance to the bilateral and
regional initiatives for facilitating trade and for creating a fair and predictable trading
environment in the Middle East.” (Turkey Ministry of Trade 2014) One of the main
concerns of the Turkish businessmen and investors regarding the ME was the safety of

71

Approximately 65 percent of Turkey’s imports from the region are concentrated on mineral fuels & oils.

121

their capital transaction. In this context, enforcement of an understandable rule of law that
would ensure justice when the conflicts arise regarding their business transactions was
crucial. Precondition for a working rule of law was of course the political stability in the
Middle Eastern markets. According to Ikenberry, “democracies are able to develop
relations based on the rule of law rather than political expediency, and this facilitates stable
and mutually beneficial dealings.” (Ikenberry 2000)
A large portion of the Turkish democracy promotion in this regard has been through
mentoring. Turkey helped redesign the economic policies of a number of Middle Eastern
countries on the basis of neoliberal reforms. For example, Syria demanded Turkish help to
redesign its economy to integrate Syria to the Western markets. (Interview with Ali Sahin
2012) The AKP shared its experience about economic policies and reforms with Syria.
Considering that the AKP redesigned the Turkish economic system on the basis of the
Copenhagen Criteria required for membership, the nature of reforms Syria implemented
could easily be understood. This way, Syrian market underwent a substantial process of
economic liberalization.
However, when the Arab Spring started, Turkey’s economic interests were being
threatened in the ME. The Libyan case is particularly important in terms of indicating the
relationship between the extent of Turkey’s economic interaction in a country and what
Turkey could do to protect its economic interests when they are being threatened.
Therefore, I would like to give a detailed account of how Turkey was being progressively
engulfed into a military intervention against Gaddafi rule in Libya in the course of Arab
Spring, despite Turkey’s insistence on diplomatic means of conflict resolution there.
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Libya
Turkey developed strong economic relations with Libya under Gaddafi rule. Before
the Arab Spring (and still), Turkey was among Libya’s greatest trade partners, along with
Italy, Germany, the UK, and South Korea. (Turkey Ministry of Trade 2014) Turkey’s
export to Libya totaled to USD 2 billion, and its import totaled to USD 500 million.
Turkey’s investment in Libya’s construction sector was particularly important in this
regard. In 2011, Turkish construction firms operated in 100 construction sites in Libya to
implement 214 major construction projects. Around 25 thousand Turkish employees
worked for these companies. The value of these projects totaled to USD 15 billion. (A.
Koray 2013)
To provide some detailed information about these construction projects, for
example, SEGA was building the whole infrastructure of Libya’s Al Qaryah ash Sharqiyah
city in Jabal al-Gharbi district. Cevahir Group was building the Benghazi Mall in Benghazi.
Çeltikoğulu implemented the Wadi El Mejaneen sewer system project of the city of Tripoli.
(Sabah Gazetesi 2011) Turkish construction companies were also involved in many other
projects, such as constructing railways, hotels, malls, schools, and hospitals. (Sabah
Gazetesi 2011) It would not be an exaggeration to argue that Libya was being built by the
Turkish construction companies. Therefore, Turkey had concentrated interest in Libya’s
construction sector. When the Arab Spring hit Libya, Turkey started to preoccupy with the
future of its economic interests there. Turkey tried to take a stance that would not harm its
economic interests in Libya.
The protests in Libya began in the first week of February, 2011. Because of the
significant Turkish presence there, Turkey was not able to develop a coherent policy
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throughout the process. Turkey was simply trying to understand the situation in Libya to
make the right decisions, which would not risk its economic interests there. (Dursunoglu
2011) Turkey established firm relations with Gaddafi before the Arab Spring. Therefore,
Gaddafi rule provided Turkey with some kind of warranty for its investment in Libya. On
the other hand, Turkey was not able to predict whether Gaddafi would fall or not when the
protests started. In this regard, initially Turkey remained unresponsive to the demands of
the protestors in Libya. Next, Turkey claimed the role of a mediator when the conflicts
grew. Finally, Turkey joined the opposition camp after realizing the impossibility of the
survival of Gaddafi regime. (Dursunoglu 2011)
In February 21, 2011, Ibrahim Dabbasi, the Libyan deputy permanent
representative, to the UN called the UN to impose a no-fly-zone over Libya. The next day,
Nikolas Sarkozi, the French President, called on the EU to impose sanctions against
Gaddafi, and started to provide a robust support to the protestors in Benghazi. Same day,
Turkey’s ambassador to Libya, Levent Şahinkaya claimed that the protests in Libya were
not as big of a threat as they were being depicted in the global media. Furthermore, he
fingered at the ongoing pro-Gaddafi protests in Tripoli to indicate the extent of the societal
support for Gaddafi. (Kaya 2011) Turkey claimed that the views that suggest a no-fly-zone
over the Libyan skies were unintelligible considering the current circumstances.
Nevertheless, the protests would continue to grow. In February 27, 2011, Mustafa
Abdul Jalil, who was the former justice minister of Gaddafi, established National
Transitional Council. In March 15, 2011, Lebanon’s ambassador to the UN, Nawaf Salam,
proposed the UN to pass a resolution on no-fly-zone in Libya. France and the UK, who had
already voiced similar ideas, provided a robust support to this proposal. On March 17,
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2011, the UN passed the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. After the 1973
resolution, France organized military campaigns against Gaddafi. On March 21, 2011,
France organized a conference in Paris to discuss the crisis in Libya, and Turkey was not
invited.
Turkey perceived France’s premature intervention in Libya as France was trying to
advance its energy interests in Libya by bringing a new French-friendly government to
power. France was buying 15% of the Libyan oil before the Arab Spring. (Regan 2011) In
this sense, France was the second largest costumer of the Libyan oil, after Italy (28%).72
Mustafa Abdul Jalil’s claim that the new Libyan government would give the priority to the
countries that helped Libya the most in its reconstruction process (in the process of the
removal of Gaddafi from power)” would reinforce Turkey’s opinions about France’s
motivations about Libya. (S. Koray 2011) This was worrying for Turkey, as it had a great
stake in Libya’s construction sector. If Turkey provided full support to Gaddafi, and if the
opposition won instead, the future of the Turkish economic activities in Libya would be
under a great risk. (Dursunoglu 2011)
When the Libyan crisis became internationalized, Turkey was still insisting on that
the protests in Libya were not very big and was portraying a pro-Gaddafi image. In
February 22, 2011, Turkish officials indicated that they were negotiating compensation
from Gaddafi for their losses during the protests. (Dursunoglu 2011) In February 28, 2011,
Turkey strongly opposed the NATO intervention in Libya. In March 3, 2011, Ahmet
Davutoglu reiterated that “No group in Libya wants an external intervention. External
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intervention would make the situation worse.” Davutoglu added that they shared their
opinions that “We don’t want Libya to become the second Iraq,” with Clinton and Obama.
(Dursunoglu 2011)
However, beginning from March 14, 2011, Turkey would progressively adopt a
mediator role to resolve the conflict without a military intervention. (S. Koray 2011) As a
result, Turkey started to call on Gaddafi to introduce reforms to address the rightful
demands of the protestors. Moreover, non-invitation of Turkey to the Paris Conference
made Turkey fear that it was being treated as an outsider by France. (Dursunoglu 2011) On
the other hand, in April 6, 2011, due to Turkey’s claim for mediation role, the protestors,
supported by France, accused Turkey for supporting Gaddafi. (Dursunoglu 2011) Turkey
started to realize that the balance of power changed in favor of the opposition in Libya, and
Turkey was being excluded from the process if it did not take the right decisions.
After France’s military attacks against Gaddafi on March 22, 2011, Turkey started
to promote NATO’s involvement in the Libyan crisis on the basis of the UN Security
Council Resolution 1973. Turkey’s goal was to prevent France’s sole leadership in this
process. Turkey as a NATO member would have more power in influencing the decision
making. (Dursunoglu 2011) Turkey’s promotion of NATO succeeded. NATO decided to
partake in Libyan crisis. On March 23, 2011, NATO started to monitor the arm embargo
against Gaddafi, which was previously being carried out by France, UK, and the US.
NATO took charge of the mission on March 31, 2011. The Turkish parliament would allow
Turkey to participate in the military intervention in Libya on March 24, 2011, including
the enforcement of no-fly-zone. However, the way Turkey acted was in direct contrast with
what it had promoted until a few weeks before.
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Turkey would continue its mediation role until April 9, 2011. Despite NATO’s
involvement, Turkey would insist that the crisis in Libya should be resolved by Libyans
alone. Similarly, Turkey declared that Turkey’s role as a NATO member state would be
restricted to the provision of humanitarian assistance to the crisis-hit Libya and evacuation
of civilians from Libya. Turkey would also take part in inspecting the arm embargo against
Gaddafi. (McGreal, Sherwood and Milne 2011) Furthermore, Turkey promoted the
inclusion of the Arab states within the NATO forces to enlarge the basis of the intervention
against Gaddafi, which Turkey thought would bring more legitimacy to this intervention.
(Dursunoglu 2011) The US supported this idea, and invited the Arab League states to
partake in the limited air strike against Gaddafi. As a result, the goal was accomplished; no
individual country would determine Libya’s future on its own, including France; and
Turkey would not be one of the countries that attacked Libya.
Meanwhile, on May 23, 2011, Turkish officials held a meeting with Mustafa Abdul
Jalil in Turkey, and indicated that National Transitional Council was the legitimate
representative of the Libyan people. ( The Tripoli Post 2011) This signified that Turkey
stopped claiming a mediator role, and started to support the opposition. Furthermore,
Turkey decided to provide the Libyan opposition with financial assistance which totaled to
USD 300 million. (Watson 2011) The USD 100 million was provided to the Libyan
opposition in the form of cash donation to buy food and pay salaries. The second portion,
USD 100 million, would be delivered in the form of credit donation; and the third part of
the assistance would be provided in the form of credit loans to the National Transitional
Council. Turkey started to provide the Libyan opposition with financial assistance in July,
2011. This had happened shortly before the opposition entered Tripoli. (Watson 2011)
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Turkey was compelled to partake in military intervention later on; when the
Gaddafi regime survived longer than it was expected, some countries started to indicate
their discontent with the duration of the military intervention under the NATO leadership.
(Dursunoglu 2011) For example, on May 23, 2011, Norway called back its planes, and
Italy called upon the NATO to stop the operations. When the coalition started to break, the
US strongly criticized the countries, including Turkey, for not providing military support.
As a result, Turkey participated in the military intervention by providing the alliance with
six F-16 Fighting Falcons. Before that, Turkey had provided the alliance with five ships
and one submarine to enforce the naval blockade and arm embargo. Turkey’s Izmir Port
and Incirlik military base were also available for the use of NATO during the intervention
in Libya. The NATO ended its mission on October 31, 2011.
After the intervention, Libya had to go through a reconstruction process. This was
what Turkish construction companies had been waiting for. Turkey’s efforts in Libya paid
off. Hitherto, Turkish firms have held 544 projects in Libya with a total value of USD 27,7
billion. (Turkey Ministry of Trade 2014) Turkish investment in Libya has exceeded 37
billion dollars already. Currently, Libya is the third biggest market for the investment of
the Turkish firms. While before the Arab Spring the trade volume between Turkey and
Libya was around USD 2,5 billion, only one year later at the end of 2012, the trade volume
between the two countries had reached USD 3.5 billion. (Koray 2013)
To sum up, the growing economy of Turkey provided Turkey with the ability to
follow a more assertive foreign policy by expanding its investment and diplomatic mission,
particularly in its region. Turkish industrial growth compelled the AKP government to find
markets for the Turkish companies, and maintain stability in these markets. This also
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required creating a clear framework for the economic interactions. (Official data is
provided in the 5th chapter) However, in the Arab Spring, Turkey’s economic interests
were severely being threatened in countries, like Libya. Hence, Turkey’s partaking in the
military intervention stemmed from its intention to protect its economic interests.
Under the AKP rule, Turkey developed substantial relations with Islamic groups in
the ME. When the Arab Spring arrived, these groups gained more power and were being
elected in a number of countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Therefore, Turkey
would try very hard to help the elected government to succeed. Turkey perceived the
elected government as strategic allies. In the following section, I will explain how Turkey
tried to protect its alliances in the process of the Arab Spring.
Strategic Alliances with Like-Minded Governments
Turkish motivation for promoting democracy has become more strategic during the
Arab Spring. By the time the Arab Spring took place’ Turkey had developed substantial
relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Iran, and Syria in the ME. Turkey’s warm
relations with these groups attracted considerable criticisms from the West as the West had
already backtracked from promoting democracy in the ME in 2006.
However, this did not stop the empowerment of the Islamic groups in the ME.
Parties associated with the Brotherhood emerged as the most powerful political actors in
Arab Spring countries in 2011-2012 national elections. For example, Egyptian Freedom
and Justice Party obtained 47.2% of the votes, Tunisian Al-Nahda (Renaissance)
movement obtained 51.1% of the votes, and the Libyan Justice and Development Party
gained 17 sits (the second biggest party), in national elections. The election of the Muslim
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Brotherhood, with which Turkey developed strong ties before the Arab Spring, empowered
the Turkish role in the region substantially. The victory of the Islamic groups since 2005
pushed Israel into historical isolation.
After the AKP came to power, it heavily invested in developing strong relations
with states in the region due to a combination of strategic and ideological factors. For
example, Turkey signed a Free Trade Area agreement with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and
Jordon in 2007. Although, a Turkish-Egyptian Strategic Dialogue Framework
Memorandum was signed in Istanbul, on November 3, 2007, the relations were not elevated
to desired levels until the Arab Spring. After the democratic elections in Egypt in 2011,
which resulted in the victory of the Islamist Freedom and Justice Party, Turkey and Egypt
signed the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HSCC). As it is discussed in the
previous sections, Turkey had similar agreements with the other neighboring countries,
which paved the way for “Shamgen Free Trade Zone” that allowed the free flow of people
and goods between Jordon, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. (Turkey Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2014)
However, it is important to realize that Turkey’s previous efforts to improve ties
with regional actors substantially contributed to its role in the region after the Arab Spring.
Winners of the Arab Spring, the Islamic groups, have had a favorable approach towards
the Turkish role in the region. The AKP strengthened its relations with the Islamic groups
in a number of ways, such as mutual visits, the training of the members of Islamic parties
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in Turkey, holding mutual conferences, supporting Palestinians against the Israelis, and
providing financial assistance.73
This continued after the Arab Spring, when Turkish top officials who visited
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya indicated their wills for strong cooperation and offered financial
assistance to the newly elected governments. In this regard, Turkish state provided the
Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party with 1 billion USD aid in the form of concessional
loan, half of it to be paid in 2012 and the other half 2013. (Development 2012) The support
that the AKP provided to the Islamists by Turkey was translated as playing into the
sectarian dynamics of the region by the seculars in the region. (Alessandri and Altunisik
2013) Nonetheless, provision of this aid was a clear indication of the AKP’s inclinations
towards the conservative forces in the Arab ME, who were its ideological partners.
The Turkish AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood, which obtained power in Egypt
and Tunisia, had a common approach in a number of areas. For example, the relations
between Israel and Turkey were bitter due to the Mavi Marmara tragedy. The Muslim
Brotherhood was a strong critic of Israel in its treatment of the Palestinians. Like Turkey,
the Muslim Brotherhood also backed the Syrian opposition against Assad. Furthermore,
the Muslim Brotherhood criticized pro-Assad Iran for its detrimental role in Syrian crisis.
(Al-Monitor 2013) Morsi, who was also an influential member of Egypt’s the Muslim
Brotherhood, revealed: “We should all express our full support of the struggle of those who
are demanding freedom and justice in Syria and translate our sympathies into a clear
political vision that supports peaceful transfer of power to a democratic system. (Tisdall
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2012) Moreover, similar to Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood has been at logger heads with
Iran over its Syrian policy. Also, both the AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood oppose the
intervention of foreign powers in the region; both Turkey and the Brotherhood aim to form
a peaceful political atmosphere and a fertile ground for the cooperation between the
Muslim nations.
However, removal of Morsi from power by a military coup d’état, the prolonging
civil war in Syria, which could have had spill-over effect on Turkey, and the unstable
political environment in Tunisia, caused by the killing of the Mohamed Brahmi, the leader
of the nationalist opposition, all damaged Turkey’s new alliances in the ME. In order to
prevent this deteriorating situation in the ME, Turkey has been providing full support to
the opposition in Syria, providing technical, financial, and diplomatic assistance to Tunisia,
and has recently downgraded its diplomatic relations with Egypt under the interim
government, after the military coup. (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014)
The likelihood of a successful democratic transition required a supportive
international and domestic environment. The international environment was not quite
supportive toward the newly elected Islamic parties. For example, the US had traditionally
provided Egypt under the Mubarak rule with substantial financial support. However, the
US withdrew this aid from Egypt when r the Freedom and Justice Party was in power. The
provision of 1.5 billion USD aid to Egypt one month before the military coup d’état has
been perceived as financing the military coup in Egypt (Stanly, The Telegraph 2013) by
Turkey. The unfavorable approach of the US and the EU towards the elected Islamic
governments in the region has deeply disappointed Turkey.
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In this regard, despite Turkey’s history as a staunch Western ally, its policies
towards the post-Arab Spring ME have not been quite in line with the Western interests.
Therefore, Turkey found itself at loggerheads with the West regarding their attitudes
toward the democratically elected Islamic groups. The divergences between Turkey and
the West were so deep that they pushed Turkey into a strategic loneliness in the ME after
the removal of Morsi from power. Turkey has been doing whatever it has been able to do
so as to strengthen its international position, and supporting the oppositions in the Arab
Spring countries has become a part of this.
To conclude, it can be said that Turkey supported the American democracy
promotion in the ME within the BMENA framework. The reason for Turkey’s support was
its belief in the positive outcomes that democratization would produce, such as economic
development, good governance, respect for human rights, enforcement of the rule of law,
and regional integration. If democratization of the region was to produce these outcomes,
both Turkey and the other states in the ME would benefit from it. Supporting BMENA
would also repair the damaged Turkish-US ties after the disapproval of March-1 Bill in
Turkey. However, Turkey had some reservations. Democratization, according to Turkey,
had to happen incrementally, consistently, in an internally driven fashion, and without
external intervention. In this regard, Turkish and the EU stances were very similar.
When the Arab Spring took place, both Turkey and the West had to take a side.
Turkey considered the Arab Spring to be a positive development; thus, its interpretation
was that events had started to flow in the right direction. Turkey considered people’s
demand for human rights, good governance, rule of law, and economic development as a
part of global movement for democratization. For Turkey, these were the rightful demands

133

of people. In this regard, these demands would not be and should not be reversed, as the
region profoundly needed such a transformation.
As Olsen suggested, when interests are at stake, the primary concern of states
becomes their interests rather than their values.74 When the conflict escalated, Iraq, Libya,
and Syria, and Turkey became preoccupied with their security and economic interests. In
Libya and Syria, Turkish democracy promotion became militarized. While Turkey was
compelled to partake in military intervention against Gaddafi by the US, Turkey has been
providing military assistance to the Free Syrian Army in Reyhanli refugee camp. Turkey
could not use its military power in Iraq under the US control. As a result, Turkey utilized
soft power tools to promote democracy in Iraq, which Turkey considered to be the only
way to keep Iraq’s unity - as one piece, which was crucial for Turkey’s own territorial
integrity.
By the time Arab Spring took place, Turkey had established substantial economic
ties in the Arab ME. Turkish investment dramatically increased in the region. Also,
Turkey’s trade with Arab countries reached considerable levels. In this regard, Turkish
business sectors needed stability in the region more than anything else. Moreover, a clear
and understandable rule of law would contribute to the fertile trading environment in the
region. To begin with, Turkey tried to create a predictable trading environment by sharing
experience and practical training with its partners in the ME. Turkey also decided to
support the protestors to create a long term stable environment in the region, as in the
Turkish point of view, opposing people who demanded change was fruitless.
74

Graye R. Olsen, Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post-Cold War Africa: How Serious is
Europe and for What Reason?, African Affairs, 97/388: 366, 1998.

134

Another crucial dimension of Turkish democracy promotion was related to the
alliances Turkey had built before and in the course of the Arab Spring. The election of the
Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt and Tunisia, and the Hamas rule in Palestine
strengthened the Turkish role in the region. In Libya, the Muslim Brotherhood, gaining 17
seats, ran second in the national election. Turkey supported the opposition in Syria so that
a Turkish-friendly government would come to power there, serving its long term strategic
interests. In the states bordering Mediterranean Sea, a strong Islamist network emerged.
When the military coup d’état took place in Egypt, Turkey strongly condemned it and
downgraded its diplomatic relations with Egypt as Turkey lost its closest Arab ally, Morsi.
In this regard, Turkey’s support for democratization—from supporting the opposition
groups to opposing the military coup d’état, and from there to providing support for Tahrir
Square—has been a matter of defending its strategic alliances. Turkey also considered such
an alliance to be beneficial for the region as a whole.
Most importantly, when Turkey’s strategic interests were being threatened, Turkey
tried very hard to reconcile its interests with its ideals. However, when Turkey realizes the
impossibility of such reconciliation, Turkey gives priority to protecting its strategic
interests.
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CHAPTER V: STRATEGIES (1): TURKEY’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
THROUGH OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
Since the AKP came to power, Turkey has engaged with the ME more assertively.
One of the ways of engagement has been through the promotion of democracy. Turkish
official democracy promotion in the ME started in 2004 through the BMENA (Broader
Middle East and North African) initiative. This project was initially launched by the US to
promote democracy and open market in the ME. Turkey under the AKP strongly supported
the idea of democratization of the ME due to a number of significant identity-based and
strategic considerations, explained in the previous chapters comprehensively.
In this chapter, my goal is to explain the strategies and projects through which
Turkey promotes democracy in the BMENA region. My findings indicate that Turkey has
promoted democracy through a number of channels, such as enlargement, experience
sharing, providing a good role model, military intervention, normative pressure, and
“Official Development Assistance” (ODA). In this chapter, I will focus on ODA alone.
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The reason is that by examining ODA in a time series manner, I will be able to indicate the
map of Turkey’s foreign aid, how much Turkey invests in a country, why Turkey invests
in some countries more than the others, and how Turkey channels its ODA into the target
states. The other aforementioned strategies of democracy promotion will be explained in
the following chapter.
Since the beginning of the Arab Spring Turkey’s support to the democratization in
the ME has gained a more strategic orientation. In the last three years, Turkish financial
assistance (as a part of its ODA) to the region has skyrocketed. Furthermore, this chapter
also confirms that Turkey’s humanitarian considerations have been overridden by its
strategic interests when the strategic interests were being threatened. The financial
assistance to the like-minded Islamic parties in Egypt, Tunisia, and Palestine in this regard
are the practices to form strategic alliances in the ME. Turkey’s engagement with Syria
and Iraq through supporting democratization is a result of its desire to ensure its survival.
Turkey’s engagement with Libya is a result of Turkey’s economic interests. In Iraq, Syria,
and Libya, Turkey does want to form strategic alliances, but this motivation is secondary
to Turkey’s security and economic interests in these countries. Moreover, Turkey’s
strategic calculations are being articulated within Turkey’s cultural context by the AKP,
which claims a regional power role for Turkey and which has deep roots in political Islam.
In this chapter, I consider ODA as a part of Turkey’s democracy promotion
strategies. There are substantial reasons for this. Turkey does not have well-designed
democracy promoter institutions, such as USAID and NED. Turkey categorizes all of its
official aid, such as humanitarian, technical, and democracy assistance, under its ODA.
TIKA (Turkish Development and Cooperation Agency) performs its development and
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democratization activities in coordination with the Turkish Republic’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Therefore, I will try to contextualize Turkish ODA to the BMENA region within
the framework of democracy promotion. While doing this, I will provide examples from
the other parts of the world to better comprehend Turkish democracy assistance initiatives.
Turkey has a long history of ODA provision. Turkey is a founding member of
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), and has been
proposed by the OECD to become a member of DAC (Development Assistance
Committee)75 in 2012. The OECD was founded to discuss matters related to sustainable
economic development in the member countries. The DAC coordinates relations with and
economic assistance for developing world. The members of the DAC are well-known with
the high amount of humanitarian aid they deliver to the developing world. Not yet a
member of DAC, Turkey has been reporting its assistance to the DAC since 1990. The
financial aid delivered to the developing world by the OECD through the contributions of
the member states is called “Official Development Assistance” (ODA). “Official
Humanitarian Assistance” (OHA) is a component of ODA. (Global Humanitarian
Assistance 2014) The largest recipients of Turkey’s ODA were, in order of magnitude,
Syria, Egypt, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Palestine, Kazakhstan
and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2012. (TIKA 2012)
In the following section, I will try to explain the Turkish ODA in more detail. I will
start with the official institutions through which Turkey channels its ODA, and then I will
explain the development and geographic distribution (region-base and country-base) of the
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Turkish ODA under the AKP administration. Afterwards, I will examine the status of
Official Humanitarian Assistance (OHA) within Turkey’s ODA.
Official Institutions and the Provision of ODA
Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversees Turkey’s institutions that deal with
development, humanitarian assistance and Turkey’s policy priorities. TIKA, Turkey’s
International Cooperation and Development Agency76, is the primary institution
responsible for channeling ODA to the target states through a number of mechanisms.
These mechanisms include the governmental institutions, national or international CSOs,
public and private partnership, and multilateral international organizations.77 Turkey’s
“Disaster and Emergency Management Office (AFAD) and Turkish Red Crescent
(Kizilay) are the two sub-governmental institutions that help TIKA to deliver Turkey’s
ODA to the target states. Targets are determined by TIKA in coordination with Turkish
Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the basis of Turkey’s foreign policy priorities.
However, TIKA is responsible to the Turkish Prime Ministry.78 TIKA has 33 coordination
offices in 30 countries globally. However, TIKA’s helping hand has extended to over 100
countries in different regions of the world. (TIKA 2014)
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As TIKA is the umbrella organization that coordinates the ODA among the Turkish
governmental and non-governmental institutions, TIKA needs a detailed examination.
TIKA was established in 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was initially
designed to coordinate the Turkish development aid to the newly independent Central
Asian Republics.79 To begin with, TIKA focused on helping build a sufficient state
structure in Central Asia. Later, TIKA started to get involved in cultural, social, and
economic cooperation with newly independent Central Asian countries. By 2000, TIKA
had gained substantial experience in the field of development assistance. Parallel to
globalization, TIKA expanded its reach to the global level as well. TIKA started to operate
in regions as diverse as the ME, Balkans, Southeast Asia, Americas, and Africa. However,
Turkey is interested particularly in culturally identical areas or regions where Turkey has
substantial strategic interests when delivering its ODA.
As Turkey expanded its reach worldwide, it also increased the amount of its
development assistance considerably to respond to its global level development agenda.
Turkey’s development aid consisted of about USD 85 million in 2002. This amount went
up to USD 1 billion 273 million in 2011. Currently, Turkish ODA goes well beyond USD
4 billion. (TIKA 2012) “TIKA is ranked amongst the Turkish organizations that carry out
most technical co-operations.”80 TIKA is involved in the areas of education, economy,
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social and physical infrastructures, security, capacity building, culture, construction,
health, (TIKA 2014) and politics.
A number of Turkish official institutions are involved in the ODA. The top
governmental institutions that contribute to the Turkey’s ODA are Office for Coordinating
the Syrian Guest Affairs, Turkish Armed Force, Turkish National Police, Manas
University, Under Secreteriat of Treasury, Higher Education Loans and Dormitories
Agency, TOKI (Turkey’s Official Construction Development Agency), Ahmet Yesevi
University, Ministry of Health, TRT (Turkey’s official TV channel), Presidency of Turks
Living Abroad, Turkish Red Crescent, and AFAD (Turkey’s Emergency Management
Office). (TIKA 2012)
In the following section I will explain the Turkish ODA in more detail.
Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Detail
Turkey accepts the OECD definition of ODA (Official Development Assistance).
According to OECD, ODA is “a loan or grant from an official source to a developing
country or a multilateral agency for the promotion of economic development and welfare.
It is reported by the members of the DAC along with several other government donors and
institutions according to strict criteria each year. It includes sustainable and poverty
reducing development assistance for sectors such as governance and security, growth,
social services, education, health, and water and sanitation.” (Global Humanitarian
Assistance 2014) Development assistance is considered ODA if three conditions are met:
The first one is that public sector should be providing it. The second is that the goal should
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be fostering economic development and welfare; and, finally, it should contain at least 25%
of grant element, and this is concessional. (TIKA 2012)
Turkey, since 1950s, has been providing ODA to the developing and
underdeveloped nations in different parts of the world. However, Turkey’s development
aid has gone through substantial transformations since then. Two crucial factors played a
role in these transformations: Turkey’s new economic dynamics and Turkey’s increasing
sense of regional responsibility towards its neighbors. Previously, Turkey tried to influence
the Central Asian Turkik Republics after the collapse of the Soviet Russia. The
establishment of TIKA was a natural result of this intention. In the 2000s, Turkey under
the AKP rule turned its face to the BMENA region. In this process, the amount of ODA
provided for the surrounding countries has substantially increased. This also indicated the
two foreign policy priorities of Turkey: Central Asia between 1990 and 2002 and BMENA
between 2002 and 2014. (Turkey Foreign Affairs Ministry 2014) As a result of Turkey’s
extended activities in these areas, Turkey emerged as a forceful actor in the international
development and cooperation field. (Turkey Foreign Affairs Ministry 2014)
Turkey launched its ODA policy on June 5, 1985 by delivering aid to a number of
impoverished African countries, such as Gambia, Somalia, and Sudan. The collapse of the
Soviet Union provided the right context for Turkey to provide assistance for the Central
Asian Turkik Republics. In the minds of the Turkish administration, Turkey shared a
common ethnic origin and language with the Turkik Republics.81 Within the context of this
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new foreign policy formulation, Turkey designed TIKA to help the politically and
economically troubled Central Asian republics. TIKA would help these post-Soviet states
to build a working state infrastructure. In 2002, after obtaining power, this time Turkey,
under the AKP rule, turned its attention towards the ME. The identity-based and strategic
factors, explained in the previous chapters, were the main driving reasons. The AKP’s
willing participation in BMENA82 initiative provided evidence for the AKP’s intentions to
contribute to the democratization in BMENA countries. Turkey’s new policy orientation
towards BMENA considerably increased the amount of Turkish aid to the region.
However, what makes Turkey an interesting case is that Turkey has been a recipient
and simultaneously, a donor of ODA for a long time. For example, “in 2011 gross ODA to
Turkey increased to US$3.7 billion making it the sixth largest recipient globally. Prior to
2009, Turkey had not even been amongst the world’s top 20 recipients of aid since 1991,
which was the year when aid was given to help to recover the country from the Van
Earthquake.” (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014) Also, for years Turkey has been a
hot spot for democracy promoters. American and European democracy assistance groups
have been very active in Turkey. (Karakas 2010) Interestingly, Turkey under the AKP rule
has emerged as a respectable actor in the area of ODA. At present, Turkey has an active

advance its economic interests in the region. In fact, in TIKA’s official webpage, it is claimed that Turkish
Development Aid is provided to the regions where Turkey has substantial economic interests.
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role in promoting development and democracy in different parts of the world, particularly
in BMENA. (Bagci and Sinkaya 2006)
I consider ODA as a part of democracy promotion if it is done by democratic states.
States might provide assistance to target states as a way to transform their regimes.
However, ODA might have an indirect impact over the democratic transformation of the
target states as well. For example, the US supported the Latin American states with ODA
to help build their capacity, for a long period of time. (Carothers, Elusive Synthesis 2010)
During this interaction, the US naturally transferred its democratic mechanisms and
process to these countries, providing a good example for ODA’s indirect impact on limited
democratization. States have clear interests in helping other states organize themselves in
similar lines. (Smith 2010) Furthermore, both the EU and the US stipulated democratic
reform to the countries that demanded financial assistance from them. (Borzel and Risse
2009) In this regard, ODA could be a part of democracy promotion policy.
However, conditioning the provision of ODA to stimulate political, economic, and
social change within the target state undermines its sovereignty. Sovereignty emerged a
significant norm in the post-Westphalian international order after 1648. (McFaul 20042005) Although powerful states often disrupted this norm by conquering other states, it
nevertheless remained as an important norm between them until the First World War. At
the beginning of the 20th century, when the big empires were being destroyed, this norm
lost some of its value. Nevertheless, after the Second World War, in the process of
decolonization, this norm gained global attention again. In the last several decades, an
interesting development took place: some other significant norms have become accepted
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by the international society. (McFaul 2004-2005) These are the norms of human rights,
democracy, and open market economy.
McFaul (2004-2005) argues that “norms protecting the sovereignty of states still
trump norms protecting the rights of individuals, but the balance is shifting. Currently,
global organizations, such as the UN and World Bank, the CSOs, and a significant number
of democratic states, mainly in the West, promote human rights and democracy. (McFaul
2004-2005) Increasingly states abusing human rights at home need to give an account for
its violations to the international society of their conducts. However, states might take
advantage of the human rights abuses in another country to intervene in that state’s
domestic affairs for their strategic concerns. In other words, they disguise their strategic
concerns and try to make their intervention appear as if they were acting for the benefit of
that state.
ODA has been created to help develop target states’ administrative, economic,
security, social, educational, and health sectors. It also helps with water and sanitation,
crucial for survival of individuals. (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014) However, I find
it important to add one more variable to this list, which is the “political sector.” The Turkish
case indicates that states are involved in a modest exercise of power competition when
promoting democracy. The donor states determine the targets on the basis of a calculation
of their strategic interests83 articulated within their respective cultural environments.
Nurdun, a top TIKA official, reiterates that the delivery of the Turkish ODA is determined
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I make this assertion on the basis of the Turkish case. For example, see Kulaklikaya and Nurdun, Turkey
as a new player in development cooperation, 2010. Turkey has been engaging with Iraq and Syria to ensure
its national security and maintain economic interests. In this regard, for example, the largest amount of
ODA in 2012 was being delivered to Syria, where conflict has escalated due to the Arab Spring.
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on the basis of Turkey’s strategic calculations. (Kulaklikaya and Nurdun, Turkey as a New
Player in Development Cooperation 2010) It is not a coincidence that Turkey delivers the
largest portion of its ODA to Central Asian republics, Turkey’s eastern neighbors, and the
Middle Eastern states, which are Turkey’s southern neighbors. All these states possess
substantial natural resources, making them important for the strategic interests of the
Turkish state. Similarly, it is not a coincidence that the US started to promote democracy
in Latin America, the southern neighborhood, where it fought against the expansion of
Soviet Russia (Carothers, Elusive Synthesis 2010) and worked to open the Latin American
markets to its products.84
While the Western world has progressively separated democracy assistance from
development aid since 1980s, (Carothers, Elusive Synthesis 2010) Turkey still considers
assisting a target state to transit to democracy as a part of its ODA strategy. Turkey
categorizes all the official aid targeting the outside world under the category of ODA.
Turkey classifies the sum of its official and unofficial aid under the category of TDA (Total
Development Aid). (TIKA 2012) For example, Turkey considers its humanitarian
assistance which has amounted to USD 2.5 billion to Syrian guests85 within Turkey
between 2012 and 2014 ( Hurriyet 2014) and its financial assistance which has amounted
to USD 1 billion to the Islamist government in Egypt as a part of its 2012 ODA. (TIKA
2012) In both cases, Turkey’s intention has been to help the opposition forces to achieve
the democratic transformation in the BMENA region. This transformation is considered to
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Also, see William Robinson Cox. Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, the US Intervention, and
Hegemony. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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Turkey officially refers to Syrian Refugees as “Syrian Guests.”
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strengthen the Turkish economic and security interests as Turkey is seen as a role model
by the oppositional forces in BMENA. (Akgun and Gundogar, The Perception of Turkey
in the ME in 2013 2014)
The original rationale behind promoting democracy through development aid was
the modernization theory of Lipset.86 Lipset treated urbanization, economic development,
and improving literacy rates as the indicators of modernization. In Lipset’s mindset,
democratization was the natural result of modernization. In the modernization process,
industrialization would foster economic development, resulting in the expansion of the
middle class. The growing middle class, recognized for their habits of consumerism, would
demand freedoms to live the life style they prefer. This required minimum government
intervention in civic life. Therefore, in Lipset’s viewpoint, the growing demands of the
middle class would finally foster democratization. This happened in the West, and there
was no reason why it would not happen elsewhere.
Yet theory of modernization was challenged by major scholars, such as Huntington.
(Huntington 1968) According to Huntington, in a country where socioeconomic standards
of people rapidly grow, the process could actually result in de-modernization, if the process
is not rightly managed by the political apparatus. The government in such cases should
respond to the growing demand of people for equality, justice, rights and freedoms.
Huntington’s de-modernization thesis would create vivid debates among the American
policy makers and scholars over the utility of democracy promotion for the US interests
and over the strategies to promote democracy.
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See Carothers, Elusive Synthesis, 2010; Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World, 1973.
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The process in which the theory of modernization was being challenged would
result in the creation of specific programs, called democracy assistance. (Carothers, Aiding
Democracy Abroad: Learning Curve 1999) These programs were designed with a clear
focus on elections, political parties, civil society, business associations or trade unions, rule
of law, media, and the parliament in the target states. (Carothers, Assessing Democracy
Assistance: the Case of Romania 1996) They would be carried out by state organizations,
such as the USAID and CSOs in coordination with the USAID. (Carothers, Aiding
Democracy Abroad: Learning Curve 1999)
There were also strategic calculations behind the utilization of the ODA by the US
government. The ODA was used as a tool to prevent or to reverse the spread of communism
in Latin American and Eastern European countries. (Carothers, Assessing Democracy
Assistance: the Case of Romania 1996) From the American point of view, the needy people
were the most vulnerable among the others, and communism could respond to their demand
for social justice. (Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: Learning Curve 1999) In this
regard, the US had to help the needy states to strengthen their capacities to serve their
people in a more efficient and effective manner. Furthermore, if democratization was
achieved in target states, the US would gain victory against the Soviet influence.
Democratization in this sense meant the victory of pro-US parties in target states, and
surely, they would make better partners in trade and international politics for the US. 87
(Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: Learning Curve 1999)
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Also, see McFaul, Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences in the Orange Revolution, 2007.
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Most importantly, states have clear interest in helping other states organize
themselves in similar ways. (Smith 2010) This facilitates the economic, social, educational,
bureaucratic, and political interaction between them. However, the most sizeable share in
this interaction goes to the state that transfers its norms and institutions to the target states.
For example, after the Latin American countries institutionalized the neo-liberal economic
policies, their economies were dominated by the American goods. Similarly, after Iraq and
Syria liberalized their market rules, their markets were dominated by the Turkish goods. In
this regard, the biggest beneficiaries in these cases are the countries with greater
economies.
Similar to the US, Turkey has supported democracy in the ME for a number of
strategic interests as well. Turkey’s shared identity with ME states facilitated Turkey’s
interaction with the region. At times, Turkey had to act on the basis of the shared identity
as well. This happened particularly when the human rights were being profoundly abused,
such as in Palestine and recently in Syria.
The Turkish case indicates that Turkey has been involved in a modest provision of
development aid to developing states in Balkans, Africa and Asia, since 1980s. Within the
context of technical assistance, Turkey transferred its democratic experiences to a number
of countries, such as Syria, Tunisia, Palestine, and Iraq. Turkey has built physical
infrastructure necessary for a functioning democracy, such as building a parliament in
Somalia. Consequently, I think ODA plays an important role in democratic transformation
of the target states. Needless to say, a functioning bureaucratic apparatus that ensures the
minimum enforcement of rule of law and that provides a certain degree of societal services
is a precondition for democracy. Linz and Stepan, further stipulate the existence of an
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economic, political, and civil society, an efficient bureaucracy, and a functioning rule of
law as the preconditions of democracy. (Linz and Stepan 1996)
Table 6 indicates Turkey’s Total (official and governmental) Development
Assistance (TDA) and “Official Development Assistance” (ODA) to the developing world
between 2003 and 2012. The statistics display a steady increase in the amount of TDA
Turkey provided to the developing world. Although between 2003 and 2011, Turkish TDA
increased in a parallel fashion (almost equal), in 2012 Turkish Official Aid suddenly
increased, doubling the private aid flowing from Turkey into the developing world. While
Turkish private aid remained at USD 903.18 million, Turkey’s ODA went up to USD
2533.3 million. By 2011, the Turkish OHA has reached to 1.0 billion USD, making up 40%
of Turkey’s ODA. (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2013)
Table 6. Turkey's Development and Humanitarian Assistance

*TOTALOFFPRI: Total Official and Private Aid
*OFFDEVASSIST: Official Development Assistance
This has ranked Turkey as the fourth largest donor globally; the US being the first,
the EU institutions being the second, the UK being the third, and Turkey being the fourth
largest donor. Turkish Private Assistance includes the “Other Official Flows” (OOF)88 and
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This includes assistance, such as debt relief.
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“Direct Investment” by private sector (DI) to the target countries. The Turkish OOF
amounted to 56.53 million USD in the form of loan facilities in 2012. Turkey included DI
within its ODA since it stimulated economic development in the target states. Turkish DI
in target countries in 2012 amounted to 735 million USD. (TIKA 2012) Another source of
TDA was the Turkish CSOs’ own resources. Turkish CSOs’ development assistance in
2012 amounted to 111.65 million USD.
Table 7. TDA Components for 2012

Aid
TDA
DI
Amount
Million 3436.48
USD

NGOA
735

OOF

111.65

56.53

*Source: TIKA Development Report 2012.
Turkish ODA and Democratization in the BMENA Region
In 2012, “46.6% of Turkish assistance was delivered to the Middle East, 31% to
Africa, 18% to South and Central Asia, and 3% to Balkans and East Europe.” (TIKA 2012)
Table 8 indicates the region-base Turkish Official Development Assistance. Turkey
delivered development aid to a diverse set of nations in the world, including all existing
continents. The table examines the period between 2003 and 2012. As data on Turkish
ODA for 2013 and 2014 is not available yet, I could not include it in this table. On the
other hand, the largest amount of aid (USD 1,694.21 million) is being provided to the
BMENA countries, which consist of North Sahara and the ME countries, in 2012. BMENA
is followed by the Central and South Asia in terms of amount of provision of the Turkish
ODA (USD 436.08 Million).
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Although provision of the Turkish ODA to the Central and South Asian countries
is not specified in the Table 9, the OECD statistics indicate that Afghanistan was the largest
recipient of the Turkey’s ODA among the Central and South Asian countries. Turkey has
built health clinics, schools, mosques, and roads, and has been training Afghani civil and
military bureaucrats as well as providing technical aid to build a working state
infrastructure in Afghanistan. (TIKA 2012) Afghanistan is not an official BMENA country,
yet Turkey has had substantial assistance there.
Table 8. Total Amount of Turkish ODA by Regions, 2003-2012, in Million USD

Turkish ODA to BMENA increased from USD 2.45 million to USD 1,694.21
million between 2003 and 2012. (See Table 8) Turkey’s ODA to BMENA had been going
upward gradually until 2011. In 2012, one year after the beginning of the Arab Spring,
Turkish ODA leaped to astronomic levels in BMENA. While Turkish ODA to BMENA
was USD 351.12 million in 2011, it had gone up to USD 1,694.21 million by 2012. On the
other hand, Turkish ODA to the Central and South Asia had been steadily increasing. Even
the 2008 global financial crisis did not diminish the Turkish ODA to these two regions.
Although data about 2013 and 2014 is not included in these tables, it is safe to assert that
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the Turkish ODA has increased to a much larger amount in 2014. This is a result of
Turkey’s substantial aid to war-torn Syria, and the other Arab states that have been
experiencing a regime transition, such as Tunisia and Libya. For example, AFAD indicated
that since 2012, Turkey has spent USD 2.5 billion on Syrians alone. (AFAD 2014)
TIKA determines the target of development aid through the guidance of the Turkish
Foreign Affairs Ministry on the basis of the Turkish foreign policy priorities. (Kulaklikaya
and Nurdun, Turkey as a New Player in Development Cooperation 2010) As it could be
seen in Table 8, the amount of ODA Turkey spends on different regions indicates Turkey’s
foreign policy priorities. Until 2011, Turkey has prioritized Central and South Asia,
delivering the highest amount of aid. Although, in this process (2003-2011) Turkish ODA
to the BMENA countries has increased substantially, it has not exceeded the ODA to the
Central and South Asia. However, after the Arab Spring, Turkish ODA to the BMENA
region increased astronomically. This means that Turkish foreign policy priorities have
shifted from Central and South Asia to the BMENA in the course of Arab Spring. Turkey
established strong relations with the Islamic actors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and
Hamas, in BMENA before the Arab Spring. Turkey increased the amount of ODA to the
transitioning BMENA countries to help sustain the newly elected friendly Islamist
governments and to finalize the struggle in Syria.
The Country-Based distribution of the ODA in the BMENA
Turkish ODA to the BMENA has followed an increasing trend since 2003 under
the AKP rule. However, there is a positive relationship between the regional developments
and Turkish ODA. It is clear that Turkey uses ODA as an instrument to engage in the

153

troubled countries where it has substantial strategic interests. For example, following the
2003 American intervention in Iraq, Turkish aid jumped from USD 1,25 million in 2003
to USD 24,57 million in 2004. It continued to increase until 2009 (USD 51,33 million).
However, it is seen that the financial crisis of 2008 affected the Turkish ODA to Iraq as
well, causing a decline to USD 39.31 million in 2010. Due to the emergence of Arab
Spring, Turkey started to reallocate its ODA to a different set of countries.
Table 9. Turkey's ODA to the BMENA Countries for 2003-2012 in USD Million

Countries

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Algeria

0.07

0.05

1.05

0.75

0.18

0.19

0.22

0.51

0.49

1.1

Egypt

0.03

0.26

1.2

0.62

0.72

0.95

0.91

1.3

3.51

503.92

1.01

53.11

3.1

Libya

..

..

3.77

1.05

1.07

1.71

0.91

Morocco

..

0.26

1.06

0.35

0.38

0.49

0.49

0.45

0.75

1.44

Tunisia

..

0.02

1.29

0.56

0.56

1.29

0.7

0.34

0.61

60.39

Iran

1.02

12.23

3.91

5.15

7.44

15.45

14.8

16.62

11.34

12.8

Iraq

1.25

24.57

12.92

18.85

46.68

47.68

51.33

39.31

27.83

19.39

Jordan

0.03

0.44

0.62

1.04

1.1

1.4

0.93

1.75

1.58

3.53

Lebanon

0.02

0.34

0.3

36.1

15.7

26.59

11.53

26.82

7.06

7.95

0.1

1.93

4.56

3.62

5.69

4.11

4.62

9.52

162.03

1019.93

Palestine

0.01

4.49

11.16

20.34

14.22

20.18

48.2

27.83

25.92

51.23

Yemen

0.01

0.03

0.1

0.04

0.08

0.44

1.24

6.01

0.45

4.52

0.7

8.74

28.56

57.65

71.61

141.96

96.46

107.32

130.89

151.75

Syria

Afghanistan

*Source: OECD Statextracts, http://stats.oecd.org/#
*DAD: Development Assistance Database
* Afghanistan is not a BMENA country
Egypt
The impact of Arab Spring on the distribution of the Turkish ODA is very obvious
(TIKA 2012) in Table 9. For example, Turkish development assistance to Egypt was
insignificant when Mubarak was still in power. In 2011, when the Egyptian democratic
elections were being held, the Turkish ODA to Egypt increased to USD 3.51 million. After
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the election of Islamist Justice and Freedom Party to power, Turkish ODA to Egypt
skyrocketed. Turkey delivered USD 503,92 million to Egypt. This was almost 500 times
more than the aid provided to Egypt in 2010. Turkey provided this assistance to Egypt in
the form of concessional loan within the framework of an agreement between the Turkish
Under Secretariat of Treasury and Egyptian Ministry of Finance. The actual loan amounted
to over USD 1 billion. The first trench, USD 500 million, was delivered to Egypt in 2012,
and the second trench, 500 million USD, was decided to be delivered in 2013. The cited
goal was to foster economic development and welfare in Egypt through financing public
infrastructure projects. (TIKA 2012) This was the first time Turkey lent a loan to a target
state at this extent. (TIKA 2012)
There have been a number of projects aiming to strengthen Egyptian state
infrastructure. For example, in 2012, Turkey brought several Egyptian students to train
them in transportation infrastructure. Nevertheless, the crucial point was that The AKP
wanted to support its partner, the newly elected Egyptian Islamist Justice and Freedom
Party by giving this loan. The 2013 Egyptian military coup d’état probably had detrimental
effects over the Turkish ODA to Egypt afterwards, as Turkey called back its ambassador
in Egypt. By acting in such a manner, Turkey indicated its disapproval of the direction that
the new Egyptian leadership was taking.
Libya
There is a similar pattern in Libya as well. Before the Arab Spring in 2010, Turkish
ODA to Libya was USD 1,01 million. In 2011, the Turkish ODA, displaying a dramatic
increase, went up to USD 53,11 million. Interestingly, the OECD statistics did not include
the USD 300 million given to the Libyan rebels by Turkey in 2011 before they entered
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Tripoli. However, the election of Liberal (non-Islamist) “National Alliance Forces” to
power resulted in a decrease in Turkish ODA, delivering only USD 3,1 million to Libya in
2012. However, as I discussed in the previous chapter, Turkey continued to develop
excellent economic relations with Libya after the Arab Spring. Surely, the financial
assistance, totaled to USD 300 million, provided to the rebels in July 2011 positively
affected the relations between Turkey and post-Gaddafi Libyan regime. On the other hand,
the decline in Turkey’s foreign aid to Libya could be a result of Libya’s high returns from
its natural resources, such as oil and natural gas. Although the Turkish foreign aid to Libya
declined in 2012, Turkey continued to train the Libyan officials. For example, in 2014, 850
Libyan police officers were trained in Turkey. (Bloomberght 2013)
Tunisia
Tunisia displays similar patterns as well. Between 2003 and 2011, Turkish ODA to
Tunisia was insignificant, only around USD 1 million. After the election of the Islamist
“Justice and Development Party” to power, the Turkish ODA to Tunisia suddenly increased
to dramatic levels, USD 60,39 million. High level of cooperation between Turkey and
Tunisia since the election, marked by 32 agreements in the areas of society concerning
politics, security, and economy, (Ihlas Haber Ajansi 2014) had probably taken this number
to a much upper level by 2014.
TIKA supports Tunisia in social, economic, vocational, technical, political, and industrial
areas. TIKA also tried to help Tunisia build a strong administrative and civic infrastructure.
This way Turkey tried to contribute to the development in Tunisia. Turkey increased its
assistance to Tunisia, particularly after the Jasmine Revolution in 2011. TIKA projects,
starting with supporting the social and administrative infrastructure in Tunisia in 2012,
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expanded to fields as diverse as politics, tourism, security, health, capacity building, and
agriculture.
TIKA has initiated 32 projects since the Jasmine revolution. TIKA, for example,
supported the establishment of an efficient fishery sector and textile workshops, opened
date processing centers, and provided technical assistance in a number of other fields.
Turkey also donated 522 vehicles, including ambulances, fire engines, and garbage
collection trucks, to the new government in Tunisia. Turkey helped Tunisia create regional
and sectoral development strategies and a mechanism for attracting investment. TIKA was
also involved in various social projects in collaboration with the Tunisian government,
such as providing food and bread to the most impoverished sectors of the Tunisian society
on daily basis.
In political terms, the Turkish AKP established tight relations with the Tunisian
Islamist Justice and Development Party (Al-Nahda); Turkey provided Al-Nahda officials
with training in political campaigning, party organization, election monitoring, the
inclusion of women, etc. In the administrative fields, Tunisian diplomats were given
vocational training in Turkey. TIKA facilitated the training of Tunisian governmental
statisticians by experts from the Turkish Statistical Institute. Turkish police provided
practical training to 581 police staff from Tunisia within the framework of the
Modernization of Justice Department and Security Cooperation Agreement; and this took
place both in Turkey and Tunisia. Turkey also has helped Tunisia develop policies to
support women and the disabled participation in economic, social, and political life. (Ihlas
Haber Ajansi 2014) Through all these mechanisms and services, Turkey transferred its

157

democratic values to Tunisia. As it could be seen, this mostly happened through
experience-sharing.

Syria
Turkish ODA to Syria followed the same pattern with the other Arab Spring
countries. Turkish ODA to Syria initially increased from USD 0,1 million in 2003 to USD
5,69 million in 2007. As a result of Global financial crisis, it goes down to around USD 4
million in 2008 and 2009. It went up to USD 9.52 million again in 2010. After the arrival
of Arab Spring to Syria, the Turkish ODA went up to USD 162,03 million in 2011. It
continued to increase up to 1,019.93 billion USD in 2012. As the conflict continued in
Syria, Turkey allowed over 1 million Syrians pass its borders. Some of them stay in refugee
camps. Turkey provided those staying in Turkey’s refugee camps with food, formal
education, recreation areas, and vocational training. The other Syrians have been trying to
make a living in Turkish cities by working unofficially for Turkish companies.89 (See
Table 10) The AFAD just revealed that Turkey’s aid to Syrians has reached to USD 2.5
billion. (AFAD 2014)

89

In Gaziantep thousands of Syrians work for private companies without a governmental approval.
However, an official representing the Turkish state told me that the government needs to turn a blind eye to
this. If the Syrians do not find a source of income in Turkish cities, they will fall into crime, more harmful
for the Turkish society. Furthermore, he reiterated that (many Turkish industrialists and businessmen told
me the same thing) “we needed to bring immigrants to our cities. Our industrialists were not able to find
enough work-force due to the rapid development of economy. The available workforce did not accept the
proposed salaries or prices. Therefore, the coming of the Syrian refuges to Turkey greatly benefitted the
Turkish economy by providing cheap labor and work-force.” (the interview took place in Fall 2013 in
Gaziantep) I can easily argue that the contribution of the Syrian refugees to the Turkish economy is greater
than the cost that Turkey spends on them.
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Turkey has assigned officials from the Turkish Foreign and Turkish Domestic
Affairs Ministries to coordinate issues concerning Syrian guests. Turkey created an
institution called the Office for Coordinating Syrian Guest Affairs. (TIKA 2012) For
example, in Gaziantep, Turkey assigned a coordinator to help the Syrian refugees to
integrate into the local society. (Interview with a number of Syrians living in Gaziantep
2013) Syrians became more organized among themselves as a result, opening Syrian
schools, work places, and cultural associations. (Interview with Ahmed Al-Bandery, a
Syrian Businesman in Gaziantep 2013) Furthermore, the Syrian refugees living in Turkish
cities are being provided with material support, such as food, shelter, and money on regular
bases by the provincial governments. (Interview with a Top Governmental Official in
Gaziantep 2013) Considering all these, it is clear that Turkish ODA in addition to
humanitarian aid has increased to way higher levels than the government has reported. For
example, TIKA did not include the assistance provided by the local municipalities and by
local ordinary people within its TDA. If these were being added to the statistics, surely the
numbers would go well beyond USD 1 billion for Syria.
Table 10. Turkish Official OHA to the Syrian Guests in Eight Major Cities, in USD
Million
Provinces
Malatya
Adana
K. Maras
S. Urfa
Gaziantep
Osmaniye
Hatay

Aid (USD)
4
20
43
295
128
25
296

Adiyaman

27

Kilis
Total

164
979
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*Source: TIKA Development Report 2012
Finally, as the Syrian conflict is yet to be resolved, Turkey has been providing full
support to the Syrian opposition to win the war against Assad. As it was argued in the
previous chapter, this has become an existential issue for Turkey. According to many
sources, Turkey has provided military aid to Syrian opposition as well. However, Turkey
rejects the provision of military aid to the Syrian rebels, and there is no official data to
support the Turkish military assistance to Syria. Taking these factors into consideration, it
is clear that Turkish support to the Syrian opposition will continue to increase, until a
Turkish friendly administration comes to power or until Turkey reaches the certain
conclusion that the Syria opposition does not promise any future to bring Assad down.
Palestine
Turkish ODA to Palestine has been steadily increasing since 2003. In 2009 it went
up to around USD 49 million, it dropped to around USD 25 million in 2010 and 2011, and
then went up to around USD 51 million in 2012. Probably, the decline in 2010 and 2011
was partly caused by the global financial crisis that also affected Turkey, and partly by
uncompromising behavior of different political parties in Palestine, preventing them from
acting as a united force against Israel, extremely angering Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In this
regard, the decrease in the amount of aid in 2010 and 2011 could be perceived as a type of
punishment to Hamas rule by Turkey. However, later, Turkey changed its policy, reincreasing its support to Palestine to USD 51 million. The post-Arab Spring environment
that brought Turkish friendly groups to power in a number of Arab countries, such as
Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, probably stimulated the idea that Turkey should support its
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newly elected allies in the ME more forcefully. As a result, we witness an increasing trend
in the Turkish ODA to Palestine, Egypt, and Tunisia.
Yemen
As Turkey has very little strategic interests in Yemen, even after the Arab Spring,
the ODA to Yemen remains in insignificant levels, USD 4,53 million in 2012. However,
as I discussed in the previous chapters, Yemen has been one of the co-chairs of DAD
(Democracy Assistance Dialog) along with Turkey and Italy, launched within the
BMENA’s Forum for the Future Program in 2004. In this regard, Turkey has carried out
projects to support democratization in the BMENA region, particularly in the areas of
women’s rights. However, Emrullah Isler, an MP of AKP, reiterated that “we are not
concerned with Yemen as much as Syria. Syria is our next door. Whatever happens in Syria
directly impacts Turkey. Therefore we need to engage in Syria.” (Interview with Emrullah
Isler 2012) This clearly explains the reason behind the low amounts of the Turkish ODA
to Yemen.
The Other BMENA Countries
The Arab countries which had no or very little uprisings received the least
development aid. For example, Morocco, Algeria, and Jordon received very little aid from
Turkey under the AKP rule between 2012 and 2013. Until 2006, Turkey provided an
insignificant amount of ODA to Lebanon, but in 2006 the amount of the Turkish ODA to
Lebanon increased to over USD 36 million. Lebanon had been provided around USD 26
million for each year between 2006 and 2010. In 2011 and 2012, the ODA to Lebanon
decreased to around USD 7 million. After 2010, Turkey redistributed the amount of ODA
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between the countries in the ME, sending the most to the transitioning Arab Spring
countries.
Although Turkish ODA to Iran has been was insignificant, Iran needs to be
contextualized differently from the other ME states. First of all, Turkey does not feel the
cultural, political, historical, and geographic affinity towards Iran, as it feels for the Arab
ME. While the Arab ME was a part of Ottoman Empire—Turkey thinks of itself as the heir
of the Ottoman Empire—, Iran has been perceived as a rival or an alternative Muslim
civilization in Turkish mindset. The aforementioned statistics clearly indicate the areas that
Turkey prioritized in it foreign affairs. These are Central Asia and the Arab ME. Also, Iran
already has had a functioning self-sufficient political system, which actually operated
based on elections and a clear and effective rule of law. In this regard, Turkey does not feel
the need to further support development of Iran, at least officially. Moreover, the target
state has to be open to the delivery of ODA as well. From our previous analysis in this
dissertation, we know that a number of Arab states approached Turkey for experience
sharing. It has been suggested by TIKA experts that the distribution of a large part of
Turkish aid depends upon the demands of the target nations. (TIKA 2014) In this regard,
the Iranian demand for the Turkish ODA has not been as significant as of the other states
from BMENA, Central Asia, and Balkans.
Turkey’s Official Humanitarian Aid (OHA)
Turkish OHA is a subcategory of the Turkish ODA. Turkey has a long history of
responding to international humanitarian crisis. For example, when Pakistan was
devastated by a mortal earthquake in 2005, Turkey was the largest government donor that
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delivered aid to what it called the brotherly nation of Pakistan, with USD 141 million. By
2012, Turkish governmental humanitarian aid had dramatically increased to USD 775
million. This way, Turkish humanitarian assistance had exceeded 1 billion USD by 2012.
This made Turkey the 4th largest global donor of OHA. (Global Humanitarian Assistance
2014) The amount of Turkey’s humanitarian assistance within its ODA exceeded 41.4%
of its aggregate ODA in 2012. In 2012, Turkey became the 15th largest donor of ODA in
OECD.90 According to Global Humanitarian Assistance Reports, Turkish humanitarian
assistance was mostly delivered to the surrounding regions.91 The OECD data indicates
that the Turkish ODA was channeled to Arab Spring countries such as Syria, Egypt, and
Tunisia,92 as a way of supporting friendly political forces in the region in 2011 and 2012.
Table 11 indicates the amount of Turkey’s Official Humanitarian Assistance
(OHA) within its ODA. The statistics show that there has been a substantial increase in
OHA since 2001. While Turkey’s OHA was USD 3 million out of its USD 151 million
ODA, the amount of Turkish OHA increased to USD 233 million in 2005, while the total
Turkish ODA went up to 759 million USD in 2005. Between 2005 and 2009, the amount
of OHA within ODA substantially decreased due to the global financial crisis. However,
starting from 2010, Turkish ODA re-increased. While in 2010, Turkish OHA went up to
264, the total ODA had increased to USD 1,273 million by 2011. As indicated in the
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OECD Statextracts, http://stats.oecd.org/#
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previous section, the total amount of the Turkish ODA had increased to USD 2533.3
million by 2012, due to people’s uprisings in the Arab ME.
According to TIKA, OHA helps the target country in the form of food, shelter,
water and sanitation, economic recovery, infrastructure, education, and other types of aid.
However, the Turkish OHA has been generally processed to the target states to provide
educational aid, food, multi-sectoral assistance, health related assistance, shelter and nonfood items, and other services or aid unspecified by the donor. The unspecified items
probably include the political aid which states were reluctant to report. The amount of
Turkish OHA targeting only Syrian refugees in Turkey has exceeded USD 1 billion. (TIKA
2012) As Turkey has followed an open door policy towards the Syrian refugees, a large
portion of the Turkish OHA went to the expenses of the Syrian refugees. (Global
Humanitarian Assistance 2013) Although Turkey reported 350 thousand registered
refugees in 2013, (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2013) the unofficial number has gone
way beyond 1 million due to Turkey’s open door policy towards them hitherto.
Table 11. OHA and ODA in Million USD 2001-2011
Total OHA Other ODA

ODA

2001

3

148

151

2002

3

152

154

2003

5

109

113

2004

66

424

490

2005

233

527

759

2006

150

669

819

2007

52

583

635

2008

31

709

740

2009

55

698

752

2010

146

799

944

2011

264

1,009

1,273

*Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance
*Other ODA: Example, debt relief
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*Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance
Turkish OHA was concentrated on a small number of states between 2006 and
2014. While until 2011, Turkish humanitarian assistance had been provided to Pakistan,
Iraq, and Somalia for the most part (67%), (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2013) since
the beginning of the Arab Spring, the large portion of the Turkish OHA has been delivered
to Syria.
To conclude, it can be said that Turkey’s democracy promotion has been carried
out mostly within the context of its ODA. Arab Spring compelled Turkey to redistribute its
assistance between countries, allocating the biggest portion to the countries in transition.
Turkish ODA has indicated substantial increase in the last three years as a result of its overinvolvement in Arab Spring countries. For example, around USD 1.5 billion of USD, 3.5
billion Turkish TDA was delivered to the Egyptian Justice and Freedom Party and the
Syrian refugees in 2012. In this regard, Turkey has shifted its focus from Central Asian
republics primarily to the Arab countries in transition under the AKP administration. As I
discussed in the previous chapter, Turkey’s identity and strategic interests have played a
major role in Turkey’s involvement in the Arab Spring countries.
The statistics also provide us with very interesting findings regarding the regions
prioritized by Turkey. After the collapse of the Soviet Russia, Turkey started to engage
with the Central Asian republics through TIKA and Turkish civil society. Since the AKP
came to power, Turkey turned its focus towards the BMENA. The Turkish case also
indicate that once a TIKA-like institution is created for a particular reason under a
particular government, it continues to perform the tasks it is created for even after the
removal of the government that created it. However, its capabilities and goals could change
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based on the available resources and the policy priorities of the time. While TIKA was
created to perform development assistance in Central Asia in 1990s, it adopted a global
agenda parallel to rapid economic growth under the Islamic AKP government in 2000s.
It is crucial to realize that both in 1990s and 2000s, Turkish foreign policy agendas
are highly impacted by the US. After the dissolution of the USSR, the US tried to expand
its influence over the Central Asian republics. The US motivated one of its closest allies,
Turkey, to play a greater role in Central Asia. Turkey would find an easy acceptance by
the newly found Turkik republics due to the shared identity in race and language. Motivated
by the US, Turkey, under the leadership of Nationalist leader Turgut Ozal, started to engage
with the republics.
Similarly, after the 9-11 terrorist attack, the US launched BMENA initiative to
bring democracy to the ME as the US considered lack of democratization in the region as
the root cause of radicalization. This time, Turkey under the leadership Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, found the idea of playing a leadership role in bringing democratization to the
region highly appealing. For Erdogan, democratization, open market economy, and the rule
of law were good for people in the region, including Turkey. As a result, in both cases, the
Turkish foreign policies were being highly influenced by the American foreign policy
priorities.
However, the difference was that although the US trackbacked from promoting
democracy in the ME, the AKP, on the contrary, increased its assistance to the opposition
forces that wanted democratization in the ME at the expanse of its relations with the US.
The provision of USD 1 billion to the Justice and Freedom Party in Egypt and USD 1
billion to the Syrian refugees by Turkey in 2012 is a good example for this case. The US
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felt threatened by the empowerment of the Islamic parties in the ME as they were highly
critical of the Western role in the region. However, Turkey as a Muslim power, did not feel
the way the US felt. Therefore, Turkey did not see any reason for why to trackback from
supporting democratization in the region.
Generally, democracy promoter Western states have well-designed institutions to
implement democracy assistance programs. The USAID, NED, NDI, and NRI are good
examples of this, but Turkey does not have a well-designed institution founded solely to
promote democracy in the target states. This has a deeper reason: Turkey does not define
its activities in BMENA as the promotion of democracy although it has been a part of
BMENA initiative since 2004.93 Therefore, Turkey’s democracy assistance is delivered to
the target countries within the scope of its TDA. In this regard, TIKA, as the primary
governmental institution, delivers ODA to the target states. However, parallel to Turkey’s
economic growth, TIKA’s progressive transformation into an institution like USAID has
been inevitable.
Turkish support for democratization of the BMENA has been driven by its strategic
interests and values. Although before the Arab Spring, values and the strategic interests
were in harmony, in the course of Arab Spring, strategic interests have become more
dominant in Turkey’s democratic assistance to the region. Parallel to this, Turkey has
increasingly adopted more coercive means, such as the military intervention in Libya to
collapse the Gaddafi regime. In this regard, it is safe to assert that in the course of Arab
Spring, promotion of democracy via supporting the opposition groups has turned into a
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matter of survival and power competition for Turkey; and progressive employment of force
in this regard is a natural result of this change in policy orientation of Turkey in the ME.

CHAPTER VI: STRATEGIES (2): TURKISH DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
THROUGH MENTORING, NORMATIVE PRESSURE, AND
DEMONSTRATIVE EFFECT
In the previous chapters, I explained Turkey’s promotion of democracy through its
Official Development Assistance and through utilization of military power in the ME. In
this chapter, my goal is to examine mentoring, demonstrative effect, normative pressure,
conditionality, enlargement, and humanitarian assistance by CSOs as the other ways
through which Turkey promotes democracy in the ME. I explain the Turkish mentorship
in the ME in more detail in this chapter. However, Turkey’s mentorship is directly linked
to the Turkish ODA. The money spent on technical assistance and experience sharing
comes from Turkey’s ODA budget. However, in order to give a more specific account of
this factor, I also included it in this chapter.
1-Mentoring
One of the ways Turkey promotes democracy is through mentoring the state
officials and political party members of the other countries. Turkey has been providing
assistance to surrounding countries to help build their capacities. (TIKA 2012) When the
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AKP came to power, Turkey started to prioritize the ME in its foreign policy agenda.
Therefore, under the AKP administration, Turkey progressively supported the creation of
similar political and economic frameworks between Turkey and corresponding states to
facilitate the political and economic interactions. Turkey also trained the officials of the
target states in a number of areas, such as security, economy, and politics. In this section,
my goal is to examine Turkey’s democracy promotion by mentoring. In this regard, experts
representing Turkish Armed Forces, Ministry of Education, Turkish Police, Turkish
Statistical Institute, Turkish Undersecretariat of Treasury, and the AKP mentor the officials
of the target states.
Training provided by Turkish security forces is a significant source of
institutionalization of democratic values in the target states. Turkish Armed Forces, which
is a NATO army, engages “in activities of programme assistance and technical cooperation
in training, transport, energy, cultural cooperation, administrative and civil infrastructure
sectors,” as well as serving in “peace-building operations”. (TIKA 2012) Turkish Armed
Forces were also involved in peace building efforts in countries, such as Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Lebanon. Turkey’s contribution to peace-building efforts has steadily
being increasing; and this was estimated around USD 36 million in 2006, USD 51 million
in 2009, USD 77 million in 2011, and USD 87 million in 2012. (TIKA 2012)
However, activities of the Turkish Armed Forces are not confined to the technical
areas. For example, Turkish Armed Forces organize various courses to promote the
participation of women in public life in Balkans and Southeast Asia. Turkish Armed Forces
have also been involved in a number of educational activities in the countries they have
operated, such as supporting the schools of those countries. (TIKA 2012) Within the
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framework of Partnership for Peace Training Center, Turkish Armed Forces trained the
personnel from the armed forces of countries as diverse as Lebanon, Tunisia, Libya,
Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Albania in 2012. Turkish Armed Forces also support
Turkey’s policies towards the Syrian guests with its available resources. (TIKA 2012)
In addition to the Turkish Armed Forces, Turkish National Police have been
training police officers of countries, such as Tunisia, Macedonia, Bangladesh and Somalia.
(TIKA 2012) The goal has been to exchange experience between the national police
organizations of the attendee countries. The training program aimed to create a “common
understanding in fighting crimes and to harmonize professional terminology” (TIKA 2012)
among the attendee countries. However, the fact is that the security forces of the attendee
countries emulate Turkish system while receiving training in Turkey.
It is also important to note that Turkish security forces provide training quite similar
to that provided in the West. There are substantial relations between the US and the Turkish
security forces. The top Turkish police officials are being trained in several top US
universities.94 They are being taught how to deal with crime in a democratic setting.
Turkey’s recent democratization was strongly influenced by these well-educated officers.
Through the aforementioned programs, Turkish security apparatuses transfer their
experiences and knowledge to their counterparts in the Balkans, ME, Africa, and Central
Asia. In this regard, Turkey significantly contributes to human infrastructure and the
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I met several top level Turkish Police officers who were obtaining their doctoral degrees in a number of
US universities, such as Kent State University and University of Cincinnati, in political science, sociology,
and justice studies areas.
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reorganization of the security sector of the target countries on the basis of democratic
credentials.
Education is another way through which Turkish values are being spread in
Turkey’s neighborhood. Educational aspect of Turkish foreign policy is particularly
helpful in improving human infrastructure in the target states (Kirisci 2012) In terms of
education, Turkey has various programs, such as awarding successful students and
providing them with the opportunity to obtain their higher educations in Turkish
universities and the Turkish Military and Police academies. The TIKA statistics indicate
that between 1990 and 2011, 40 thousand international students received their higher
education in Turkey. This has happened within the framework of Turkey’s “Grand Student
Project”, launched in 1990. (TIKA 2012)
To provide some details, Turkey provided assistance to 354 Iraqi students in the
form of scholarship and other types of aid, such as clothing. Turkey also enabled 24
doctoral students with scholarships from Gaza Islam University under the Academic
Support Program. (TIKA 2012) As a part of “Research and Doctoral Scholarship for
Foreigners” project carried out by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of
Turkey (TUBITAK), Turkey brought 9 Palestinian, 3 Iraqi, 58 Iranian, and 1 Syrian
student, in addition to students representing a number of other countries for their postgraduate studies. Turkey also provided assistance to 174 Syrian, 232 Palestinian, 504 Iraqi,
and 660 Sudani college students in 2010. In addition, Turkey organized awards and
scholarship programs for the master students to continue their educations in Turkish
universities. (TIKA 2012)
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Another aspect of Turkey’s educational program concerns the deployment of
teachers to the other countries. For example, “322 teachers were deployed to 13 countries
including Tunisia, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Afghanistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Moldova and Tajikistan” (TIKA 2012) as a part of
an educational project implemented by The Ministry of National Education and the
Presidency of Turks Living Abroad and Relative Communities. These teachers promote
Turkish art, culture, language, and literature in target countries. This way Turkey has been
diffusing its values in the surrounding countries.
Exchange programs have proved quite useful in promoting democracy. For
instance, Morningstar, former United States ambassador to European Union, reiterated that
“exchange programs have been especially successful” in terms of successful democracy
promotion. According to Morningstar, thousands of high-school and college students that
came from the former-Soviet countries returned to their countries with highly positive
views of the US, having acquired democratic values. They influenced their surroundings
(family, friend, and coworkers) in their countries. This created a multiple effect according
to Morningstar. (Morningstar 2009)
Exchange students in Turkey get the chance to recognize an imperfect democracy
with its strengths and weaknesses. Generally, international students that receive their
education in Turkey come from closed, undemocratic regimes. Therefore, during their
residence and education in Turkey, they get the chance to get to know a democratic system
still in the making. When they return to their countries, they carry with them the values
they have acquired in Turkey. (Kirisci 2012) I cannot forget a conversation with one of my
Kazakh friend in this regard. He reiterated that when they go back to their countries, the
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Kazakh state thinks that they are being overly Turkified, antithetical to Kazakh state’s
interests. Therefore, he added that the Kazakh state might terminate the educational
cooperation program with Turkey.95 On the other hand, these students could very well play
a bridge role between Turkey and their countries of origin.
In this regard, similar to what Morningstar stated for the US, students that graduate
from the Turkish universities become volunteer consulates of Turkey as they absorb the
Turkish cultural and political values. When they leave, they leave with the love of Turkey
inside, and they promote Turkey in their countries. Turkey is trying to find ways to increase
the number of international students in the Turkish universities. (TIKA 2012)
Another way that Turkey promotes democracy in the surrounding countries is by
mentoring the officials of the target states about economic matters. For example, Turkey’s
Undersecretariat of Treasury trains the surrounding countries’ officials in the areas of
Private pension system, capacity building for supervisory authority, financial services,
exchange regime and OECD liberalization codes, public debt and risk management,
insurance, and establishing a single treasury account system. This program included
countries as diverse as Iran, China, South Africa, Colombia, Macedonia, and Tunisia.
(TIKA 2012)
Nevertheless, it is important to realize that Turkish economic and financial systems
operate according to the neo-liberal economic policies and open market rules and
regulations. Within the framework of these types of training programs, Turkey basically
teaches the officials of these countries how to organize their economy according to open
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market rules. This is not an intentional move to promote democracy by Turkey. (Kirisci
2011) The promotion of democratic values happens automatically in the course of practical
training and implementation. In this context, Turkey just teaches the targets how to set a
successful system.
However, this is in Turkey’s interests: if the target states organize their economic
and political systems similar to those of Turkey, the economic and political interactions
between them become much smoother. Harmonization of the rules creates a greater clarity
and predictability in both the Turkish and targets’ markets. This is particularly helpful for
businessmen who have investment in more than one country in these countries. Just as how
the European businessmen ask the Turkish authorities to facilitate their investments in
Turkey by making legal changes, the Turkish businessmen ask the other countries in the
region, such as Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Egypt, to make changes in their legal frameworks
to create a more conducive atmosphere for their FDI. For this reason, they also put pressure
on the Turkish government to do its part.
As I denoted earlier, (non-educational) consultancy and know-how transfer is a
significant part of Turkish democracy promotion. However, similar to the aforementioned
cases, Turkey does not help to build the capacity of the target states to promote democracy.
The diffusion of democratic values happens in the process of interaction. Also, Turkey’s
mentoring indicates Turkey’s foreign policy priorities. After the Arab Spring, Turkey
would turn its attention, and reallocate the biggest part of resources to the BMENA region.
(TIKA 2012)
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For example, Turkey provided consultancy services in sectors, such as health,
finance, and security to a number of countries in 2010.96 123 Turkish experts provided
Syria with consultation and know-how services. Also, Turkey assigned 111 Experts to
Palestine, 100 to Afghanistan, 99 to Lebanon, and 72 to Iraq in 2010. (TIKA 2014)
Hundreds of experts were also assigned to help a number of other countries, such as
Kazakhstan and Kosovo. The total number of Turkish experts assigned to train the officials
of the target countries was 1795 in 2010. The number of officials of the target states who
were provided in-service training by Turkish experts in 2010 was 12143. (TIKA 2014)
Finally, Turkey is also involved in political training. Political training is carried out
by the AKP. Over 20 political parties mainly from Asia and Africa ask the AKP to train
them in areas, such as political campaigning, party organization, and party out reaching.
The parties that ask for training come from very diverse backgrounds. For example, there
are Muslim, non-Muslim, Islamic, conservative, nationalist, and liberal parties among
those who demand such training. These parties come from diverse countries, such as the
Kurdish Regional Government, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and some other countries from
Africa and Asia. The AKP provides them with political party training by organizing workshops, conferences, and panels.
For example, an Islamic party from the Arab world asked the AKP for political
party training.97 The AKP accepted the offer, and organized a one week long workshop.
Throughout the workshop, the AKP trained the representatives of that political party about
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how to organize a successful party, carry out election campaigns, connect to youths and
women, deal with authoritarian governments, and maintain grassroot campaigns.
Furthermore, the AKP took them to different party buildings and state institutions (such as
the Turkish Parliament) to show them the Turkish democratic setting, and how they
functioned within this framework. Moreover, the AKP has developed tight relations with
the trained parties due to these types of interactions.
The AKP has successfully transformed these conservative parties in some areas.
Among its counterparts, parties with deep roots in political Islam, the AKP is the most
progressive in terms of women’s rights. More importantly, the Arab counterparts of The
AKP do not have any concern for the involvement of women in politics. My interview with
an expert from the AKP Foreign Affairs Commission sheds light on this point. She
reiterated that a number of political parties from the Middle East asked them for political
party training, most of whom being the conservative parties. She complained about the lack
of women participants in the committees, which is quite surprising for Turks.
When they came for training, the lack of women within the
participant group attracted our attention, and we had to explain
them how important the women participation in politics was, by
telling them that we received 54% of our votes from women. I
asked them to bring female members with them for the next time.
Although, they initially found the idea of the necessity of women
participation in politics strange, in the next training session, they
included women members within their groups. It is really strange
for us to see a political understanding that excludes women.
(Interview with an expert from the AKP’s Foreign Affairs
Commission 2003)
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An important way that the AKP interacts with the ME is through panels. For
example, an Ankara-based think tank, called Institute of Strategic Thinking which is also
close to the AKP, organized a panel to discuss the Turkish-Egyptian relations after the
military coup in Egypt, in Spring 2014. The participants included some well-known
Turkish and Egyptian scholars, an Egyptian Journalist, and a top official from the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood, who was a former minister of the Morsi Cabinet. The speakers
discussed democratization in Egypt in comparison to the democratization in Turkey. They
tried to draw lessons from the Turkish experience of democratization.
However, one important point was that the Turkish scholars emphasized the
importance of non-violent way of maintaining their democratic struggles within Egypt.
According to them, the military rule in Egypt already announced the Muslim Brothers as a
terrorist group, and any act of violence, even from a distant member of the movement,
could help the military rule to reinforce its claims. In this regard, they warned the Muslim
Brotherhood to be careful about this, and to stay away from violence. This idea received a
lot of support from the Egyptian speakers. In this regard, the AKP plays a highly
constructive role, by its emphasis on peaceful ways of democratic struggle, in the process
of change in the ME.
2-Demonstrative Effect
Huntington argues that democratization in a country can provide a positive example
to the surrounding countries about the achievability of democratization and the way to
initiate and maintain it. Huntington calls this the demonstrative effect. (Huntington 1991)
For Huntington, the most successful case of democratization through demonstrative effect
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happens in regions. Kirisci argues that transformation in the surrounding countries is
strongly influenced by Turkey’s demonstrative effect. (Kirisci 2012) In this sense, Turkey
does not intend to promote democracy, but Turkish values are diffused to the countries that
it interacts with, automatically. Turkey only provides a successful model that they can
emulate. In this regard, in the following part, I examine demonstrative effect as an
important source of Turkey’s democracy promotion.
One way the positive Turkish model is channeled to the BMENA is through
tourism. Table 12 indicates that in the last ten years, the number of tourists from the
surrounding countries to Turkey has been increasing due to the relaxed visa regime
enforced by the AKP government with the other countries in the BMENA. For example,
when the AKP came to power, the number of the tourists from the ME was around 780
thousand. However, this number went up to around 2.5 million in 2012.
Table 12. The Number of Tourists from the BMENA to Turkey

2002

2004

2008

2011

780.431

1.031.226

1.917.329

2.438.206

*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

Furthermore, Turkish model has found its way into the ME through a number of
other channels. The most important channel is the regional and global media, which
brought the Turkish economic success, Turkey’s democratization pains, and peaceful
foreign policy in the past ten years to the attention of millions of viewers in the region.
Furthermore, highly popular Turkish TV series created a positive image of Turkey in the
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ME.98 The aforementioned channels, such as experience sharing and educational
opportunities, also provided the top officials and students from the region to see and
emulate the Turkish model. As a result, people who came to Turkey saw how Turks
maintained their lives. When they returned, they wanted to have the same system. In regard
to Turkey’s demonstrative effect, democratic values find their ways to the target states
during socialization.
3-Normative Pressure
Normative Pressure (such as criticizing anti-democracy leaders and praising prodemocracy ones) is often used by international or supranational organizations, such as
NATO and the EU as a way to promote democracy. This entails the “incorporation of new
member states into an existing system of values, roles, and behaviors” (Kentmen 2012) In
this new environment, the new member states are pressured to adhere to the shared norms
and values. Normative pressure also includes openly announcing the democratic deficit of
a state, calling the leader of a country during important decision making that affects its
democracy to put pressure, promoting democratic norms in panels and conferences to make
them more salient, monitoring elections, publishing reports on human right records of the
states, and creating links between civil society organizations of the target and the donor
countries. (Borzel and Risse 2009)
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Turkey, in many instances, has used a diverse set of normative pressure to open up
a target country to democratic development. For example, Erdogan openly declared the
need for democratic transformation in 2003 while delivering a speech in Harvard.
(Erdogan, Democracy in the Middle East, Pluralism in Europe: Turkish View 2003) Also,
before the fall of Mubarak, the prime minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on
him to initiate a process of democratic reform, strongly demanded by his people. (Today's
Zaman 2011) Furthermore, Erdogan called on the Muslim leaders to reform the political
systems of their countries in Cidde Saudi Arabia in 2005. “Abdullah Gül, President of
Turkey, was the first head of state who visited Egypt on 3 March 2011 in the aftermath of
the Tahrir Revolution. Then, President Gül paid another visit to Egypt on 7-8 February
2013 and reiterated, on that occasion, Turkey’s messages of solidarity and cooperation with
the friendly and brotherly Egyptian people.” (Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014)
Abdullah Gul emphasized the need for democratization in the ME in ICO (Islamic
Conference Organization) in Tehran, Iran in 2003. (Gul 2003) Furthermore, Erdogan tried
to convince Syria’s Assad to leave the power and transfer to democracy when the Arab
Spring hit Syria for about six months. (A. Sahin 2012) Finally, while Turkish leadership
strongly condemned the 2013 military coup d’état in Egypt, which ended the rule of
Freedom and Justice Party, they motivated the Tahrir square, the supporters of Freedom
and Justice Party, to continue their resistance to get their democratic rights back. (Bugun
Gazetesi 2013)
Turkey, as a part of its democracy promotion policy, has monitored elections in a
number of countries. For example, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed a group
of ten representatives, called “Turkish National Observers Committee” (TNOC), to
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monitor the election in Tunisia. (Ulutas 2011) Turkey also sent TNOC to observe the July
7, 2012 national elections in Libya. (Turkish Embassy in Trablus 2012) The TNOC which
consisted on a diverse body of individuals, such as scholars, MPs, experts of Turkish
Foreign Mission, also monitored the 2006 national elections in Palestine. (Turkey Ministry
of Foreign Affairs 2014) Turkey also sent the TNOC to observe elections in diverse
countries, such as Azerbaijan and Egypt.
Moreover, Turkey started to promote the Muslim rights through the establishment
of Combating Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims in the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Within this context, Turkish Ambassador
Omur Orhun started to prepare reports on the conditions of Muslims in different EU
countries, such as Sweden. With the election of Turkish candidate, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu
as the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Turkey
strengthened its role as the promoter of the Muslim rights. However, this also indicates
Turkey’s aspirations to represent and lead the Muslim world.
4-Conditionality
Conditionality is another effective democracy promotion instrument. It is also
called the “carrots and sticks”99 strategy. It can be positive or negative in nature.
Conditionality entails that states making progress in democratization are rewarded while
states regressing in democratic development are punished. “This method rests upon the
assumption that countries are rational actors that value benefits over costs. (Kentmen 2012)
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For example, economic pressure, such as sanctions against governments abusing human rights or
economic rewards, such as trade benefits and balance of payments for governments that support
democratization.
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For, example, in the past the US Congress stipulated assistance to the Ukraine to encourage
it to progress in its democracy and to pressure Ukraine to solve its trade disputes with the
US. (Morningstar 2009)
Turkey has recently started to employ this strategy so as to promote democracy in
the region. For example, USD 1 billion ODA was delivered to Egyptian Justice and
Freedom Party under Morsi leadership. This could easily be called as the carrot that Turkey
provided Egypt for strengthening its government’s capacity, necessary for a working
democracy. Furthermore, Turkey downgraded its diplomatic relations with Egypt under
the interim government after the 2013 military coup d’état. This could easily be regarded
as Turkey’s stick strategy for promoting democracy in Egypt.
5-Peace Building
Peace building is another way through which states promote democracy. For
example, in Ukraine, Bosnia, Palestine, Caucasus, and Sudan, the EU has launched twentyone missions on the basis of the European Security and Defense Policy. This tool is often
utilized in Post-Conflict states and regions with the purpose of reconstruction, stabilization,
and peace-building. Peace keeping operations, aiding security reforms, policing and border
control, and supporting the rule of law are some of the activities carried out within this
context. (Borzel and Risse 2009) Turkey has been involved in peacebuilding activities in a
wide range of countries, such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Lebanon. (TIKA 2012)
In this regard, Turkey has been supporting peace and stability in unstable democratizing
countries.
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6-Enlargement
Democracy is also being promoted through enlargement. Enlargement is often
discussed within the EU expansion context. (Everts 2004) The EU, in the enlargement
process, makes use of “carrots and sticks.” These positive and negative incentives motivate
the candidate states to democratize. Interestingly, Turkey initiated a regionalization project
by creating a visa free zone with Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. It is called Shamgen,
intentionally named this way to associate it with the EU’s Schengen agreement. Although
democratization was not a stipulation for membership to this regional formation, Turkey’s
democratic norms were diffused to these countries through Turkey’s socialization with
them. For example, Turkey was able to transfer its experience regarding open market
economy to Syria successfully. This substantially transformed the legal framework of the
Syrian economic system. (Interview with A Young Syrian Scholar in Miami 2012)
However, the Shamgen regionalization experiment failed in the course of Arab Spring. The
member states had to make a strategic choice. Turkey’s pro-democracy policies started to
threaten the undemocratic members of Shamgen, resulting in its failure.
In conclusion, this chapter attempts to explain the strategies through which Turkey
promotes democracy in the ME. I argued that Turkey promotes democracy or diffuses its
democratic values in the ME through at least six channels. These are mentoring,
demonstrative effect, normative pressure, conditionality, hard power, and enlargement. As
I have already given a detailed account of the Turkish ODA as a strategy to promote
democracy in the region, I did not mention it in this chapter. Furthermore, as I broadly
discussed the conditions under which Turkish democracy promotion becomes militarized
in the fourth chapter, I did not include it in this chapter.
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CHAPTER VII: STRATEGIES (3): TURKISH DEMOCRACY PROMOTION BY
TURKISH CIVIL SOCIETY
In the previous chapters, I examined the Turkish state’s promotion of democracy
under the AKP rule in the last 12 years. However, the Turkish civil society is also involved
in a modest exercise of democracy promotion. In fact, some of the major and most
organized projects in this regard are carried out by the Turkish civil society. In this regard,
I would like to explain the contribution of the Turkish civil society organizations (CSOs)
to Turkey’s democracy promotion policy in the ME. In this chapter, initially I determine
the major CSOs that are involved in democracy promotion. Next, I explain the activities of
these CSOs. Further, I expand on the weaknesses and the strengths of the Turkish CSOs
that do the most in the ME in terms of the promotion of humanitarian and democratic
values. Finally, I explain how independent the Turkish CSOs are from the Turkish
government.
I develop my arguments in this chapter based on face to face interviews with CSO
representatives and statistical data from the Turkish Statistical Institute. I determined the
most relevant CSOs on the basis of the scale and nature of their activities outside Turkey.
TIKA Development Reports and my interviews with CSO members helped me
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substantially in this regard. It must be kept in mind that the Turkish CSOs are involved in
a wide range of activities, ranging from opening educational and health institutions to
orphanages and from providing emergency aid to the crisis hit areas to the direct promotion
of democracy.
The democratic institutionalization on the basis of European harmonization
packages provided the Turkish civil society with a fertile ground to flourish both in number
and in influence. The 1980 constitutional changes resulted in the closure of around 20.000
CSOs, which almost consisted of the half of the total number of CSOs that time. (Park
2012) In the past 10 years, a wide range of CSOs were being established in Turkey
representing a highly diverse set of people, such as Kurdish, religious, secular, and women
groups as well as sport clubs. The governmental statistics indicate that the number of CSOs
in Turkey has increased by 44% in the last decade. In 2000, there were 60,931 CSOs, and
this number increased to 88,210 in 2011. (Saglam, Today’s Zaman 2011) Moreover some
of the CSOs started to expand their activities to the international level, which contributed
greatly to non-governmental support of Turkey to democratization.
Parallel to rapid economic growth and democratization in Turkey, Turkish CSOs
started to get involved in larger projects with greater numbers, such as building schools,
hospitals, orphanages, and mosques in the target countries, such as Somalia and
Afghanistan. (Dogan, Unofficial Interview with Ali Dogan 2013) While, in 2002, GDP
per capita was $3,500 in Turkey, it increased to over $12,000 in 2012, in 10 years.
Individuals who gained more wealth started to contribute to the budget of the Islamic
humanitarian CSOs in a greater extend. Islamic CSOs in Turkey do not accept funds of
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foreign origin; (Interview with Ahmet Unsal 2012) their resources are confined to the aid
from individuals living in Turkey, and rarely to wealthy Muslims living abroad. In this
regard, the freedom environment fostered in the process of the EU membership and
economic development benefitted the Turkish CSOs greatly. In this new environment, the
CSOs started to act more independently, carrying out some of the global-scale
humanitarian projects.
TIKA rightly describes the role of the Turkish CSOs as: “In line with the recent
Turkish foreign policy, Turkish CSOs, deeply rooted in centuries of charitable foundations
tradition, play a significant role in Turkish development assistance in a multitude of
geographies across the globe. Turkish CSOs engage in assistance activities of
accommodation, health, clothing, food in situations of humanitarian crisis as well as postcrisis activities of education, vocational training, cultural and health aid etc. to heal disaster
victims.” (TIKA 2012) (See Table 13 for the change in the amount of civil humanitarian
assistance between 2005 and 2012)
Table 13. Turkish Humanitarian Assistance by CSOs between 2009 and 2012
Million USD

Date
Amount

2005
$56.70

2006
2009
2010
2011
2012
$78.25 $109.00 $105.68 $199.52 $151.08

*Source: TIKA Development Reports 2005-2012
TIKA’s reports indicate that a number of Turkish CSOs actively partake in the
provision of humanitarian assistance. These are TOBB, Adana Dosteller (Adana Friendly
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Hands), Beshir Social Society of Aid and Solidarity, Dost Eli (Friend’s Hand), Sadaka Tasi
Society, Turkish World Research Foundation, Turkish Religious Foundation, Yardimeli
(Helping Hands) Society, Doctors Worldwide, Turkemeneli Foundation, and a number of
other small CSOs. (TIKA 2012) However, the most notable CSOs in terms of promotion
of democracy are TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Research Foundation), IHH,
Kimse Yokmu, MAZLUMDER, Doctors Worldwide, Gulen Group, and Deniz Feneri. In
the following section, I would like to give a detailed account of the activities of the major
Turkish CSOs with regard to their contribution to Turkey’s democracy promotion agenda.
1-TESEV
TESEV, a partner of DAD (Democracy Assistance Dialog), promotes
democratization in Turkey and the wider Muslim world. TESEV organizes panels,
conferences, and roundtable meetings to discuss democratization of the BMENA. TESEV
prepares a fertile platform for the exchange of ideas between governmental officials and
significant civil society leaders. Through this way, TESEV has helped dissemination of
information regarding the democratic transformation of Turkey and the BMENA. (TESEV
2014) This aspect of TESEV has also helped develop a civil society dimension of
democracy and democracy promotion in BMENA region.
TESEV has three particular interest areas, which are Democratization Program,
Foreign Politics Program, and Good Governance. (TESEV 2014) For example, some of
the previous activities of TESEV include, but are not restricted to, disseminating
information on reforming the institutions of justice, the new democratic constitutional
process, the basic principles of a democratic constitution, democratic reform of police,
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intelligence, and military in Turkey, democratic solution of the Kurdish issue,
establishment of regional governance in Turkey, and finally freedom of the media and
freedom of expression. Furthermore, within the scope of its DAD role, TESEV has
produced knowledge on Turkish-Israeli relations, Armenian Diaspora, Turkish perception
in the ME over the years, and how to improve the Turkish role in the region. (TESEV 2013)
Most importantly, TESEV has played a particular role in helping improve the social,
economic, and political conditions of women in the ME in cooperation with its Western
and Middle Eastern counterparts. (TESEV 2005-2006)
While the AKP has promoted democracy in Turkey and BMENA, TESEV has
performed democracy promotion as a CSO. TESEV has significant partnerships with
western institutions, such as National Democratic Institutes (NDI), No Peace Without
Justice (NPWJ, Italy), and National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the Middle
Eastern CSOs, such as the Human Rights Information and Training Centre (HRITC,
Yemen). TESEV, a significant partner CSO representing Turkey in DAD, has provided a
great platform for the exchange of ideas between the CSOs and the governments in the
region.100
2-The Gulen Community
In addition to TESEV, the Gulen group significantly contributes to the diffusion of
democratic values as a civil society actor in areas they operate. The Gulen group is wellknown for its efforts in starting up educational institutions globally. The Gulen community

100

For further information, please visit TESEV Website at http://www.tesev.org.tr/Eng/
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opens primary and high schools, college prep-schools, universities, language courses,
cultural centers, residential holes, dormitories, and student houses almost in all countries.
The leader of the group is Fethullah Gulen. He is being recognized as an important
religious scholar, public intellectual, and an Imam. He currently lives in a remote area in
Pennsylvania, the US. According to Bilefski and Arsu, Gulen “has long advocated
tolerance, peace and interfaith dialogue, drawing on the traditions of Sufism, a mystical
strain of Islam generally viewed as being moderate.” (Bilefsky and Arsu 2012) However,
many in Turkey accuse him for trying to infiltrate into the state apparatus. (Bilefsky and
Arsu 2012) Despite the accusations, the Turkish courts have pronounced Gulen not
guilty.
Educational activities of the Gulen group are important in the sense that they diffuse
the Turkish values through their educational activities, emphasizing the culture of tolerance
and cohabitation, deeply rooted in Turkey’s Sufi background. When the importance of
tolerance and multi-culturalism are considered for a functioning democracy, importance of
the activities of the Gulen schools could be realized in a better way. For example, Gulen
schools in Bosnia contain a diverse body of students, such as Serbs, Croats, and the Muslim
Bosnians. These are three groups that fought severely after the resolution of Former
Yugoslavia. The same case could be witnessed in Sudan and Afghanistan as well.101

101
The Author’s interview with a number of key movement members in different time periods and
locations between 2010 and 2014.
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The Gulen group also possesses a large media network consisting of national and
international newspapers and TV channels. For example, the Zaman Press that is owned
by the Gulen Group is circulated in the EU and Central Asian republics in addition to
Turkey. The Hira journal that disseminates knowledge on culture, religion, and science, is
published in Arabic, and has been gradually gaining popularity. The Hira is the Arabic
addition of the Sizinti in Turkish and the Fountain in English. The publishing companies
close to the Gulen movement translate the books on the Turkish understanding of Islam
into Arabic. (Kirisci 2012) This is important in terms of the promotion of democracy, as
Turkish culture and religious understanding rooted in Sufism is transferred to the target
countries by these channels. It is needless to mention that Sufism, which emphasizes
tolerance and kindness towards the creation of God, is quite compatible with Western
democratic values; and it is being diffused to Turkey’s neighborhood partly by Gulen
schools.
Although the number of Gulen schools per country is very small, their effects
should not be underestimated. The graduates of the Turkish colleges and private schools
are being appointed to the key bureaucratic positions in their countries. 102 There are two
significant reasons for this: Firstly, students are accepted to these schools after they take
competitive exams, so the students accepted are generally among the smartest. Students
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Gulen schools teach multiple languages in the target countries. In addition to the official languages of
the target countries, they teach English, Turkish, and sometimes Russian, French, German, and Arabic
according to the rules of the target country. Furthermore, the students of Gulen schools are among the best
in academic performance in their countries. Naturally they come to important positions after completing
their degrees. One thing to keep in mind is that these students are also raised admiring Turkey and Turkish
culture. Therefore, they take Turkey as a role model. Source: Multiple conversations with teachers working
in Gulen schools in different countries between 2010 and 2014.
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receiving the top scores in the entrance exams of these schools are awarded with
scholarships; secondly, students need to pay tuition. Therefore, only the children of rich
families and the smartest kids have the chance to be accepted to these schools in
impoverished states of Asia, Africa, and Balkans; and these schools are generally being
established in the cultural, economic and political centers of host countries. In this regard,
Gulen schools can easily be regarded as elite raising schools. Children graduating from
these elite schools are placed in the best possible positions in their home countries. The
graduates of these schools get a great chance to lead their countries based on the
professional and life experiences they acquire in Gulen schools.103
Gulen community carries out its humanitarian activities to the crisis areas through
Kimse Yokmu (Is Anyone There) organization. Kimse Yokmu focuses on providing aid,
such as food, clean water, shelter, and medication to needy people, particularly during crisis
times. (Kimse Yokmu 2014) Kimse Yokmu also builds schools, hospitals, temporary
houses, tents, and orphanages in areas hit by natural disasters. For example, Kimse Yokmu
opened an orphanage, health clinic, school, and a place to provide hot meal on daily basis
in Haiti after the recent earthquake. (Kimse Yokmu 2014) Similar services were provided
to Pakistan after the earthquake of 2005 and flood of 2010. Kimse Yokmu has also provided
humanitarian assistance to countries as diverse as Somalia, Palestine, Bangladesh,
Azerbaijan, and Bosnia. (Kimse Yokmu 2014)

103
The Author’s interview with a number of key movement members in different time periods and
locations between 2010 and 2014.
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3-MAZLUMDER
Another significant CSO that contributes to Turkey’s democracy promotion agenda
is MAZLUMDER (Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People).
It prepares reports on human rights issues in the Muslim world. For example,
MAZLUMDER published reports on human rights in Turkey, Arakan, Bahrein, and
Bangladesh. MAZLUMDER has also been organizing conferences, panels, round table
meetings,

demonstrations,

and

human

rights

awareness

sessions.

This

way,

MAZLUMDER contributes to Turkey’s democracy promotion agenda by creating
awareness about the place of human rights within the Islamic context and human right
abuses within the Muslim world. In this regard, MAZLUMDER is the conservative Muslim
voice of universal values in the Muslim world representing Turkey.
On the other hand, it is quite clear that MAZLUMDER is particularly interested in
the human rights problems in the Muslim world. As a result of this profound interest in the
Muslim affairs, MAZLUMDER has developed strong relations with Islamic civil society
and political actors in the region. (MAZLUMDER 2014) A key member of MAZLUMDER
reiterated that “we have a lot of credibility in the ME. Sometimes the officials ask help
from us when they need to address an issue in the ME.” (Key Member of MAZLUMDER
2012) Different from Gulen group, MAZLUMDER obviously and solely focuses on the
Muslim world. While carrying out its human rights campaigns, MAZLUMDER has
successfully utilized and is motivated by its Muslim identity.104

104
I inferred this from our conversation with my interviewees from MAZLUMDER and from examining
the materials on their websites.
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4-Doctors Worldwide
Doctors Worldwide (Yeryuzu Doktorlari) is another significant CSO that provides
humanitarian aid in the form of health assistance in countries with diverse identities and
locations in the world. Doctors Worldwide are involved in a wide range of humanitarian
activities. Initially, the Doctors was started by volunteer doctors performing free surgical
operations in impoverished countries of Africa and Asia several times a year. Later, the
Doctors got involved in building health clinics, hospitals, and educational centers in failed
states, such as Somalia. Somalia does not have a working state system that could provide
its people with the most basic services they need. Considering this desperate situation, the
importance of the assistance of CSOs, as that of the Doctors, could be understood better.
The Doctors bring Somalia the system it needs through health sector. It brings well
educated doctors to train the doctors and technicians in Somalia. The Doctors have also
opened hospitals in Yemen and Palestine. (Interview with a Doctors Worldwide Official
2013) In the following section, I would like to explain the type of relationship these major
CSOs have with the AKP government.
Dependent or Independent
Turkish CSOs play an important role in disseminating knowledge, raising human
capital, building relations with the civil and governmental actors in the target countries via
networking, and providing humanitarian aid. All of these are important factors of
knowledge-based society and important components of democracy and its promotion.
Turkish CSOs have also expanded their reach to a global scale in the last few years as a
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result of the freedom environment provided by the EU membership process and economic
development in Turkey.
The AKP’s coming into power in Turkey has accelerated and strengthened the
position of the Islamic CSOs performing humanitarian activities. Until then, the Islamic
CSOs and political forces had functioned sporadically. Therefore, the accurate description
of what happened was the mobilization of the political and civic forces that shared the same
world view around the same ideals, humanitarian activities and the promotion of human
rights. (Yanik 2013) Soon the state under the AKP leadership coalesced with these CSOs,
and started to work with them in a more coordinated manner in conjunction with the
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Red Crescent. (Interview with a
Doctors Worldwide Official 2013)
For CSOs to do their job effectively, they need to have a certain level of
independence from the government. To empower their democracy, the CSOs need to play
a balancing role against the government.105 Independent CSOs also constrain government
abuse of state power. In the last 12 years, all of the aforementioned CSOs have developed
close relations with the AKP government. However, this does not mean that they are being
controlled by the Turkish state in any way. These CSOs were conducting humanitarian
works long before the AKP government came to power. Turkish CSOs have been
performing their activities despite the restrictions of the Turkish state for a long period of

105

Ketola, EU Democracy Promotion in Turkey, 2011
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time. However, as most of these CSOs are Islamic in nature, the election of the AKP to
power empowered their roles both domestically and internationally.
For example, by using its influence in police and civilian bureaucracy, the Gulen
community helped the AKP government to take the military under the civilian control.
Recently, the Gulen movement has severely criticized the Turkish government for
partaking in corruption, which came to the public attention on December 17, 2013. The
Gulen community also criticized the AKP government and unconstitutional firing and
reassigning thousands of police officers to undermine the 17 December corruption scandal
in which several members of the AKP cabinet was involved, including the Turkish PM.
However, as it could be seen in the Gulen movement case, despite a successful cooperation
in the last several years, the AKP government and the Gulen movement are now at the
loggerheads. This is a good example of CSOs’ independence from the government in
Turkey.
To give another example, according to MAZLUMDER, the AKP has done better
than the previous governments in terms of the democratization of Turkey. However,
MAZLUMDER, a Kurdish Islamic CSO, does not think that the AKP has done enough in
terms of institutionalizing democratic values regarding the protection of the rights of the
underdog groups, such as Kurds and devoted Muslims. (Unsal 2012)
On the other hand, Doctors Worldwide does not have a political orientation as much
as the Gulen movement and MAZLUMDER. Therefore, although they are not controlled
by the state, they have not been confronting the state either. TESEV is a secular
organization. Therefore, there is no ideological tie between TESEV and the AKP
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government. Finally, it is clear that Turkish democracy promoting CSOs are highly
independent from the Turkish government in their activities. When the policies of the
government oppose their agendas, they take a highly critical stance towards the
government. In the following section, I would like to discuss the contributions and the
limitations of the Turkish CSO activities on the basis of interviews with CSO practitioners.
However, the greatest weakness of the Turkish CSOs is that only when a
governmental policy harms their interest, do they raise their voices. They do not unite their
resources to fight for the rights and freedoms of the civilians as a whole. For example, as
Ketola successfully indicates, secular Turkish women groups have quite an
uncompromising approach against the rights of religious women to cover. In this regard,
unfortunately, in Turkey, the role Turkish CSOs play, as a whole, is far from where it is
supposed to be so as to strengthen Turkish democracy.
The Strengths and Limitations of the CSOs
It is crucial to realize that humanitarian involvement can simultaneously be a
strategic investment to serve Turkish interests. For example, one of the interviewees from
Doctors Worldwide CSO that did not want his name to be disclosed suggested that
“Turkish nation started humanitarian aid in Somalia without any consideration of strategic
calculations, only for humanitarian reasons. However, the humanitarian aid to Somalia
created a strong bond between Somalia and Turkey beneficial for Turkish interests. Turkey
has become the most trusted ally of Somalia, and we have influence over the government
of Somalia… It is important in terms of having a foot in mid-Africa. Once (North) Somalia
was controlled by Ottomans, and the government surely, as a part of its historical mission,
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finds it necessary to partake in resolving the crisis that Somalia is going through at the
moment.” (Interview with a Doctors Worldwide Official 2013)
When I asked where Turkey stood in comparison with the US and the EU in terms
of influence over Somalia, he told me that “we are not even close to them. They have big
budgets for such works, and they make well-designed long term consistent plans. Our
resources are much smaller; the way we work is not consistent; we do not work on the basis
of well-structured long time plans like the West. What brings us the added value is that we
deliver aid to crisis hit areas ourselves. The aid we provide is concrete and it directly meets
people’s immediate needs, such as food, shelter, and larger projects, such as constructing
orphanages, hospitals, roads, parliament, schools, water wells, and airports. People see
these, and they have great impact on people’s daily lives and facilitate the functioning of
the Somalia government. On the other hand, the aid delivered to Somalia for example,
through the UN institutions, reaches people in need really late. When it reaches, often the
crises are already over. In this regard, the timely delivery of UN humanitarian aid in crisis
hit areas is inefficient and less effective.” (Interview with a Doctors Worldwide Official
2013)
Another interviewee gave some additional information about the way Turkish
CSOs work providing humanitarian aid. He started with criticizing the UN by telling me
that “the UN staff is afraid to interact with people in crisis areas. For example, in Haiti,
after the last (2010) earthquake, because of security reasons, the UN delayed the delivery
of the items for the urgent needs, such as food and shelter. People started to get violent
because of hunger. On the other hand, we started to deliver the aid that we brought from
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Turkey immediately. We established our tents to distribute food, clothes, and shelter, and
we constructed a tent health clinic and a place for orphans immediately. Furthermore, we
recruited Haitians to work with us for the delivery of the humanitarian aid. Fortunately, we
were not faced with any dangerous situation there. The UN approach to people in crisis
areas is biased. They see these people as dangerous.” (Interview with a member of Kimse
Yokmu 2012)
On the other hand, Ahmet Unsal’s remarks, gives us important clues in terms of the
influence of the Turkish Islamic CSOs in the ME. According to Unsal, “MAZLUMDER
has a considerable level of credibility in the Muslim world. Using this credibility, we try
to bring the conflicting Islamic groups together to facilitate the settlement of their
problems.” (Unsal 2012) Although Unsal made these claims on the basis of his own
experience as a top official in MAZLUMDER, the other major CSOs, which have Islamic
sensitivities, are perceived the same way. For example, the Gulen group and Doctors
Worldwide have a highly positive image in the ME as a result of their humanitarian
activities.
Although in terms of the provision of humanitarian assistance, the Turkish groups
are not as professional as the Western groups, in some other areas the Turkish civil society
could be doing an equally good, if not a better job. For example, TESEV publishes high
quality reports about different issues in the ME. Moreover, the Gulen schools, most of
which are among the top schools wherever they have been started up, have become a brand
that represents Turkey worldwide.
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In conclusion, the Turkish civil society has recently emerged as an important actor
in Turkey’s relations with the other countries. The Turkish civil society has deep roots of
charitable foundations. The Turkish CSOs function in the area of humanitarian assistance,
education, health, politics, and economy. The major Turkish groups to be named are
TESEV, the Gulen Community, MAZLUMDER, and Doctors Worldwide. While these
civil society actors contribute to the democratic development and transformation of the
target states, they also create strong bonds between the people in target states and the
Turkish people. Although these groups cooperate with the government in the areas where
they have common goals, they focus on their own agendas when it diverges or conflicts
with that of the government.
Turkish CSOs have important weaknesses, but their strengths in some other areas
compensate for their weaknesses. One important weakness of the Turkish CSOs is that they
lack a long term and well-designed plan for their activities. In this regard, the strategic
benefit of their activities might disappear in a short period of time. The strength of the
Turkish CSOs originates from their direct interaction with people, particularly in crisis hit
areas. Furthermore, some civil organizations have become successful in creating global
brands. The Turkish Islamic CSOs are in a more advantaged position when it comes to
establishing firm relations with the groups in the region. Their shared identity with region
plays a facilitative role in this regard.
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CHAPTER VIII: THE LIMITATIONS, STRENGHS, AND SPECIFICITIES OF
TURKEY’S DEMOCRATIC ACTIVISM IN THE ME
Hitherto, I have explained the domestic and international contexts in which Turkey
launched its official democracy promotion policy in the ME, Turkey’s motivations for
promoting democracy, the conditions under which Turkey’s democracy promotion policy
is being militarized, the strategies through which Turkey has promoted democracy, and the
role of the Turkish civil society in Turkey’s democracy promotion policy. However,
without explaining the limits of Turkey’s democratic activism in the ME, this research
remains incomplete. Furthermore, as I stated at the very beginning of this dissertation, I
would also like to explain how Turkey’s democracy promotion policy differ from that of
the West.
In this chapter, I will first explain the perception of BMENA region about Turkey.
The perceptions are important particularly as they tell how receptive the ME is to the
regional power role that Turkey claims. Next, I will examine whether Turkey’s democratic
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activism is effective, if not, what the reasons are for that. Finally, I will introduce the
specificities of Turkey’s democracy promotion policy in the ME.
BMENA’s Perception of Democracy and the Turkish Role
In terms of democracy, as in the rest of the world, people in the ME had a highly
favorable opinion of democracy. As McFaul argues, democracy has a near-universal
appeal. (McFaul 2004-2005) This is also the case in the ME. Moreover, according to the
Pew-Research Global Attitudes Project Survey, people in the ME find Turkey as a sincere
promoter of democracy in the region, unlike the promotion of the US and Israel. Not
surprisingly, countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, where Turkey did not have urgent
security interests at stake and where Turkey quickly called on their dictators to leave power
when the protests started, were the ones that had the most favorable opinion of Turkish
democratic activism in the region in 2011 and 2012. However, the Egyptian and Syrian
public opinions towards Turkey changed between 2012 and 2013.
Table 14. Continuing Desire for Democracy

Continuing Desire for Democracy
Countries
2011
2012 Change
Lebanon
81%
84%
3
Turkey
66%
71%
5
Egypt
71%
67%
-4
Tunisia
63% Jordan
72%
61%
-11
Pakistan
42%
42%
0

*Source: Pew-Research Global Attitudes Project, 2012.
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Although key Turkish policy makers relate the new interests in the Middle East
towards Turkey to Turkey’s EU accession process, the polls show that “Turkey’s vastly
improved image in the Middle East over the last decade is often attributed to its new active
foreign policy in the region, its economy and popular culture.” (Levack and Percinoglu
2012)
A public opinion poll conducted by TESEV in 2012 indicates that the average
positive perception towards Turkey in the BMENA was 75%. While in North Africa and
the Arab peninsula, around 84% of people had positive perceptions towards Turkey, in
Levant, it was 66% and in Iran 71%.106 However, the popularity of Turkey dropped to 59%
in 2013, the sharpest decline being in Egypt and Syria, where Turkey has had acted highly
partisan during the Arab Spring.
Table 15. People Think That Turkey Favors Democracy in the ME
People think, Turkey favors
Democracy in the ME (%)
Lebanon
49
Turkey
58
Egypt
78
Tunisia
74
Jordan
70
Pakistan
38

*Source: Pew-Research Global Attitudes Project, 2012.
Table 16. I totally agree that Turkey can become a model for BMENA region
countries

106
North Africa includes Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt; the Arab Peninsula includes Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman.
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Egypt
Jordan
Lebanon
Palestine
S. Arabia
Syria
Iraq
Tunisia
Gulf
Yemen
Libya

42%
66%
49%
72%
65%
21%
62%
74%
58%
70%
67%

*Source: TESEV 2013 Public Opinion Poll Survey in BMENA Region (Akgun and
Gundogar, The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East in 2013 2014)
Table 16 indicates that Turkey is still seen as a model in the region by 51%. People
who think that Turkey could become a model do so for Turkey’s growing economy (34%),
democracy (24%), secular political system (19%), Muslim background (20%), and its
strategic value (6%). Although the polls show that only 20% of people in the BMENA
think that Turkey’s Muslim identity is what makes Turkey a model, if this religious
component was not there, presenting Turkey as a model to the region would be quite
meaningless; one of the European countries could pretty well play that role.
Table 17. Turkey’s Role in the ME

Date
2011
2012
2013

Turkey’s Role in the Middle East
Influence Model Cohabitation Bigger Role
70%
61%
67%
71%
61%
53%
58%
66%
64%
51%
55%
60%
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*Influence: Turkey has become more and more influential in BMENA Region politics in
the recent years.
*Model: Turkey can be a model for BMENA Region countries.
*Cohabitation: Turkey is a successful example of coherence of Islam and democracy.
*Bigger Role: Turkey should play a bigger role in the BMENA Region.
*Source: TESEV 2013 BMENA Public Opinion Poll (Akgun and Gundogar, The
Perception of Turkey in the Middle East in 2013 2014)
Table 17 indicates interesting facts about how people perceive Turkey in the ME.
On one hand, belief for Turkey’s playing a model role dropped from 61% in 2011 to 51%
in 2013. On the other hand, people still think that Turkey is an influential actor in the
BMENA region. While in 2011, the rate of people who thought this way was 70%, this rate
decreased to 61% in 2012, and then climbed up to 64% in 2013, a period where Turkish
policies are the most questioned in the ME. Finally, the rate of people who think that
Turkey should play a greater role in the ME has dropped from 71% in 2011 to 66% in 2012,
and then to 60% in 2013 in the BMENA region. However, most of people still think that
Turkey should play a role, despite the troubles that Turkey has faced in Egypt (the removal
of its closest ally, Morsi, from office) and Syria (Turkey’s support for anti-Assad groups
has made Turkey an unpopular actor there).
One of the questionnaires tried to measure the positive influence of external actors
on the process of Arab Spring in people’s perception. While in 2011, 56% of people
considered Turkey to have a positive influence over the Arab Spring, this number declined
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to 42% in 2012, and then to 37 in 2013. In this regard, Turkey had the highest ratio
compared to the other actors, such as the US (24%), France (28%), Germany (27%), the
UK (26%), Russia (29% in 2012, 38% in 2013) and China (29% in 2012, 38% in 2013) for
the year 2013. However, an interesting fact is that the perception about the Russian and
Chinese role has improved. (Akgun and Gundogar, The Perception of Turkey in the Middle
East in 2013 2014) This is a bad news as the democratic states are losing credibility in the
region. This could lead people to imitate Russia and China instead of the democratic world.
To sum up, there is a favorable environment towards Turkish role in the BMENA
region. Only in Egypt and Syria, perceptions towards Turkey have sharply declined.
Nevertheless, even in these two countries, substantial segments of the population support
the Turkish role. These are the groups that Turkey has supported in these two countries
during the Arab Spring. It can clearly be seen that perceptions change quite rapidly,
meaning that a country can transform the perception in the target countries by following
the right policies. In these regard, Turkey can improve the way people perceive it in Egypt
and Syria in the long run by moderating the aspects of its policies towards these countries
that people find unattractive.
Moreover, people in the ME believe in the sincerity of the Turkish leadership in
their support for democratization of the region. This is a big plus for Turkey. This means
that Turkey still has credibility and soft power in the BMENA region. Turkey has the
potential to make BMENA states do what it wants them to do by its attraction and
credibility rather than by hard power tools. In this regard, Turkey should be very careful
not to further damage its credibility in the region.
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However, one point that needs to be paid serious attention is that the perception
towards positive role that the democratic world, including Turkey, played during the Arab
Spring has been declining while Russia’s and China’s roles has gained more credibility. In
this regard, this is an alarming situation as people might prefer authoritarianism instead of
democracy as a result of the inconsistent behaviors of the well-established democracies.
However, an equally important issue is whether Turkey has the capacity to turn these
positive perceptions into strategic gains in the region. In the following section, I will try to
find an answer for this question.
The Effectiveness of the Turkish Democracy Promotion
As it has been indicated in the previous chapters, Turkey has substantially invested
in its ties with the ME. Among the other things, one substantial goal of Turkey is to become
a regional hegemon in the ME. This goal does not contradict Turkey’s other goals, such as
promoting stability and democracy in the region. However, the question is whether Turkey
is able to play such a role. If it is not, what is the reason for that?
Statistics about Turkey’s economy and politics indicate that Turkey can actually
play a major role in the ME if its shortages are being addressed. To give some detailed
information, Turkey possesses the second largest NATO army. Turkey has also been
building its high-tech weaponry systems progressively.107 Turkish economy is the 16th
largest globally and 6th largest in the EU. (CIA World Facts Book 2013) While Turkey’s
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GDP was USD 232 billion when the AKP obtained power in 2002, it went up to USD 1125
billion in 2012. Parallel to this, GDP per capita went from USD 3.500 in 2002 to over USD
12.000 in 2012. (Webpage n.d.) Turkey’s export to the ME went from around USD 4.5
billion in 2002 to around USD 33.3 billion in 2012. Turkey’s import from the ME jumped
from around USD 3.1 billion in 2002 to around USD 24 billion in 2011. (Turkish Statistical
Institute 2013) No other country in the region has the military and economic power at this
magnitude. Turkey’s imperial experience in the region also sets it apart from the other
states.
The same positive trend has been observed in the support that Turkey provides for
democratic transformation in the ME. To provide some details, Turkish ODA to the ME
increased from USD 2.45 million in 2003 to USD 1.7 billion in 2012. (TIKA 2012) Turkey
took part in a limited NATO military campaign against Gaddafi in Libya; Turkey opened
its doors to Syrian refugees, and assisted the Syrian opposition in their fight against Assad.
Turkey strongly supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia after their
election to power. Turkey provided them with financial assistance, consultation, know-how
transfer, and technical assistance in the areas of security, democracy, society, and economy.
Turkey’s Islamic CSOs, most of which has global humanitarian agendas with a special
focus on the Muslim World, also increased their engagement with the ME. (TIKA 2012)
Although Turkey increased the amount of its aid that it provided for
democratization and development of the states in the ME, Turkey’s human structure that
could effectively and efficiently turn this investment into long term strategic benefits is
missing. Turkish Foreign Mission is the primary institution that is responsible for
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establishing the infrastructure for the realization of Turkey’s regional and global goals.
(Kutluay and Dincer 2012) The human infrastructure could entail the low number of
employees representing the Turkish Foreign Mission in the ME. It could also refer to the
insufficient expertize on the ME in Turkey. In fact, Turkey’s failed Syrian and Egyptian
policies well indicate Turkey’s urgent need for experts on the ME.
In order to clarify this point, let me provide some details. Turkey has 25 foreign
missions in the Arab ME. The total number of career staff working in the Arab ME is 135
(See Table 18), and this means that Turkey is represented by 5 diplomatic staff in each
Arab state. Only 6 employees out of 135 can speak Arabic. The 2011 statistics indicate that
a sum of 26 employees can speak Arabic in Turkish Foreign Mission. This was 10 in 1990.
Turkish Foreign Mission has traditionally complained about the heavy workload because
of the insufficient employees that confined its operational capabilities. However, this
problem has worsened as a result of Turkey’s increased engagement with the ME.
Table 18. Institutional Infrastructure of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry

1990

2000

2011

Embassies

73

91

114

Consulates

53

59

71

Permanent
Missions

8

11

11

3.957

4.574

5.744

Total Number
of Personnel
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*Source: Data in this table is obtained from the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry by
Osman Bahadir Dincer and Mustafa Kutlay.
Although Turkey has increased the number of employees in its Foreign Mission in
the ME, this number is far from being sufficient. This becomes obvious particularly when
we compare it with the foreign missions of the other major countries. For example, in 2011,
the US had 66591 employees, and it allocated Euro 39336 million to its foreign mission.
The number of employees working for the Turkish foreign Mission was 5533 for 2011.
This number was 4574 in 2000 and 3957 in 1990. In 2011, Turkey allocated around Euro
437 million to its Foreign Mission. Germany on the other hand allocated Euro 3194 million
to its Foreign Mission in 2011. For the same year, the number of employees working for
the German Foreign Mission was 12437. For 2011, Brazil allocated Euro 986 million to its
Foreign Mission. The number of employees working for the Brazilian Foreign Mission was
4150. (Kutluay and Dincer 2012) Other major EU countries, such as the UK, France, and
Italy allocate much more resources to their Foreign Missions compared to Turkey.
As the statistics indicate, Turkey is way below the US and Germany in terms of
resources that it allocates to its Foreign Mission. Although Turkey’s human infrastructure
is better than Brazil’s, Brazil allocates more budget to its Foreign Mission than Turkey. In
this regard, in order for Turkey to be able to compete against the EU countries and the US,
it needs to further improve its operational capabilities. (Kutluay and Dincer 2012) Only
after the human infrastructure that carries out the projects is sufficient, can Turkey increase
the effectiveness and the efficiency of the Turkish foreign mission in realizing Turkey’s
regional ambitions. Turkey will achieve better results if it can pool its resources with that
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of the EU and the US in the ME. However, because of differences in their identities which
strongly impact their cost-benefit calculations, such cooperation in the area of supporting
democratization in the ME does not seem to be a viable method.
Turkey’s engagement with the ME is through many channels. As indicated in the
previous chapters, TIKA, Turkish CSOs, Turkish Government, and the other Turkish
governmental institutions provide assistance to the ME in their respective fields. However,
despite such a large amount of investment, Turkish Foreign Mission remains weak as a
result of its shortages in human infrastructure. This affects all other institutions as the
Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry is the head institution that coordinates all the aid on the
basis of Turkey’s foreign policy priorities. In this regard, Turkey’s democratic and
humanitarian projects in the ME remain haphazard, short-term, on-demand, and without a
meaningful long term strategic calculation by the Turkish officials. Even if Turkey
formulates a long term strategic plan for its investment in the ME, the inadequate human
infrastructure of Turkish Foreign Mission would not correspond to this long term plan.
On the other hand, Turkey is perceived quite positively in the ME. (Akgun and
Gundogar, The Perception of Turkey in the ME in 2013 2014) However, this positive
perception of Turkey, as the developments in Syria and Egypt have indicated, could wane
away in a short period of time, if the right decisions are not made by politicians. Under the
AKP administration, Turkey has tried to maintain its strategic relations with states in the
ME over official institutions and mechanisms. Inter-cabinet meetings that indicated
strategic alliances and free trade zone agreements were good practices of this
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institutionalization. Again the lack of experts that would be responsible for maintaining
these relations on a regular basis has not been adequate as indicated above.
Interestingly, lack of a well-structured plan and institution to support
democratization in the ME has still had some positive implications. (Kirisci 2012) Turkey’s
democracy is still in the making. What Turkey does most of the time in the ME is to share
its experience. Parallel to Turkey’s democratization and economic development, its
relations with the ME in areas of trade, tourism, media, entertainment, education, and
bureaucracy have also substantially improved. The region witnessed the pains of
democratic and economic growth in Turkey, and the global media, such as Al-Jazeera and
CNN, played a role in informing people about this change. In fact, without the impact of
the global media, as an intervening variable in this process, the transformations in Turkey
would not produce the results witnessed at the present. Next, the democratic transformation
in Turkey motivated groups in the ME to achieve the same outcomes. (Ulgen 2011) This is
Turkey’s demonstrative effect. Turkey has achieved success through its demonstrative
impact by becoming a source of inspiration for people in the region, which brought about
the Arab spring. (Kirisci 2012)
Positive public opinion about Turkey in the ME has placed Turkey in a more
advantageous position over the Western states. According to 2013 SETA public opinion
poll in the BMENA region, despite Turkey’s over-engagement with some countries in the
region which caused a severe decline in positive perception towards it, such as in Syria and
Egypt, over 50% of people still perceive Turkey positively, and want Turkey to play a
greater role in the ME. In this regard, the ME has the good will that Turkey needs to
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materialize on. (Akgun and Gundogar, The Perception of Turkey in the ME in 2013 2014)
However, Turkey does not have the necessary human infrastructure and experience to
materialize on this good will. (Dincer and Kutluay 2012)
Furthermore, Turkey needs to be careful not to harm this positive perception in the
region. Currently, there is a gap between Turkey’s aspirations and capabilities. Therefore,
Turkey needs to follow a low profile in the region in line with its organizational
capabilities. Once its organizational capabilities reach a meaningful level, then Turkey
should try to realize more ambitious goals, such as the order giving role. At the moment,
the only way to shape the political order in the ME for Turkey is to work as closely as
possible with the international society, particularly the EU, the US, and the regional
powers.
One important question concerns, how Turkey differs from the US in terms of its
activism in the ME. Moreover, what are some futures of the Turkish democracy promotion
that are absent in the West? In the following section, I will try to answer these questions.
The Specificities of the Turkish Democracy Promotion
There are a couple of points that need to be distinguished about Turkey’s
democracy promotion. Firstly, Turkey still does not have an official democracy promoter
institute. Although TIKA is progressively transforming into such an institution, it is not
there yet. (Kirisci 2012) Secondly, Turkish officials do not call what they do in the ME as
democracy promotion. The reason is that democracy promotion has a negative connotation
in Turkey. The rhetoric of democracy promotion is seen as a tool to exploit the natural
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resources in the ME. Therefore, Turkish officials name what they do as supporting welfare,
human rights, and stability in the ME.
Moreover, the dominant view among the Western scholars is that states promote
democracy in the target countries when their short-term strategic interests are not
threatened or when democratization of the target states serve promoters long term strategic
interests.108 (Smith 2010) The Turkish case is the case of a medium power which has no
control over crucial political developments in its immediate neighbors. Simultaneously,
Turkey partly promotes democracy to preserve its short-term security/survival as well as
long term economic and security/alliances interests.
To specify this point, Turkey’s engagement with Iraq under the American
occupation and currently with Syria hit by the Arab Spring is a result of its concerns for its
territorial integrity and national unity. Turkey, as a medium power, does not have the ability
to oppose the US, which aimed to install democracy in Iraq after its occupation. In order
for Iraq, which is heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity and sect, to maintain its territorial
integrity, Iraq needed to have a working state after the occupation. Thus, democracy
promotion has become a useful tool for Turkey to ensure its survival by building a working
Iraqi state. Otherwise, the divisions on the basis of ethnic or sectarian lines in Iraq could
threaten Turkey’s territorial integrity.
Turkish democracy promotion serves its long term strategic interests for three
reasons: Firstly, Turkey believes that only democracy could create a long term stable
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environment, conducive to investment and sustainable peace in the ME; secondly, Turkey
wants the states in the ME to organize themselves in the same manner so that economic
and political interactions between Turkey and these states become easier; and thirdly,
democratization in the Middle Eastern states helps bring the friendly, like-minded
governments to power. Turkey does promote democracy for humanitarian reasons.
However, this happens only when its strategic interests are not at stake. Therefore,
regardless of their power capabilities, primary concern of states is their survival, and the
humanitarian concerns have a secondary importance for them. (Waltz 1979)
Furthermore, Turkey has the leverage of being a Muslim nation in the ME. Unlike
the West, Turkey does not feel threatened by the empowerment of the Islamic groups in
the ME. However, this is not the case for the US and the EU. For example, when in 2005
and 2006, Islamic groups gained more power in the ME, both the US and the EU withdrew
their support for democratization of the region. The reason was that they thought the
election of these Islamic groups, strong critics of the Western policies towards the ME, was
antithetical to the Western interests. (Youngs and Wittes 2009) On the other hand, Turkey
did not think the way the West thought. Furthermore, Turkey called the backtracking of
the West as double standards against the elected devoted Muslims. Suddenly, Turkey found
itself at the loggerheads with the West as it continued to support democratically elected
Islamic forces in the ME. Therefore, values of statesmen can strongly influence their
policies towards the target states.
Moreover, the AKP’s role conception towards the ME strongly influences its
subsequent policies. The AKP perceives Turkey as the heir of the Ottomans. It also
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conceives Turkey as a regional power in the ME. As a result, the AKP necessarily attributes
the leadership and the role of being the organizer in the region to Turkey. Therefore, in the
AKP psyche, democratization of the ME would help people to emancipate themselves from
the dictators who are the remnants of the Western imperial past. Democracy would also
help bring the like-minded governments to power in the ME. Then, long missed regional
integration in the ME could be realized.
The motivation for bringing like-minded governments to power seems to be the
common point regardless of global power statuses of the states when promoting
democracy. It is generally agreed that the US has many flaws and inconsistencies in its
democracy promotion. Moreover, it has also been stated that the US support of democracy
has been to serve the purpose of bringing American-friendly groups to power in target
states. Similarly, Turkey has helped substantially the elected Islamic parties in Arab Spring
countries as a matter of strategic alliance building. Often though, it is the harmony between
states’ aspirations and power capabilities that mostly determines the chances that such
policies will have to succeed.
Hitherto, I have explained the limits of Turkey’s role and the differences between
Turkey’s and the West’s democracy promotion policies. In the following section, I would
like to explain the type of democracy Turkey promotes in the ME.
The Type of Democracy Turkey Promotes in the ME
As I argued in the previous chapters, Turkey promotes democracy in a number of
ways, including regionalization, military intervention, experience sharing, political party
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training, and demonstrative effect. Therefore, the nature of Turkey’s democracy promotion
should be examined from a number of dimensions.
To begin with, one way Turkey promotes democracy in the ME is by sharing its
experience. Turkey transfers its democratic procedures, norms, institutions, and
mechanism in the process of experience sharing to the states in the ME. Ikenberry argues
that “a common identity among states facilitates the establishment of a stable and durable
order. Values and a sense of community matter as a source of order—not just power and
interests… States with similar political values and social purposes will be more likely to
understand each other, which facilitates cooperation. If the common values are liberal and
democratic, substantive norms exist that specify expectations about how conflicts are to be
resolved.” (Ikenberry 2000)
In this regard, the more neighbors around Turkey organize themselves in a fashion
similar to Turkey, the easier it becomes to interact with its neighbors for Turkey. Turkey
generally shares experience and transfers know-how in areas, such as finance, security,
banking, border regimes, social services, and building physical and human infrastructures
essential to the functioning of a state. Because Turkey’s democracy is far from perfect, it
transfers its experience in democratic functioning of the states to the ME with all its flaws
and weaknesses.
In other words, Turkey promotes democracy in the ME through political party
training. The AKP has been providing Islamic parties in the ME with training. Political
party training entails how to run an affective election campaign, to set the party structure,
to frame discussions, to set agendas, to connect with people, to outreach the youths and
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women, and how to act in post-conflict settings. The AKP basically teaches the Islamic
parties how to achieve success in their respective countries.
The AKP has an Anglo-Saxon understanding of secularism that promotes the
freedom of religious practices, a highly liberal political conception of women that stresses
the participation of women in all sectors of life, a populist understanding of democracy that
places the main emphasis on elections despite the pluralist rhetoric, and a conservative
understanding of social issues, such as the alcohol consumption, mixed male-female
student houses, and abortion. In this regard, these are the values that the AKP transfers to
the participant political parties via training.
Nevertheless, it does not mean that the participants automatically accept the
promoted values. For example, the Egyptian Justice and Freedom Party opposed the idea
of secular state promoted by Erdogan right away. Unlike the Egyptian Islamists, Tunisian
Justice and Development Party embraced the idea of secular rule more readily.
Turkey’s demonstrative impact has been one of the most influential ways to
promote democracy in the ME. The reason is two folds. Firstly, Turkey diffuses its values
to the surrounding countries via socialization through trade, tourism, cultural and
educational exchanges. Secondly, global media has also effectively presented Turkey as a
model to the ME. This was in line with the role ascribed to Turkey by BMENA initiative.
In this regard, democratic and economic growth of Turkey was being presented to the ME
via media networks, such as Al-Jazeera and CNN on regular basis. Without the
endorsement of these media networks, even if Turkey achieved an impressive success, its
impact in the ME would not be as powerful. Since Turkey had similar economic and
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political problems with the Middle Eastern states, the positive developments in Turkey
under the AKP rule, presented by powerful global media networks, created a substantial
amount of interest towards Turkey. This paved the way for emulation of the Turkish values
in a greater extend in the ME.
In conclusion, this chapter indicates that the ME is still highly receptive to the role
that Turkey wants to play in the ME. However, Turkey has some shortages that make its
democratic activism and any other policy towards the region less effective. Turkey does
not have the adequate human infrastructure to realize its goals in the ME. Furthermore,
Turkey’s democracy promotion differs from that of the US firstly because of its strategic
choices articulated within its respective cultural environment, its power capabilities as a
medium power, its claim of regional power role in the ME, and its lack of an institution
designed so as to promote democracy. The type of democracy Turkey promotes is similar
to that of the West when the Turkish state shares its experience with the other states to
develop human infrastructure and legal framework. Furthermore, the AKP plays a
constructive role by mentoring the Islamic parties about how to adopt and achieve success
in the authoritarian settings of their states and how to act in post-conflict political
environment of their societies (such as the 2013 military coup d’état in Egypt).
When the ME is examined, it is seen that the Arab world, despite what has
happened, has a favorable opinion of Turkey and still thinks that Turkey could and should
play a greater role in the ME. Only in Egypt and Syria, where Turkey has overly being
involved, there is low support for the Turkish activism in the region (Egypt around 25%
and Syria around 30%). Also, the Turkish promotion of democracy is considered sincere
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as opposed to the Western promotion, which is being dismissed as hypocrisy. In this regard,
Turkey has credibility, and people still think the Turkish stance matters. In this context,
Turkey could actually play an important role in institutionalization of the democratic
principles in the ME more than any other state.

CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION
When the AKP was founded, Turkey was going through substantial social, political
and economic processes. Among other things Turkey was devastated by the 1999 Istanbul
earthquake, 2001 political crisis, economic devastations, and terrorism problem. Within
this environment, the divide between the Islamists and the seculars as well as between
Kurds and Turks sharply exacerbated. The Islamist Salvation Party government was
removed from power by the pressure from the Turkish military in 1997. In this
psychological context, some Turkish Islamists took a decision to establish the AKP.
The AKP would be different from the Islamist party (National Salvation Party) in
a number of ways. The AKP adopted a pro-Western, pro-democracy, and pro-open market
economic system attitude. In this regard, the AKP was founded as a globalization friendly
political party. Furthermore, the AKP accepted the main pillars of the Turkish system, such
as democracy and secularism. However, later the AKP would revise the Turkish secularism
which had previously taken the American Anglo-Saxon understanding as a role model. The
AKP would start prioritizing the urgent needs of people on its party list. This way, the AKP
managed to stay away from ideological confrontations for a long period of time until 2008.
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On the other hand, the AKP would try to retain the Western support to secure its existence
within the unfriendly domestic political conditions of Turkey. In fact, without the Western
support, the AKP would not be able to subordinate the Kemalist status quo in Turkey; and
without the subordination of the Kemalists, the AKP would not be able to play the
independent domestic and international roles it has been playing since 2008.
The AKP’s leading members consisted of devoted Muslims who wanted to develop
strong relations among the Muslim nations in all areas, such as politics, culture, and trade.
Turkey’s identity as the heir of the Ottoman Empire had a prominent place in the psyche
of the Turkish Islamists, which the AKP was a part of. The reason was that Ottomans
represented the unification of a large segment of Muslims under the same political entity,
providing them with security and stability for about 400 years. Therefore, in addition to
leadership aspirations, the AKP also felt responsible for the nations the Ottomans governed
once. The AKP was affected by some sort of anti-Westernism as well: the AKP found the
Western imperial past to be the root cause of many significant problems in the Muslim
world at the present.
On the other hand, the AKP was well-aware that, its primary responsibility was to
provide security for its people. The AKP also had to further Turkey’s wealth by finding
new markets for the rapidly growing Turkish industry. The efforts of the AKP in both areas
proved fruitful in a short period of time. The growing wealth in Turkey contributed to the
resources of the Turkish state. Therefore, the AKP started to engage in the countries that
Turkey has had substantial interests, particularly the ME, more assertively. The successful
utilization of shared identity by the Islamic AKP government facilitated Turkey’s
engagement with the ME.
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The AKP engaged with the ME for many strategic and identity-based reasons. To
begin with, Turkey’s survival was being threatened by American intervention in Iraq.
Turkey also had interests in the region regarding economy and security. Secondly, it would
be easier to develop mutually beneficial trade ties with the people in the ME because of the
shared identity. However, for this to happen, the region needed an atmosphere of
cooperation, peace and stability. An EU-like regional integration in the ME would provide
the region with the long-missed stability. However, the realization of this goal was difficult
when the dictators were still in power in the ME. Democracy would provide the people of
the region with the chance to reflect their national will in decision making mechanisms of
their countries. As the people of the region have a strong concept of being the members of
the same Ummah (religious community), they would be willing to integrate with the other
Muslims in the region. Therefore, democracy promotion would become a tool for Turkey
to engage with the ME to realize these goals.
When the US intervened in Iraq, Turkey’s national security was severely being
threatened. The US intervention in Iraq initiated a process of regime change. Turkey as a
regional power under the AKP leadership did not have enough power to prevent the US
intervention in Iraq. Therefore, the AKP tried to influence the Iraqi government taking into
consideration the new legal and political conditions which were in the making. The
integrity and unity of Iraq became the primary security interest of Turkey. The partition of
Iraq on the basis of ethnic and sectarian lines could have a spill-over effect on Turkey. In
this regard, the AKP tried to push different ethnic and sectarian groups to participate in the
democratic processes of Iraq by the utilization of diplomacy and rarely hard power. The
goal was to increase the legitimacy of the new Iraqi authority by the participation of all
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elements of the Iraqi society in the reestablishment of their country. Similarly, the AKP
transferred Turkey’s democratic experience to Iraq to help create a functioning state and
democracy there. Otherwise, Iraq would end in partition, which would be detrimental for
Turkey’s territorial integrity.
The US’ BMENA initiative, launched in 2004, created a significant incentive for
the AKP to realize its goals. The AKP was able to retain the leadership position in the
initiative since it was assigned as a co-chair of BMENA along with the US. The BMENA
aimed to democratize the ME and North African Arabic speaking countries in addition to
Iran and Turkey. Turkey as the most democratic Muslim state would be a positive role
model for these nations. Therefore, the constructive Turkish role in the ME was supported
by the US. Turkey was also backed to minimize the influence of Iran in the region. The
BMENA anticipated regionalization in the ME, similar to that of the EU. The AKP strongly
supported this; the BMENA would also provide the AKP with the opportunity to improve
its relations with the Muslim nations.
However, the AKP would raise several objections to the American way of
promoting democracy. The AKP stressed a long-term, consistent, internally driven, and
multilateral process of democratic transformation in the ME. This opposed the US’ liberal
interventionist, instant, and externally pressed approach of democratization. Nevertheless,
both the US and Turkey accepted the necessity of democratization in the region, which was
beneficial for all parties involved. The EU had a stance similar to that of Turkey regarding
the democratization of the ME. However, the EU would act similarly to the US when the
Islamic groups gained power in the ME in 2005 and 2006 elections.
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On the other hand, the engagement with Iraq proved quite useful for Turkey. The
trade between Turkey and Iraq substantially developed in favor of Turkey. The Turkish
private sector flew into Iraq to sell their products. The Iraqi economy was being
progressively dominated by the Turkish goods. Then, the business groups demanded
Turkey to develop similar ties with the other neighbors as well. The increased separatist
Kurdish threat, triggered by the formation of Kurdish Regional Government in North Iraq,
also compelled Turkey to work hard to coordinate their efforts on the Kurdish problem
with the states that contained substantial Kurdish populations, such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
As Turkey started to cooperate with these countries on the basis of security, it also
developed strong trade ties. Trade became the most substantial way to diffuse the
democratic experiences of Turkey to the surrounding countries. To provide an example,
Turkey transferred its economic regulations to create a harmony between the Turkish and
Syrian markets and border control rules. The experience was later extended to Lebanon
and Jordon as well. Turkey was progressively being seen as a role model by the countries
in BMENA. Both the AKP experiment and the Turkish economy received substantial
attention. Islamic parties from all over the Muslim world wanted training from the AKP,
such as from Tunisia, Palestine, North Iraq, and Egypt. Correspondingly, many countries
asked Turkey for technical training and experience sharing in the areas, such as banking,
finance, FDI regulations, and trade tariffs. The AKP also shared its experience on how it
dealt with the Kurdish problem. It shared its Kurdish Opening reform packages with Syria.
This way, Turkey’s values were being progressively diffused to the surrounding countries.
Increased trade between countries paved the way for increasing tourism and cultural
exchange.
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However, the AKP started to worry about keeping and maintaining these newly
acquired strategic gains in the ME. The stability of the region was the most important
condition for the continuity of this mutually beneficial process between the countries in the
region. When the Arab Spring arrived, although it could have a destabilizing impact over
the region, the AKP welcomed it. The reason was threefold: the feelings about Turkey’s
historical and religious responsibilities towards people in the region, the pressure from the
Turkish society, and the desire to maintain long term stability in the region. Long term
stability was a requirement for Turkey’s survival, alliances, and economic interests.
However, the demand of people for freedom and justice should not have been overlooked.
Therefore, Turkey started to support the movements in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Turkey did not have the type of strategic
interests in these countries that Turkey had in its neighbors: the developments in
neighboring countries could risk the very survival of the Turkish state. On the other hand,
Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt were seen as important markets and strategic allies in the ME.
These countries successfully replaced dictators with democratically elected leaders in 2011
and 2012. The AKP developed strong relations with the Islamic actors in the BMENA
before the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring opened the way for these Islamic actors to come
to the leadership positions in their respective countries. Therefore, the previously
established friendship ties between the Islamic actors in BMENA, including Turkey, turned
into a strategic alliance, empowering all groups within this network. However, lack of the
Western support to the Islamists in Egypt and the mistakes of the Egyptian Islamist
government would fail this new geopolitical alliance formation. Erdogan’s strong pro-
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Morsi attitude after his removal from power would damage the relations between Turkey
and Egypt under the new Egyptian administration.
When the wave arrived to Syria, the AKP took a stance supportive of the forces
demanding political change for a number of reasons. Firstly, the previous reaction of the
AKP to the protests in Egypt, Tunisia, and Lebanon compelled it to act in the same
normative lines. If it did not do so, it would be accused of hypocrisy, damaging its
credibility and its role as a positive model in the region. Secondly, the AKP thought that
similar to the previous cases, Syria would transit to democracy in no time, and Turkey
would reap the rewards when the new friendly groups were elected. Thirdly, Turkey
thought that the only way to maintain the long term stability in Syria, a country where
Turkey has substantial security and economic interests, was to support the opposition.
Fourthly, the AKP thought that people demanded and deserved to live in a democratic
setting where they are being taken seriously for the decision they make about the future of
their children.
However, the conflict in Syria continued way longer than the AKP expected.
Turkey’s national security started to be threatened again, similar to the situation after the
American intervention in Iraq. Kurds in Syria demanded independence, in alliance with the
PKK in Turkey. Radical Islamists also started to settle in Syria and Iraq under the name of
ISIS. Terrorists from Syria launched some attacks within the Turkish territory, leaving
many deaths and injured behind and creating a substantial amount of public pressure in
Turkey. The AKP burned all the bridges with Syrian regime—once its closest ally in the
region and provided full support to the opposition. This was a wrong step as the AKP did
not really know much about the ethnic and religious combination, the ideological
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background, and the goals of the opposition it supported in Syria. As a result, the AKP had
to confront the crude reality. A Kurdish and radical Islamic formations have been in the
making in Syria, and Turkey’s closest Western allies do not want Assad to leave as a result
of their doubts about a possible radical religious empowerment in Syria.
Syrian conflict has been very costly for Turkey. The developments compelled the
AKP to be accountable for its actions and ideology. Many Muslims escaped from the
conflicts in Syria. They sought refuge in Turkey. The AKP opened camps for them,
providing them with education, vocational training, food, and shelter. When the AKP
realized that camps were not enough for the refugees, it decided to let the refugees settle in
the Turkish cities. Then the refugees started to work unofficially for the Turkish companies.
Soon Turkey started to think more strategically regarding the refugees. It started to
teach them the Turkish language. Turkey started to treat the Syrian refugees as the future
allies of Turkey after the resolution of the conflict in Syria. They would bring the Turkish
influence to their countries. This also meant that Syria would become a significant market
for the Turkish industry. The Syrian refugees would prefer to buy Turkish products instead
of the goods of the other countries, as a result of habits they acquired in Turkey. Since
2012, Turkey has spent around USD 2.5 billion on the Syrian refugees. Considering that
the USD 1.5 billion American aid, given to the Egyptian government annually, the extent
of Turkey’s, as a regional power, investment in Syrian refugees could better be understood.
On the other hand, the business sector in Turkey was in need of urgent workforce
before the Arab Spring. The workforce in Turkey was shrinking as a result of the rapid
growth of industry. Further, the available workforce was not willing to work with the salary
or price the private sector offered to them. As a result, Turkish companies started to recruit
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the Syrian refugees unofficially. This brought relaxation to the markets in highly
industrialized Turkish cities, such as Gaziantep, Istanbul, and Izmir. This meant that the
Turkish government turned a blind eye to the unofficial involvement of the Syrian refugees
in work life in Turkey. In other words, the Syrian refugees have substantially contributed
to rapidly growing Turkish industry by providing the cheap workforce it needed. Turkish
economy grew by 4% in 2013, (Milliyet Gazetesi 2014), 1% more than the estimated
results.
The TDA (Total Development Assistance) statistics of Turkey indicate that before
the AKP administration, between 1990 and 2002, Central and South Asia had the
prominent place in Turkish Foreign Policy. The largest share of the Turkish ODA (Official
Development Assistance) was delivered to this region. However, the AKP administration
reallocated the amount of ODA to the recipient countries, allocating the greatest share to
the BMENA region. The statistics indicate that in the course of Arab Spring the Turkish
ODA to the transitioning Arab states, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Libya increased
substantially. For example, USD 1 billion was provided to the Egyptian Islamist Justice
and Freedom Party. Similar increases happened in Syria, Libya, and Tunisia as well. This
provided a strong evidence for the AKP’s intentional support for the Islamic forces in the
ME because of Turkey’s concerns for strategic alliances.
Turkey’s own democratization process during the AKP administration gives
important ideas about its motivation for promoting democracy in the ME. The AKP started
to promote a liberal democracy at home. Meanwhile, the AKP changed the checks and
balances in the Turkish political system in favor of the elected civilians through the
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assistance provided by the EU and the US. However, this marked the beginning of the
AKP’s conservative policies.
On the other hand, the Arab Spring created an insecure political atmosphere for the
AKP at home and in the region. The AKP started to perceive the developments that
challenged its authority in Turkey, such as the Gezi Park protests, through conspiracy
lenses. For the AKP, some global socio-economic forces were aiming to overthrow the
government through such developments. From that point on, the AKP started to act more
authoritarian, deviating from standards, provided by the Copenhagen Criteria of the EU
membership. Parallel to this, the Turkish democracy promotion gained a more strategic
dimension. Supporting democracy in countries such as Syria and Iraq has turned into
efforts to ensure the very survival of Turkey. Similarly supporting democratization in
Egypt and Tunisia has progressively meant supporting strategic alliances with the Islamic
groups.
On the other hand, considering the extent of the Turkish investment in political
change in the Arab Spring countries, the question becomes: “what are the limits of Turkey’s
impact?” Turkey possessed all power instruments to play the regional power role in the
region. Turkey does a substantial amount of work in the field, such as mentoring and
financing allies. Furthermore, there is a highly positive perception about Turkey in the ME.
People in the ME believe in Turkey’s sincerity towards the region, and they want Turkey
to play a greater role in the region. However, Turkey lacks the human infrastructure in its
foreign mission to turn its investments into strategic gains in a highly receptive region. In
this regard, Turkey needs to improve its human infrastructure to play a more assertive role
in the ME.
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Moreover, as Turkey articulates its policies within its own respective culture, its
strategic choices might differ from the choices of the well-established Western
democracies. For example, the West is bothered by the election of the Islamic groups to
power, due to their highly critical stance towards the role the West and Israel have played
in the region. Turkey, on the other hand, finds the election of Islamic groups to power as a
natural outcome of people’s choice in the ME. Furthermore, due to similarities between the
ideals of the AKP and Muslim Brotherhood in the region, the election of moderate Islamic
groups empowers Turkey’s role in the region. As a result, Turkey and the West have
diverging interests when it comes to the empowerment of the Islamic groups.
The type of democracy Turkey, as a state, promotes in the region is very similar to
that of the West in many aspects. For example, Turkey trains the Middle Eastern officials
on how to run a successful state by teaching them the Turkish system, which is strongly
influenced by Turkey’s membership to the Western institutions and Turkey’s historical ties
with the West. Clearly, Turkey processes the values and experiences that it has gained in
its interaction with the West to people in the ME.
The AKP, as a political party rooted in political Islam, mentors the Islamic groups
substantially by teaching them how to function in the authoritarian settings of their states,
on the basis of its own experience in Turkey. In this regard, the AKP trains them on how
to organize their parties, how to do political campaigning, how to survive in post-conflict
political environment, such as after the military coup d’état in Egypt, and how to do
grassroots outreach. In this regard, the AKP plays a highly constructive role in
democratization of the ME.
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Finally, Turkish CSOs are also involved in democracy promotion abroad. The
Gulen group, TESEV, Doctors Worldwide and MAZLUMDER are the most significant
groups that promote democratic values in the ME. The Gulen group is interested in the
provision of humanitarian aid, educational activities, business, and press. MAZLUMDER
is interested in human rights issues in the Muslim world. TESEV is an official democracy
promoter think-tank, similar to NDI. Doctors Worldwide provides assistance regarding
health to the target countries. The Turkish CSOs work independently from the government.
When their interests converge with the interests of the Turkish government, they cooperate.
However, when their interests diverge, they focus on their own agendas.
To sum up, Turkey, under the AKP rule, has been involved in a modest exercise of
democracy promotion. Despite all its flaws, Turkey has been significantly contributing to
the process of positive change in the region. However, whether Turkey will continue to
support democracy in the ME or not is partly related to the sincerity of the Western world
in supporting democratization in the ME without discriminating between groups on the
basis of their ideological orientations. Otherwise, if some groups, such as Islamists, feel
that they are being forced out of the political systems by the support of the West, they might
turn their faces towards more authoritarian models, such as those in China and Russia.
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